The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws: The War on Terror and the Classifications of the »Dangerous Other« by Eckert, Julia M.
www.ssoar.info
The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws: The War on
Terror and the Classifications of the »Dangerous
Other«
Eckert, Julia M. (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerk / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
transcript Verlag
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Eckert, J. M. (Ed.). (2008). The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws: The War on Terror and the Classifications of the
»Dangerous Other« (Sozialtheorie). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839409640
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-70012-5

Julia M. Eckert (ed.)
The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws
2008-04-29 13-29-52 --- Projekt: transcript.titeleien / Dokument: FAX ID 033d177427601268|(S.   1    ) T00_01 schmutztitel - 964.p 177427601276
 
               
 
2008-04-29 13-29-52 --- Projekt: transcript.titeleien / Dokument: FAX ID 033d177427601268|(S.   2    ) T00_02 seite 2 - 964.p 177427601284
Julia M. Eckert (ed.)
The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws
The War on Terror and the Classifications
of the »Dangerous Other«
               
2008-04-29 13-29-52 --- Projekt: transcript.titeleien / Dokument: FAX ID 033d177427601268|(S.   3    ) T00_03 titel - 964.p 177427601316
This book was printed with the financial support of the Max Planck
Institute for Social Anthropology Halle/Saale.
Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Max-Planck-Instituts für ethnologi-
sche Forschung in Halle/Saale.
I would like to thank the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropolo-
gy, especially Franz and Keebet von Benda Beckmann, Gesine Koch
and Kathrin Niehuus for the support of this publication.
 
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbiblio-
thek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deut-
sche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in
the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de
© 2008 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld
Cover layout: Kordula Röckenhaus, Bielefeld
Proofred by: Julia M. Eckert
Typeset by: Gesine Koch
Printed by: Majuskel Medienproduktion GmbH, Wetzlar
ISBN 978-3-89942-964-0
2008-12-11 13-19-06 --- Projekt: transcript.titeleien / Dokument: FAX ID 02a2196899954896|(S.   4    ) T00_04 impressum - 964.p 196899954904
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons  
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
CONTENTS
Laws for Enemies 7
JULIA ECKERT
Liberalism versus Terrorism:  
Warfare, Crime Control, and the United States  
after 11 September 33
THOMAS M. HAWLEY
Suspect Subjects:  
Muslim Migrants and the Security Agencies in Germany 55
WERNER SCHIFFAUER
Political Rationalities, Counter-terrorism and Policies on Islam 
in the United Kingdom and France 79
FRANK PETER
Documents, Security and Suspicion:  
the Social Production of Ignorance 109
TOBIAS KELLY
The Danger of ‘Undergoverned’ Spaces: 
the ‘War on Terror’ and its Effects on the Sahel Region 131
JAN BACHMANN
Islamic Activism and Anti-terrorism Legislation in Morocco 163
BERTRAM TURNER
Notes on Contributors 193

Laws for Enemies 
JULIA ECKERT
Introduct ion
The ‘war on terror’ has affected anti-terrorism laws and anti-terrorism policies 
worldwide. New legislation was passed in many countries; laws existing prior 
to 11 September 2001 have been used with a new focus on security and pre-
vention; and there were attempts to integrate and harmonize national and in-
ternational anti-terror measures in order to coordinate strategies against what 
is perceived as a global and globally coordinated threat. 
This book addresses two developments in the conceptualisation of citizen-
ship that arise from the ‘war on terror’, namely the re-culturalisation of mem-
bership in a polity and the re-moralisation of access to rights. Furthermore, 
the book asks in what ways these developments are globalized, and how they 
are adopted, adapted, instrumentalized, and circumvented in different political 
and social contexts. It traces the ways in which the trans-nationalisation of the 
‘war on terror’ has affected national (or regional) notions of security and dan-
ger and images of ‘the dangerous other’, asking what changes in the ideas of 
the state and of the nation have been promoted by the emerging culture of se-
curity, and how these changes affect practices of citizenship and societal 
group relations. 
The new security regime comprises legal frameworks, technologies, re-
gional and global alliances, but at the same time it also employs categories 
and images of danger and the dangerous other. Furthermore it usually entails 
the securitisation (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al.1998) of ever more policy fields. 
In the processes of the globalisation of this security regime, laws are harmo-
nized, technologies exported, the production of specific knowledge about 
threats and conflicts is coordinated. The question is to what extent the export 
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of policy transports not only specific legal provisions and security technolo-
gies, but also schemes of understan-ding crime and risk and security as well 
as categorisations of the dangerous other. 
The adoption of the security regime by governments and other interested 
parties always implies a localisation of these technologies, the categories and 
cartographies. Many countries around the world adopted new or re-enforced 
pre-existing legislation (e.g. Bascombe 2003) after 9/11, and were obliged to 
do so by the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373. Most of the legislation 
now enacted entailed measures that had been debated for a long time in con-
nection with other perceived threats such as ‘organized crime’, drug traffick-
ing etc. (see, e.g. Crenlinsten 1998). Some new legislation revived earlier se-
curity laws; some built upon existing legislation (for Germany see Hirsch 
2002: 7; for India see Krishnan 2004; for the U.S. see Cole 2003; for Malay-
sia see Bascombe 2003). Most see new forms of cooperation between the dif-
ferent security agencies, i.e. the police, internal and external intelligence ser-
vices and the military, the path for which was prepared in many countries 
with reference to the new challenges posed by globalisation and by transna-
tional criminal networks. In the wave of legislative activities throughout the 
post-9/11 world we can also see a reclassification of domestic conflicts into 
the anti-terrorism strategy and a tendency to relate both specific types of con-
flicts and various policy fields to the phenomenon of terrorism and to security 
concerns.
Thus, the introduction of new security measures has had repercussions in 
the legal organisation of fields not immediately related to terrorist activities. 
In fact, the identification of the fields that are considered to be directly related 
to the threat of terrorism and which, therefore, have to be addressed by the 
new security measures, is a matter of contestation.1 Because of the allegedly 
diffuse nature of the terrorist threat, policy makers and different state agencies 
adopt encompassing visions of the new necessities of preventive control: Not 
                                             
1  Terrorism was often defined in the new legislation in a rather vague manner that 
allows to cover all sorts of actions, including association or even simple contact, 
as in the now repealed Indian anti-terrorism law, the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (POTA); the expression of support for the ‘causes’ of terrorist organisations 
(as in Turkey); or material support even if unintentional, as in the U.S. PA-
TRIOT ACT. The term ‘terrorism’ is used not in a neutrally descriptive way, de-
scribing specific forms of political violence, but in a normative way, and some 
scholars have held that it can only be used in such a pejorative manner and have 
therefore abandoned the term entirely, claiming, like Cynthia Mahmood, that 
‘terrorism is a concept that mystifies rather than illuminates; it is a political and 
not an academic notion’ (Mahmood 2001: 528). But it is, of course, precisely 
the insinuation of a normative judgement, as well as the vagueness with which 
the term is used, which shapes the politics of security. The problems of defining 
terrorism are discussed by Charles Tilly (2004), among others. 
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only financial transactions, organized crime and illegal border crossing are 
under observation, but whole geographical areas were classified as potential 
‘bases’ of terrorist organisations that demand intervention (such as the Sahel 
region, and of course Taliban Afghanistan; see Bachmann in this volume). 
Moreover, policies towards minorities, towards migration and immigrants 
(whether naturalized or not – see Schiffauer this volume),2 towards religious 
(Islamic) or minority rights organisations (see Peter this volume) and, of 
course, towards data protection have been rethought in connection with cur-
rent perceptions of the threat of terrorism. 
This securitisation of various policy fields not only changed administra-
tive priorities within these fields; it has also affected administrative practice 
and practical interpretations of norms and policies, as Werner Schiffauer and 
Frank Peter show in their contributions to this volume. 
Thus, despite the precedents, it appears that the ‘war on terror’ gives these 
developments a new quality: Firstly, it globalizes them to a new degree and 
with a new urgency and force; secondly, it merges more tightly independent 
developments in policing, in development cooperation, in policies concerning 
migration and in notions of citizenship; and thirdly, it introduces the culturali-
sation of membership and moralisation of rights to a new degree and with 
new legitimacy. 
However, the war on terror was adopted and adapted differently in differ-
ent countries: Not all countries jumped onto the bandwagon of the new dis-
course of security; some, of course, were excluded from the outset, being con-
sidered an enemy; and some only joined the agenda after they had been pres-
sured by the U.S. and the EU, for example under threat of withholding aid. 
There were several governments which hesitated to join the war on terror or 
to link their domestic problems to its agenda, such as Indonesia and Morocco 
(see Bertram Turner in this volume). Both joined the war on terror only after 
they had experienced ‘their own’ terrorist disasters: Bali and Casablanca. 
What differed was, however, not only the individual country’s readiness 
to join the agenda, but also the ways in which the agenda was used and im-
plemented. For different governments it served different ends. Some, such as 
those of Russia, China, Uganda or the Philippines, used the politics of secu-
rity mainly to justify their own wars against insurgents. Others instrumental-
ized the measures to cope with political opposition, a tendency observable for 
example in Egypt, Malaysia, or Uganda. The governments of India and Paki-
stan engaged in their own race to be regarded and treated as an ally, motivated 
by their own regional conflict and the hope for financial, technological and 
political U.S. American support for their strategies within this conflict. Yet 
                                             
2  In debates of the European parliament, a close connection between terrorism and 
immigration is frequently claimed; see Bigo (2002); see also Tsoukala (2004: 3). 
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other governments, such as those of Mali or of Djibouti,3 sought out the new 
possibilities in acquiring aid inherent in the anti-terrorism strategies of the 
U.S. Others were forced to introduce anti-terrorism measures (Bascombe 
2004: 4), mainly the small islands of the Caribbean and the Pacific, which 
were compelled to change their financial or gambling laws to facilitate the 
surveillance of transnational financial transactions and money laundering op-
erations. They were pressured both by the U.S. and the EU under the threat of 
withholding financial aid.4 The introduction of anti-terror measures in line 
with the new international architecture of security became part of develop-
ment politics worldwide (Large 2005: 3; see also Bachmann in this volume).5
Thus, legal innovations, technologies and ideas about security and danger en-
tered different countries in ways related to their local tensions and concerns 
and their position within the global order, a global order now interpreted in 
terms of its security implications. As Jan Bachmann shows in his contribution 
to this volume, the geography of security is one of friends and foes, save ha-
vens and areas of withdrawal, of failed states and rogue states. 
The processes of adopting the models and ideas underlying the new secu-
rity regime were shaped by these factors: by the local tensions and conflicts 
which were now interpreted in the light of the globally unified security para-
digm, or for which the latter was now used if only as a legitimation; and by 
the position of a state in the global geography of security. The measures en-
tered political structures at different levels: They were responded to at na-
tional level, had their effects at the local level, and were made use of by dif-
ferent societal agents in conflicts of diverse nature, local, national, transna-
tional. Each appropriation spun off its own social effects, and each connected 
differently to other implementations of security measures, as Turner shows 
vividly in his chapter on Morocco in this volume. 
Despite the differences in the ways the ‘war on terror’ entered into na-
tional and local politics, and although the ways of adopting a policy is shaped 
by regional or local concerns, the ideas and procedures characteristic of the 
‘war on terror’ also seem to be exported. In their encompassing and rather un-
specific nature, they offer themselves for various purposes to different actors. 
                                             
3  Djibouti for example received $ 30 million for letting the U.S. establish a per-
manent military base. 
4  Another means of pressure is the blacklist of Non-Cooperative Countries and 
Territories of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
5  Little material is available as yet to answer the question of whether the securiti-
sation of development relates to aid objectives such as poverty alleviation bene-
ficially or detrimentally. Since large funds are designated for security enhance-
ment, such as police training, air safety, etc., priorities within aid allocation are 




The Omnipresent  Threat  
Particularly influential in the realisation of security measures all over the 
world seems to be the specific construction of danger in the contemporary 
context. The ‘new terrorism’ is said to be inspired by religious fanaticism 
(e.g. Laqueur 2000). Since 11 September 2001, this so-called ‘new terrorism’ 
is first and foremost Islamist terrorism. There are competing criminologies of 
Islamist terrorism, referring to either cultural or political causes. However, se-
curity policies and measures taken are neither related to the assumed causes of 
terrorism nor are they designed to remedy those causes. Instead, they are re-
lated to a specific perception of risk. This risk is shaped on the one hand by 
the specific structures of organisation attributed to the ‘new terrorism’, and on 
the other hand, by the dynamics attributed to religious fanaticism. This risk is 
perceived as potentially immense, yet at the same time elusive. Possible dam-
ages are considered possibly apocalyptic (cf. Morgan 2004: 30) due to the po-
tential access of terrorists to biological weapons, nuclear and other dangerous 
materials inherent in advanced technology (e.g. Laqueur 2000). At the same 
time the perpetrators are seen to be, firstly, highly dispersed and only loosely 
connected to a transnational network. Secondly, they are well-nigh ‘invisible’, 
and most so as ‘sleepers’. Thirdly, they are regarded as beyond negotiation or 
deterrence, since they are said to be inspired by religious fanaticism and an al-
leged general hatred of the West (or modernity). They are perceived as largely 
‘aimlessly’ or nihilistically destructive. ‘Today’s terrorists seek destruction 
and chaos as ends in themselves’ (Morgan 2004: 30). ‘New terrorists want 
only to express their wrath and cripple their enemy’ (Stevenson 2001-2002: 
35). These opinions echoed many analyses of the alleged specificity of reli-
gious terrorism (e.g. Laqueur 2000). The novelty of Islamist terrorism, it is 
said, lies in the fact that it is de-territorialized in two ways: It is neither based 
in any one territory, from which terrorists operate or whereto they can with-
draw, but it is potentially everywhere, hidden in loosely connected undiscov-
erable sleeper cells of amateur terrorists; nor does it aim at territory, as insur-
gent or secessionist terrorism used to (e.g. Diner 2004). Rather, it is claimed 
to be merely destructive, with a complete, indiscriminate contempt for life. 
Suicidal terrorism above all, allegedly inspired by mere hatred and alien in its 
motives, renders not only bargaining but also deterrence impossible. 
Thus, the ‘new terrorism’ is perceived and presented as external to society 
to a new extent. The question of ‘Why do they hate us so much’, which ini-
tially arose in the U.S. and was revived in a British version after the 7 July 
bombings of the London Underground with the additional shock of home 
grown Muslim terrorists, in some ways never quite sought an answer. Terror-
ism’s causes or its relation to the society it targets became secondary to an as-
sumed essential alienness and a religious fanaticism that is beyond reason, 
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beyond understanding, and allegedly disconnected from a social and political 
context.
Thus, there is also a new concept of danger. Danger, legally defined as a 
specific action that will, if not hindered, lead to the damaging of a good that is 
protected by law, is now no longer connected to the actions of individuals, but 
to a general situation of threat (Bender 2003: 138, 139; Lepsius 2004: 66, 67, 
83). This general situation of threat is emanating from an elusive network6
and its fundamental ‘occidentalism’ (Buruma/Margalit 2004), in which indi-
viduals are replaceable. ‘We do not know where, and precisely who, the en-
emy is’, felt one member of the EU parliament.7 Because of the characterisa-
tion of the ‘new terrorism’ as an omnipresent but elusive threat, arising from a 
de-individualized (Lepsius 2004: 66) general and diffuse Islamist terror, secu-
rity measures are said to be necessary which presume that the enemy could be 
everywhere and everyone – nearly. Makdisi speaks of a ‘spectral terrorism’ 
that offers the ‘foundation for a universal campaign of investigation, interro-
gation, confiscation, detention, surveillance, torture and punishment on, for 
the first time, a genuinely global scale […] not only where it [terrorism] does 
manifest itself but where it might manifest itself, which could, of course, be 
anywhere’ (Makdisi 2002: 267). 
No matter how realistic or unrealistic a description of the ‘new terrorism’ 
is,8 the claims to the diffuseness of the threat, the new invisible nature of the 
                                             
6  On the network thesis see also Mayntz (2004). 
7  Mogens Camre, Danish member of the UEN (Union for a Europe of the Nati-
ons), European parliamentary debate 6 February 2002 quoted in Tsoukala (2004: 
6).
8  There is, of course, the question to what degree the ‘new terrorism’ is actually 
so new and whether it is really so diffuse, de-territorialized and ‘aimless’ as is 
being claimed. See also David Tucker (2001) on the similarities between old and 
new terrorism; as well as Peter Waldmann’s (2004) critique of the theses of al-
leged novelty of the network structures. It is easy to demonstrate that there have 
been, and still are, clear and identifiable aims, even rather territorial in nature, of 
transnational Islamist terrorism (see also Steinberg 2005), such as the removal 
of the U.S. army from Saudi Arabia and now also from Iraq, or the destruction 
of Israel. Moreover, many of those Islamic insurgencies which are now conside-
red to be connected to the transnational networks of Al Qaeda, and which 
constitute this network, have, of course, very ‘conventional’ aims, such as the 
independence of Chechnya, the withdrawal of the Indian army from Kashmir, 
the independence of Aceh or of Mindanao. The security discourse related all 
sorts of Muslim led insurgencies to ‘global terrorism’ and thereby justified stra-
tegies for regions of unrest accordingly. Of course, new relations might in fact 
have been established between different local or regional armed groups and 
others, or with Al Qaeda. Most importantly, the characterisations of the ‘new 
terrorism’ mostly fail to see or, because of the apparent enormity of the attack of 
9/11, refuse to take into account any political context within which the ‘new ter-
rorism’ arose. There have been references to the chosen traumata of the Muslim 
world and the grievances of Arab populations. But the idea that the ‘new terro-
12
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perpetrators, the unparalleled potential for destruction and the allegedly novel 
form of organisation in transnationally loosely connected cells, all have been 
the main grounds for the justification of the specific measures taken against 
‘the new terrorism’. ‘Terrorism has been used in a calculatedly undefined and 
indefinite, rather than specific, way. It names not a specific Other, but a gen-
eral and omnipresent threat’ (Makdisi 2002: 266). 
Prevent ion
The idea of the omnipresent, elusive threat has shaped a new type of security 
measures in that they now raise ‘suspicion’ to a new importance as grounds 
for action. Previous legal distinctions between suspicion (entitling the police 
to investigate) and prognoses or probable cause, that is: The well-founded ex-
pectation of an event to occur entitling the police to use preventive measures, 
have been abandoned in many places. ‘Prevention’, this seemingly innocent 
word, relates to the idea of controlling potentials, of surveying future possi-
bilities, of controlling not what people did or do or are planning to do, but 
what they might at some point do. Prevention furthermore changes security 
from a matter of politics into one of technology, involving specialists’ knowl-
edge of risks and their pre-emption (see also Bigo 2002: 74; on experts see 
also Peter this volume). 
Most countries, therefore, detect new forms of cooperation between the 
different security agencies, i.e. the police, internal and external intelligence 
services and the military, the stage for which was set in many countries with 
reference to the new challenges posed by globalisation and by transnational 
criminal networks. There is, accordingly, a certain diffusion of the distinction 
between internal and external security (Bigo 2001), practically expressed in 
the new tasks of collaboration between the above mentioned services or legis-
lated in new competencies for some sections of the army, border security, 
etc.9
Some shifts in the division of power are encoded in law, as for example 
the extended periods of legal detention in many countries before an arrested 
person must appear before a magistrate. This has always been one of the most 
                                                                                                                              
rism’ might not constitute a rejection of modernity as such but a rejection of 
being shut out from it (Mamdani 2004: 19) or losing out within it or not being 
able to define it oneself has been obliviated by the construction of an essential 
alienness rooted in ‘culture’ and fundamentalist religion. 
9  Didier Bigo interprets the developments within the security agencies as a move 
on their part to develop a new field of activity and give themselves a new lease 
of life after the end of the Cold War made them well-nigh redundant (Bigo 
2002: 64). Richard Rorty warns of the advent of the security agencies as ‘de fac-
to rulers’ (Rorty 2004: 11). 
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common measures of anti-terrorism legislation (Crenlinsten 1998: 405) and is 
being employed again, for example, not only in the PATRIOT ACT of the 
USA, which allows indefinite detention of non-deportable non-U.S. citizens, 
but also in the British Anti-terrorism law; the now repealed Indian anti-
terrorist law POTA; in Singapore; in South Africa’s anti-terrorism bill; or in 
the Philippines, where the immigration law is used for indefinite detention. 
Encoded in law are also the new surveillance measures, stop and search li-
censes or similar methods without judicial warrant as in the USA, in Belarus, 
in Germany and France (see Amnesty International). 
Many laws, particularly those concerning changes in arrest laws and de-
tention laws and the expansion of police powers, explicitly sideline the judici-
ary or reduce its role. Thus, Rorty’s warning that ‘the courts would be 
brushed aside, and the judiciary would lose its independence’ (Rorty 2004: 
10) might already be beginning to take shape, and possibly with the conniv-
ance of the judiciary. 
Not in all cases, however, is the shift towards further competencies for the 
executive and for security agencies encoded in law. Often it is produced by 
the practices of state agencies, such as the greater reliance of the judiciary on 
intelligence reports (taking them as proof that makes further evidence unnec-
essary), and generally the enhanced status of intelligence information for po-
litical decision-making. Werner Schiffauer in his contribution to this volume 
explores the processes whereby a consensus is forged within a state apparatus 
and beyond on the necessity of changes in the structure of the state implied in 
the new measures. This also relates to the apparently increased legitimacy of 
secrecy of governmental activities within democratic regimes. Secrecy is 
couched not only in terms of security needs but also in terms of expert knowl-
edge. It relates to an increased authority of specialized agencies to ‘know 
best’. This curtails the powers of legislatures. Added to this is often a new 
level of ‘loyalty’ of the fourth estate, the media, in relation to governmental 
policies towards Muslims and Islam. Thus, this innocent word ‘prevention’, 
so much less brutal than ‘repression’, so much less vindictive than ‘punish-
ment’ entails possibilities for the expansion of state powers that potentially 
undermine not only civil liberties but also procedures of political deliberation. 
Not everywhere unanimity reigns about the necessity of a shifting balance 
of power, as Thomas Hawley indicates for the USA in his contribution to this 
volume. The conditions for and precise processes of generating a consensus 
and overcoming competing interests or oppositional positions within the state 
apparatus are thus in themselves a matter for analysis. And, as Frank Peter 
shows in his contribution to this volume, anti-terrorism measures can take an 
altogether different form, attempting to administer an Islam suitable, that is: 
incorporable into the nation state. 
14
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Ident i ty 
Consequently, the conceptualisation of citizenship has undergone implicit but 
fundamental changes. Firstly, there is a shift of rights and duties in favour of 
the state related to the new role of suspicion: Suspicion as grounds for gov-
ernmental action undermines the presumption of innocence. ‘Because “the 
risk” exists always and everywhere, it becomes normality; to be harmless is 
then the exception that has to be proven by the citizen for his or her own per-
son’ (Denninger 2001: 472, my translation). 
Although this was posed as a general description of anti-terrorism meas-
ures by those who fear for the future of civil rights, not all people are equally 
likely to be suspect and come under observation. The first task of prevention 
is, of course, to separate the potential threat from the protected. 
The ‘war on terror’ operates with categories that are for the most part as-
criptive categories; the classification of people as potentially dangerous re-
lates only secondarily to their actual activities. Rather, because of the alleged 
elusiveness of ‘the enemy’, suspect subjects are classified according to their 
religious or national background, their ethnicity, their associations or other so 
called ‘characteristics’. These form the basis of the current data gathering and 
surveillance activities. Surveillance, registration, the gathering of personal 
data, tracking emails and internet usage, monitoring financial transactions 
and, above all, stop-and-search and ‘sneak-and-peak’ searches are, in the end, 
not undertaken indiscriminately but according to criteria like race, religion 
and national background. All involve categories and classifications that are 
not related to the actual activities of those targeted but to their legal status, 
their history (migration), their nationality or their religious affiliation. Above 
all it is the construction of ‘supporting milieus’, those social groups that ter-
rorists might hail from, hide in or that are believed to ‘breed’ terrorist mind-
sets, that extends the preventive measures and their categories to include in-
numerable people who have no other connection to the perceived threat than 
their religious identity or regional background (see Schiffauer and Turner in 
this volume). ‘Seeing like a state’ (Scott 1998) in the war on terror involves 
categories that are at the same time selective and distinctive, but also broad 
and vague. 
Attempts to fix identities, to create secure knowledge about individuals, 
such as are discussed by Tobias Kelly in his contribution to this volume, al-
ways produce their specific possibilities of fraud and conceal-ment – and thus 
further perceptions of insecurities for the state. Kelly shows why attempts to 
make people more legible through biometric identity documents actually 
force security personnel to resort back to the actual bodies of people, and thus 
promotes a racialized approach to security measures. ‘Precisely because iden-
tity cards do not tell the state everything they want to know, state officials are 
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forced to resort to reading bodies for marks of suspicion, feeding into racial-
ized notions of danger.’ 
Connected to the categories and classifications of security measures, a 
new focus on national homogeneity is emerging; heterogeneity is perceived as 
a ‘problem’ to be tackled and, potentially, a security risk. Of course, hetero-
geneity has often been considered and treated as a problem, not only since the 
rise of the idea of the nation-state, and particularly in Western immigration 
countries.10 However, the current idea of homogeneity, implicit as it is in the 
categories of ‘potential danger’, does not only supersede heterogeneity (or 
specific kinds of ethnic or religious forms of heterogeneity), but instead intro-
duces a dichotomy related to the spectre of the clash of civilisations. The idea 
of a clash of civilisations, and particularly its implicit or explicit applications 
in security measures, employs a concept of culture as being of a deterministic 
nature.
Some forms of heterogeneity are thus not a matter of difference or plural-
ity, but of alienness. This firstly targets Muslim minorities. While distinctions 
are made on all levels of the new security discourses (mostly by non-
Muslims) between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’, between Islam and 
Islamism, and – despite the references to the similarities – between the Abra-
hamitic religions, the implicit labelling of people (and of types of conflicts) 
under the quasi-explanatory heading of Islam constructs Muslims as the 
‘other’. This construction, rooted as it is in the history of Western imperialism 
(Mamdani 2004; Agnes 2005), also relegates Islam to the realm of the in-
nately pre-modern. Unlike others designated as pre-modern, Muslims are as-
sumed to be also largely anti-modern, thus replacing philanthropic or pater-
nalist relations designed for the purely pre-modern with those of ‘fear and 
pre-emptive police or military action’ (Mamdani 2004: 18). This spawns two 
seemingly divergent types of administrative and legal strategy. On the one 
hand we have those counter-terrorism strategies which are ‘played out in the 
incorporation, administration and regulation of Islamic institutions and prac-
tices’, as Frank Peter shows in his contribution to this volume. For him, civil 
Islam, as he calls it, is a governmental strategy, ‘a state policy aiming to re-
fashion a certain number of institutions and practices among immigrants from 
Islamic background in order to reduce the risk of socio-political conflicts and 
terrorism’. It risks, however, ‘entrenching the perception of Islam as a poten-
tial threat’. On the other hand we have policies that aim at exclusion, banish-
ment or containment, such as those discussed by Schiffauer, Kelly and Haw-
ley.
                                             
10  As Nina Glick Schiller has pointed out, in the U.S. there often existed a relati-
onship between anti-immigration laws and assimilation campaigns and measures 
against religious and political diversity, which even included de-naturalisation. 
See also Cole (2003). 
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Social discourses of ‘othering’ differ and connect to local plausibilities. 
Islamophobia (cf. EUMC 2006) and the fear of ethnic heterogeneity reign 
large in countries of immigrant Muslim communities, but also in India, a 
country with an indigenous Muslim population of about 140 million. Muslim 
majority countries differed widely in their reactions, depending not so much 
on their democratic or authoritarian set-up, but on the status of religion in 
their state ideology (Middle East Working Group 2002). As Bertram Turner 
shows in his chapter on Morocco, social patterns of othering there took on dif-
ferent forms of distinguishing between ‘others’ who could be re-integrated – 
‘lost sons’, so to say – and those who were constructed to be foreign, danger-
ous and essentially alien. Thus, the dichotimisations of the war on terror take 
root wherever and to the degree that societal fissures and tensions correlate to 
the categorisations of security. 
The impact of such dichotomies on group relations, both the relation be-
tween majority and minority populations and social relations within targeted 
groups, has yet to be explored, and even more so, since the concept of ‘the 
sleeper’ as the undiscovered and undiscoverable ‘dangerous other’ has com-
plicated the relation between assimilation and ‘otherness’. ‘The sleeper’s’ is 
an idea of invisible otherness; it questions commonly held ideas of similarity 
and belonging. While those who are clearly identifiable as (practizing) Mus-
lims in Europe have gained the nimbus of the quintessential ‘other’ and are 
therefore often considered and even treated as potentially suspect, the real 
danger is now seen in those who cannot be distinguished as being different, 
but are assumed to be essentially so. The allegedly malevolent concealment of 
their essential otherness justifies the return to criteria of ‘heritage’ in blood or 
ethnicity for distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Related to this, conceptualisations of different ‘degrees of membership’ in 
polities have gained a new saliency. The idea of a national core culture, be it 
the so-called ‘Judeo-Christian tradition’ of Europe – which, of course, offi-
cially became ‘Judeo’ only after the annihilation of six million Jews in Europe 
– or, for example, Hinduism in India, which different groups can be more or 
less close to, and which bestows on them more or less legitimate claims to 
membership, re-emerges as a notion of political organisation. Claims to mem-
bership and membership itself can own different degrees of legitimacy, and 
this legitimacy is being grounded more generally in a ius sanguinis or a re-
ligio-cultural complex, that is something of a ius culturae. Culture here again 
is perceived as a quasi-natural disposition. It is clearly demarcated according 
to one’s religious background. 
This culturalisation of membership rights enters legal categories in natu-
ralisation procedures, legal grounds for expulsion or denial of entry, observa-
tion, screening and inspection of whole categories of the population (rather 
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than of individuals). It is thus not mere rhetoric; it undermines our very prin-
ciples of universality by re-introducing systems of dual law. 
Dual  Law 
The attachment of civil rights to membership ideas that rely not on formal cri-
teria but on criteria of ‘culture’ or ‘blood’ is visible in the developments lead-
ing to unequal structures of access to law. The tendencies towards a shift of 
the burden of proof onto members of certain social categories, and very con-
cretely the policing laws that ground legitimate police action on mere suspi-
cion or even merely the ‘potential’ of a person committing a crime is possibly 
the foremost instrument of this development: If whole categories of people 
are considered potential threats, individuals belonging to these categories 
have to prove their non-dangerousness. This abandons the presumption of in-
nocence and introduces a measure of Sippenhaftung, i.e. the collective liabil-
ity of family members, co-religionists, or others categorized as having the 
‘same’ characteristics. If ascriptive membership or a legal or merely ‘bio-
graphical’ status such as that of being an ‘immigrant’ – and particularly a 
Muslim one, whether naturalized or not – is enough to provide grounds for 
suspicion, and suspicion now provides grounds for police action, this shift of 
the burden of proof is extended to people who have not engaged in any crimi-
nal activity but are suspected of having the potential to at some point do so 
simply because of their religious or national background, their legal status, 
their acquaintances or possibly their extended family relations (see also Cole 
2003: 2). The presumption of innocence is restricted to ‘us’, for ‘them’ there 
is the suspicion of guilt. 
Werner Schiffauer in his contribution to this book explores the ways in 
which unequal access to law is established in Germany. He shows how dual 
law tendencies are often not explicit in legislations. The ways in which such 
unequal access to law or dual law is de facto created lie in the practices of 
judges and administrators and their interpretations of norms. 
Not only citizenship rights but even basic civil rights and human rights, 
that should pertain to all persons on the territory of a state, whether citizen or 
not, whether legally or illegally present, attain a new character as they become 
attached to conditions either of membership or of ‘worth’. Adding to a cul-
turalisation of membership is a moralisation of rights.
As becomes apparent in Thomas Hawley’s discussion of the ‘citizen ter-
rorist’, the two processes are related. 9/11 brought onto the stage terrorists as 
foreigners. Hitherto, most terrorists had been nationals of the state they at-
tacked. The foreignness of Islamist terrorists was in line with the construction 
of their cultural alienness and their status as outsiders. However, there were 
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the perplexing cases of nationals who joined the Islamist cause. This was a 
matter of betrayal. The perception that terrorists were aliens in a legal sense 
gave way to the perception that terrorists were aliens in a social sense, 
whereby nationals also became outsiders to the moral realm of the commu-
nity.
The new moralisation that re-attaches rights to the moral worth of a per-
son – as judged by those who can provide access to or deny rights – is visible 
in extremis in the treatment of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ in Guantanamo 
and other places of detention, and in its justification by Dick Chaney when he 
said: ‘The people that are at Guantanamo are bad people.’11 These detentions 
not only contravene any code of international law, but also introduce the logic 
of the rights of (assumed) terrorists to be less important, less valuable than the 
rights of others, since they are ‘bad people’. There are two versions of this ar-
gument. Firstly, it has been held that the protection of the rights of (alleged or 
convicted) terrorists is not compatible with justice since the protection of their 
rights would violate the rights of their victims and even their potential victims 
(see for example the debates of the European parliament as described in 
Tsoukala 2004: ft 27 and 28). The denial of rights with the argument that a 
person is ‘bad’ goes in some ways even further, since it categorically denies 
those deemed to be ‘bad’ the right to have rights. Jakobs defined the duty of 
the state for a ‘law for enemies’ (Feindstrafrecht) in the following manner: 
‘Whoever does not provide sufficient cognitive securities of behaviour as a 
person cannot expect to be treated as a person. Even more, the state must not 
treat him as a person since he would otherwise violate the right to security of 
other persons’ (Jakobs 2004: 93, my translation). 
The re-moralisation of rights in this manner, of connecting access to law, 
or the right to have rights to the moral value of a person – a moral value, that 
is defined, of course, by those who have the power to determine access – and 
the new role of the state in defining morally worthy citizens or people adds 
new forms of legitimizing (and legalizing) inequality before the law to old 
forms of exclusion. 
The construction of a normative community which is evident in all the 
Manichaean and belligerent oppositions of civilisation vs. barbarism, freedom 
vs. hatred, ‘with us or against us’ etc. condemns certain categories of people 
who are not considered morally to be members of the normative community 
to the status of outlaws. This exclusion, again, is not achieved with respect to 
the activities or actual deeds of the persons concerned but with respect to their 
religious or national background. ‘If to live by the rule of law is to belong to a 
common political community, then does not the selective application of the 
rule of law confirm a determination to relegate entire sections of humanity as 
                                             
11  Dick Chaney on Fox News Channel, Monday 13 June 2005. 
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conscripts of a civilisation fit for collective punishment?’ (Mamdani 2004: 
257).
This dual system of law finds its climactic formulation in the debate on a 
special criminal law for ‘enemies’ as practically invented by the USA in its 
detention centres (of which Guantanamo is only one), or the ‘Feindstrafrecht’
as it has been called in German (Jakobs 2004). A special criminal law for 
‘public enemies’ is emerging. It differs from other criminal law in that it cre-
ates different legal standards for ‘enemies’, whatever or whoever that may be, 
and even for ‘potential enemies’. Since the point of the law for enemies is 
prevention of future deeds (Jakobs 2004: 92), an enemy cannot be distin-
guished from a potential enemy. The identification of a potential of a person 
to become an enemy will differ: It can either rely on previous deeds, or on in-
tentions and processes of planning, or on membership in specific organisa-
tions or on categories of people who are deemed potentially hostile. Guan-
tanamo and other centres of detention, and the whole concept of ‘unlawful 
enemy combatants’, are the beginnings of such special criminal law for ‘ene-
mies’. However, it is also visible in the circumvention of ‘normal’ criminal 
law and its safeguards by the use of administrative law in security measures. 
Philosophically, these ideas of dealing with ‘the enemy’ were frequently 
related to the fundamental distinction between friend and foe that was for Carl 
Schmitt, the German jurist whose ideas gave Nazism a justification in legal 
philosophy and political theory, the essence of the political. Schmitt, unlike 
the propagators of the ‘war on terror’, did not write about morals;12 he insists 
that the opposition between friend and foe underlying the political is in no 
way related to the opposition between good and evil (Schmitt [1932] 1963: 
27) or any other such opposition. Schmitt does, of course, hold that the exis-
tence of the state (state security) supersedes all other legal norms: ‘In a state 
of emergency the state suspends law by virtue of its right to self-preservation’ 
(Schmitt [1934] 1979: 19, my own translation). This is reminiscent of the U.S. 
justifications for the suspension of rights during the ‘war on terror’, although 
U.S. officials usually employed a more mundane language than Schmitt’s 
theoretical elaborations. 
The law for enemies also differs from ordinary criminal law in that it does 
not intend to rehabilitate, reform or even punish, but, above all, to banish (see 
Jakobs 2004: 89). Banishment, of course, can be a punishment more severe 
than other kinds of penalties. All measures, the seemingly banal ones of gath-
ering data on the religious belonging of a person, or the dramatic ones applied 
at the detention centres, are justified largely with reference to ‘banishing dan-
                                             
12  Denninger (2005) therefore sees Fichte as the original thinker of the law for 
enemies, the Feindstrafrecht (Denninger 2005: 9), and Fichte’s ideas on the out-
law are also cited by Jakobs (2004) in his advocacy of this kind of law. 
20
LAWS FOR ENEMIES
ger’ or preventing it from materializing: Indefinite detention at Guantanamo 
has been justified by pointing out that some of the detainees who had been re-
leased had taken up the fight against U.S. forces again and that this needed to 
be prevented.13 In Germany the use of the Law for Foreigners (Ausländer-
recht) and its provisions for deportation and denial of entry, rather than of 
criminal law in order to deal with people considered to potentially pose a se-
curity risk, is justified by the idea that this way, potential danger can be ban-
ished from German territory.14 The securitisation specific to the ‘war on ter-
ror’ made possible such uses of administrative and procedural law for security 
concerns. Procedural and administrative law is used in many places to cir-
cumvent the safeguards built into criminal law (see Cole 2003: 14). Adminis-
trative procedures are used where criminal law would not hold as those tar-
geted cannot be convincingly accused of committing a crime recognized by 
penal law (Schiffauer in this volume). Legal status thus attains a new signifi-
cance in matters of fundamental rights and the access to law, since the univer-
sality of protections under criminal law does not pertain to administrative 
procedures or immigration law etc., for which legal status is of course central 
(see also Bender 2003). 
Banishing danger is the core idea of the preventive state. It relates to what 
Garland has described as the ‘culture of control’ that de-socializes crime, and 
gives up on rehabilitation or reform, but restricts itself to ‘retribution, inca-
pacitation and the management of risk’ (Garland 2001: 8). The enemy (and 
the criminal) are perceived to be beyond redemption or the possibility of 
(re)integration because their deviance is seen to be rooted in their ‘nature’ or 
personality (Garland 2001: 181), rather than in the social context. 
‘Intrinsic evil defies all attempts at rational comprehension or criminological expla-
nation. There can be no mutual intelligibility, no bridge of understanding, no real 
communication between “us” and “them”. To treat them as understandable […] is to 
bring criminals into our domain, to humanize them, to see ourselves in them and 
them in ourselves’ (Garland 2001: 184). 
The externalisation of ‘the enemy’ is, of course, all the more plausible when 
the explanation for their ‘difference’ is strengthened by reference to ‘a differ-
ent culture’ and its fundamental ‘otherness’ or the perception of a ‘new terror-
                                             
13  Dick Cheney, quoted in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 June 2005, “Schlechte Men-
schen”, p. 10. 
14  The contradiction inherent in the call for a global ‘war on terror’ and the prac-
tice of banishing people considered to be potentially a security risk beyond na-
tional boundaries is not addressed. In this way, the U.S. detention centres and all 
forms of indefinite detention are consequent to the proclaimed globality of the 
‘war on terror’. 
21
JULIA ECKERT
ism’ that is fuelled by an innate hatred of modernity. Because the ‘enemy’, 
the deviant or the criminal is in this way treated as essentially different and 
thus beyond (re-)integration, they primarily need to be banished, excluded, 
incapacitated. For Garland, it is the prison that is ‘located precisely at the 
junction point of two of the most important social and penal dynamics of our 
time: risk and retribution’ (Garland 2001: 199). Of course, expulsion, deporta-
tion or the denial of entry have the same potentials for the management of 
risk, and they have similar, if sometimes more fundamental aspects of retribu-
tion or punishment (see Bender 2003: 132). 
Banishing danger de-socializes conflicts; it de-politicizes terrorism and 
merges ideas of innate alienness with (in many cases largely) administrative 
procedures of exclusion. Technologies of prevention and neo-liberal thinking 
about crime as discussed by Garland (2001) prepared the ground for thoughts 
about terror. The crime regime Garland describes presents itself as ‘un-
ideological’ ‘technical’, preventive and incapacitating, etc. It is, of course, 
ideological in its interpretation of social relations and the individual, depicting 
crime as resulting from a natural disposition rather than from circumstances. 
With the war on terror this whole way of thinking is pushed further into a 
field of morals (‘evil’). And culture enters into the equation replacing the na-
ture of character or psyche with a quasi-natural cultural disposition, as im-
plicit in any notion of a clash of civilisations. In this way, the neo-liberal phi-
losophy of crime prepared the grounds for the neo-conservative philosophy of 
cultural enmity and its translation into policy. The belligerent opposition of 
‘good and evil’, ‘freedom and hatred’, ‘civilisation and barbarism’ is thus no 
mere rhetoric or the creation of enemy images, but has already entered the 
procedures of law and administration. 
The inadvertent proximity of general trends in policing, of the preventive 
posture of the war on terror, and the ideas of Schmitt have triggered a debate 
on the advent of the permanent state of emergency (Agamben 2003). But just 
as debates on the general threat to civil liberties posed by security measures – 
which is, of course, also a valid criticism – overlook the development of a 
dual class system of rights, the idea of the age of exceptionalism also seems to 
miss the asymmetry of the state of emergency. Of course, all states of emer-
gency do not target all citizens equally; usually they target certain forms of 
behaviour and certain activities equally, regardless of the person in question – 
denying rights to these actions. The current situation, however, treats certain 
activities differently according to who ‘commits’ them. ‘While there has been 
much talk about the need to sacrifice liberty for a greater sense of security, in 
practice we have selectively sacrificed non-citizens’ liberties while retaining 
basic protections for citizens’ (Cole 2002: 955, emphasis in the original). 
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Since citizenship now comes in different degrees,15 the protection of some-
one’s liberties and rights also depends on his or her degree of legitimate 
membership. Generally, criticism and opposition to the politics of security 
were not forcibly stifled. Indeed, there are many dissenting voices from hu-
man rights organisations, lawyers and academics. Beyond a potential general 
threat to civil liberties entailed in the new measures, it is the idea of equality 
before the law that seems to be undermined in a new manner – and with a new 
degree of legitimacy. 
Consensus
In many countries, especially those in the West, previous resistance to far-
reaching security measures seems to have dissolved.16 This is due, it seems, 
firstly to the emergence of dual law: Since most people actually do not feel – 
rightly or wrongly – they might become a target of the new laws, since they 
do not belong to the categories of people addressed by them, they also do not 
                                             
15  A case in point beside the various cases of the revocation of citizenship when 
the persons concerned hold a double citizenship and one of them is revoked, is 
one case in which German citizenship was revoked despite the person in questi-
on having no other citizenship, and having committed no deed other than not 
declaring his membership in an organisation that is under observation by the 
German Federal Security Agency. The organisation in question is not outlawed 
and has not even been accused or is suspected of promoting violence or similar 
such unconstitutional activities. In 2007, the Administrative High Court overtur-
ned the ruling and granted the plea for the retention of German citizenship. 
16  There are many voices of dissent, such as human rights organisations, immigrant 
rights and asylum groups, concerned lawyers, etc. As suggested above, they we-
re not forcibly silenced. Their media presence is, however, marginal. Moreover, 
their dissenting opinions remain marginal also in the face of the social dichoto-
misation already prevalent. In a few countries, resistance to the expansion of an-
ti-terrorist measures seems to have borne fruit – for different reasons. In Kenya, 
their introduction was prevented by public protests (Bachmann 2004: 5), appar-
ently largely because of the memory of authoritarian rule is still fresh in the pub-
lic’s mind. In Mauritius, both the president and vice president refused to give as-
sent to the Prevention of Terrorism Special Measures Regulations, which were 
enacted in 2003, and resigned. In India, the new anti-terrorist law POTA passed 
by the BJP was resisted by opposition parties (and of course many civil rights 
activists), and it was repealed by the Congress-led government which came into 
power in 2004. This might not have been for the love of civil liberties but rather 
for other political reasons, and it also does not necessarily mean that the new In-
dian government employs entirely different practices against what it classifies as 
terrorism. Nonetheless, these examples raise the question of what the conditions 
are for ‘logics’ other than that of the preventive state to be effective, other per-
ceptions of the situation to be accepted and other voices to be heard – and why 
elsewhere this is not so. 
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oppose measures they would otherwise find unacceptable (see also Hirsch 
2002: 6).17 The production of clarity by locating societal troubles in a foe – 
who is without history or cause – potentially overcomes the deep ambivalence 
towards some surveillance measures and other expansions of state control. 
The dichotomisation of good and (potentially) dangerous, of worthy members 
and suspicious subjects, and the apparent bifurcation of the threat (of falling 
victim to terrorist attacks and of falling victim to the war on terror) reproduce 
the dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ underlying the dual law system. 
Secondly, there seems to be a new consensus on a conceptualisation of se-
curity and risk that relates individual, national and international security in a 
new manner. The security discourse elevates state security as the precondition 
for other forms of (individual or societal) security above all other forms of se-
curity, especially above social security, but also above civic security (i.e. the 
security from the state, habeas corpus, privacy, etc.). The distinction between 
private and public enemies is dissolved (Bigo 2002: 81). The politics of ‘un-
ease’, as Bigo called it (Bigo 2002), the new role of fear that can be witnessed 
in the dramatic scenarios of the media, the moral panics, as several authors 
have described the new Islamophobia (Schiffauer 2005); bring about a return 
to Hobbes – who had probably never been very far anyway. New ideas of se-
curity become common sense in the acceptance of governmental authority to 
know best how to protect, and from what. 9/11 provided an opportunity for 
many governments to overcome some – or most – of the resistance posed by 
parliaments, the media, civil rights groups or the judiciary. 
Consensus seems to be dependent either on the successful portrayal of an 
‘us vs. them’ distinction so as to make security measures appear to target only 
‘them’ and identify the state with ‘us’, rendering public enemies and private 
enemies quasi-identical. Wherever such a dichotomy could not be convinc-
ingly established – either, it seems, because the targeting of all citizens by 
state security measures was still too vividly remembered, like in Kenya, or, as 
in many Muslim majority countries, because no essential alienness could be 
argued – the plausibility of the necessity of the security measures, or their 
beneficial nature for the ‘good citizen’ seems to have been less evident. Deci-
sive for the social life of anti-terrorism laws seems to be whether there is or 
emerges a congruence between governmental categories of ‘the dangerous 
other’ and societal forms of othering. Unanimity on securitisation apparently 
progresses best alongside the dichotomisation of society. 
On another level, and in some ways even more subversive, the new laws 
served as powerful instruments in conflicts entirely unrelated to security is-
                                             
17  An indication of this is also the outcry in Britain about the suggestion to extend 
the powers of detention without trial inherent in the British anti-terrorism law to 
all Britons in order to make the law less discriminative (Large 2005: 3). 
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sues and thus were embedded in the structures of political competition. They 
became indispensable, and even in places were they were revoked, like in In-
dia, where the anti-terrorism law of 2002 was repealed in 2004, they found 
new forms in criminal law reforms or in other extraordinary laws.18 In India 
like in Morocco, the new possibilities for damaging an opponent inherent in 
the laws also entered into local quarrels, being used as a weapon in struggles 
and disputes at the neighbourhood level, or in local rivalries amongst different 
economic groups (Turner in this volume), and became a powerful weapon for 
the police and anybody in league with them.19  They had the potential to 
change local power relations by providing new measures of legitimate partici-
pation. Individuals or groups, the legitimacy of whose membership could be 
questioned along the lines of the new culturalisation of membership and the 
moralisation of rights, now find it harder to articulate their claims. Not only 
governments made use of the new possibilities for ‘pre-emptive punishment’ 
and control inherent in the security measures; civil society actors, too, 
adopted the measures for their own purposes. As Turner writes in his contri-
bution to this volume: ‘The fact that local people make use of Moroccan anti-
terror legislation for their own purposes implicitly keeps it operative.’ 
Thus, the structures created and the laws passed in the course of the ‘war 
on terror’ can affect political practices and social relations far beyond their 
immediate goal. They become embedded in the political structures through 
their usefulness for diverse strategies. Through the adoption of the measures, 
their justificatory imagery of friend vs. foe, of the unworthy other, of the mor-
alisation of rights also enters into the practices of those using the measures. 
This imagery can be as useful as the measures in themselves, since subsuming 
diverse conflicts under one banner potentially creates new alliances20 that 
strengthen different agendas, thereby uniting against a common enemy. 
The export of ideas through the export of policy, however, succeeds best 
when there is an additional local use for the exports. So far it is mainly in 
countries and societies where social tensions can be interpreted along the lines 
                                             
18  India amended its unlawful activities (prevention) bill to include some of the 
provisions of the repealed POTA. However, it abolished the provisions for inde-
finite detention and for confessions to the police being admitted in court, thus 
abandoning the measures most prone to misuse. 
19  The measures were more easily instrumentalized in this manner when the targets 
were Muslim, since then they could more plausibly be connected to the global 
discourse of the ‘dangerous other’; but some prominent cases also involved non-
Muslim politicians opposed to the regional leading parties. 
20  One striking new alliance is the one in Germany between left-wing feminists, 
such as Alice Schwarzer, and right-wing politicians, who both oppose Islam in 
the name of protecting women against ‘tradition’. In India, on the other hand, 
the hijacking of women’s issues by the Hindu Right was resisted by the feminist 
movement, albeit not always successfully. 
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of the ‘war on terror’, that is, where the foe can be externalized from society 
and such externalisations have a history that dual law emerges, and the cul-
turalisation of membership and the moralisation of rights takes root. 
React ions
There are as yet no investigations into the reactions of those groups specifi-
cally targeted by anti-terrorist measures and their categorisations of labeling 
and of unequal access to law. One question is whether these developments ac-
tually serve to diminish the threat of further terrorist activities and recruitment 
(see Crenshaw 1991). Since they fail to isolate terrorism from widely felt 
grievances, but rather seem to further the plausibility of this link, one could 
claim that they are likely to produce more anger and hatred among the tar-
geted and thus possibly produce more terrorists or at least sympathies with 
their ideas. 
The actual ‘production of terrorists’ is possibly hard to prove, since causa-
tive explanations must be more complex. The reactions of those belonging to 
targeted categories can be assessed, however, in terms of their withdrawal 
from social relations beyond their group and in terms of their identification 
with and use of norms and institutions of a polity. Both are possibly strongly 
affected by the experience of labelling and of unequal access to law. From 
what we learned from research into individual and collective identity forma-
tion, the measures implemented under the ‘war on terror’ are likely to produce 
a social dichotomisation that leads to experiences of alienation and processes 
of self-segregation. These may trigger militancy and anti-systemic violence. 
The social and political costs of escalation seem obvious, but also the re-
treat and further segregation of groups considered and treated with distrust, 
and faced with a constant suspicion must cause social costs. Organisations 
which are being criminalized or forcibly dissolved might go underground, 
where they will most likely develop new internal dynamics, new structures of 
leadership and new ideologies of integration or alienation. Moreover, social 
segregation also often means new social relations within one group, and a 
strengthened exclusivity of identification with that group which entails new 





The globalisation of the ‘war on terror’ operates on at least two levels: One is 
the explicit export of security technologies, legal arrangements, knowledge, 
and the coordination of alliances and forms of cooperation in various policy 
fields. These efforts take different courses, some relying on pressure, others 
on financial incentives, or both, and yet others on a moral economy of alli-
ances.
On another level, the ‘war on terror’ is globalized by the various forms of 
appropriation of its specific ideas of security and danger, its categories and 
maps as forms of knowledge, its interpretations of conflicts. It is established 
on different levels, entering into political relations as a new tool and steering 
ideas about security and danger in a specific direction: Ideas of security are, 
again, first and foremost ideas about state security, subsuming other forms of 
security under the former. This also entails renewed sources of nationalism, 
relying, of course, on enemy images that have always accompanied such sen-
timents. Thinking about difference, belonging and alienness, however, is in-
creasingly shaped in broader, more global and therefore in more inescapable 
and fundamental terms of ‘civilisational’ core cultures. 
The ‘war on terror’ seems to have globalized the de-socialized conception 
of conflict that stems from neo-liberal thinking about crime prevention. It has 
added the cultural dimension, albeit treating culture as a non-social, quasi-
natural disposition. Moreover, the notion of ‘evil’ and the concomitant mor-
alisation of rights affect the ways conflicts are dealt with. The emergence of 
dual law, explicitly legislated or implicit in the practices of administrators, is 
due both to the technicist approaches of the preventive state and the culturali-
sation of belonging and the moralisation of rights. Ideas of ‘civilisational’ 
unity and homogeneity shape the ways various forms of social difference are 
dealt with and are the base of offers of different degrees of membership or ex-
clusion.
Each adoption of the tools provided, for whatever purpose, embeds them 
in political structures. Power relations between societal groups change or are 
re-enforced due to differences in the legitimacy of claims to membership and 
participation established by the model of rights entailed in the security regime 
of the ‘war on terror’. Reactions of the individuals and groups who are tar-
geted by these measures might differ; they might take the form of resignation 
and withdrawal, radicalisation and the escalation of conflict, or the protest 
might be voiced by other means. The social and political conditions of each 
need to be explored. 
Thus, we are left with the question of which changes in the ideas of the 
state and of government have been promoted by the emerging culture of secu-
rity, and how they affect notions and practices of citizenship. What does the 
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securitisation of politics mean? Is it the advent of a general state of exception? 
(Agamben 2003) The claim was made that these changes serve long-term 
goals of altering state structure. Makdisi (2002) as well as Düx (2003), for ex-
ample, maintain that we are observing the final push for a general shift from a 
providing state (either of welfarist or developmental nature) to a controlling 
or preventive state for which ‘terrorism’ is merely an occasion for expansion. 
This thesis is supported by the fact that most legislation allegedly neces-
sary because of the novelty of the ‘new terrorism’, or the general merger of 
internal and external security, was not new but had long been debated in many 
countries. 9/11 provided an opportunity for many governments to overcome 
some – or most – of the resistance posed by parliaments, the media, civil 
rights groups or the judiciary. Likewise, the re-emergence of retribution and 
incapacitation as a way of dealing with conflicts or with crime has been de-
veloping ever since the late 1990s, as Garland (2001) has shown. Despite 
these precedents, it appears that the ‘war on terror’ gives these developments 
a new quality: Firstly, it has established the dispositive of security as the 
globally predominant one, at least for the time being. It has made plausible 
the employment of specific expertises about social conflict (rather than oth-
ers), and it has furthered a specific merger of social and governmental prac-
tices of othering, resulting also in the culturalisation of membership and the 
moralisation of rights. 
Acknowledgements
I thank Nina Glick Schiller and Tatjana Thelen for their insightful and inspir-
ing comments on an earlier version of this chapter. I am grateful to the par-
ticipants of the workshop ‘The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws’ held from 
26 to 27 May 2005 at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in 
Halle/Saale for the fruitful discussions on the issue. I am indebted to the ini-
tiative ‘Justizgewährung, Staatsraison und Geheimdienste’ of the Berlin 
Brandenburg Academy of Sciences from which I have gained valuable in-
sights into the legal debates on the topic. I thank Werner Schiffauer for many 





Agamben, G. (2003): Stato di Eccezione, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. 
Agnes, F. (2005): ‘Citizenship and Identity in Post 9/11 Nations’. In: A. 
Fitz/M. Kröger/A. Schneider/D. Wenner (eds), Import Export. Cultural 
Transfer. India, Germany, Austria, Berlin and New Delhi: Parthas Verlag 
and Katha, pp. 182-88. 
Amnesty International (no year): Charting the ‘War on Terrorism’, at: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/war_terrorism.html (accessed 25 
June 2005). 
Bachmann, J. (2004): ‘‘Leave no Continent Behind’. Die Integration Afrikas 
in den Krieg gegen den Terror und ihre Folgen’, Afrika im Blickpunkt, 3: 
1-7.
Bascombe, D. (2003): Anti Terrorism Legislation in the Commonwealth, at: 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/new/anti_terror_legislationcw2003.pdf 
(accessed 25 June 2005). 
–––– (2004): An Update of Anti Terror Legislation in the Commowealth,
at: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/new/anti_terror_legislationcw
2004.pdf (accessed 25 June 2005). 
Bender, D. (2003): ‘‘Verpolizeilichung’ des Ausländerrechts? Die ausländer-
rechtlichen Maßnahmen des Gesetzgebers nach dem 11. September 2001’, 
Kritische Justiz, 36: 130-45. 
Bigo, D. (2001): ‘The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)’. 
In: M. Albert/D. Jacobson/Y. Lapid (eds), Identities, Borders and Orders,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 91-116. 
–––– (2002): ‘Security and Immigration: toward a Critique of the Govern-
mentality of Unease’, Alternatives, 27, Special Issue: 63-92. 
Buruma, I./Margalit, A. (2004): Occidentalism; the West in the Eyes of its 
Enemies, New York: Penguin. 
Buzan, B./ de Wilde, J./Wæver, O. (1998): Security. A New Framework for 
Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Cole, D. (2002): ‘Enemy Aliens’, Stanford Law Review, 54: 953-1004. 
–––– (2003): ‘The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Ter-
rorism’, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 38(1): 1-30. 
Crenlinsten, R. (1998): ‘The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism in 
Liberal Democracies’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44: 
389-413. 
Crenshaw, M. (1991): ‘How Terrorism Declines’, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 3: 69-87. 
Denninger, E. (2001): ‘Freiheit durch Sicherheit?’, Kritische Justiz, 4: 467-78. 
29
JULIA ECKERT
–––– (2005): ‘Recht, Gewalt und Moral’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 June 
2005, at: http://www.fraktuell.de/ressorts/nachrichten_und_politik/dokumenta
tion/?cnt=690272 (accessed 27 June 2005). 
Diner, D. (2004): ‘Steht das jus in bello in Frage? Über Regulierung und De-
regulierung der Anwendung von Gewalt’. In: E. Reiter/W. Matyas (eds),
Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik, Hamburg: Mittler & Sohn, 
pp. 59-71. 
Düx, H. (2003): ‘Globale Sicherheitsgesetze und weltweite Erosion von 
Grundrechten’, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP), 6: 189-95. 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (2006): 
‘Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Xenophobia’, Wien. 
Garland, D. (2001): The Culture of Control, Oxford, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Hirsch, B. (2002): ‘Der attackierte Rechtsstaat: Bürgerrechte und “Innere Si-
cherheit” nach dem 11. September’, Vorgänge, 3: 5-9. 
Jakobs, G. (2004): ‘Bürgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht’, HRR-Strafrecht,
3(5): 88-95. 
Krishnan, J. (2004): ‘India’s Patriot Act: POTA and the Impact on Civil Lib-
erties in the World’s Largest Democracy’, Law and Inequality, 22: 265-
300.
Laqueur, W. (2000): The New Terrorism; Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass 
Destruction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Large, J. (2005): ‘Democracy and Terrorism’. Paper presented at the Interna-
tional Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March 2005, 
Madrid, at: http://english.safe-democracy.org (accessed 27 June 2005). 
Lepsius, O. (2004): ‘Freiheit, Sicherheit und Terror: die Rechtslage in 
Deutschland’, Leviathan, 32(1): 64-88. 
Mahmood, C. (2001): ‘Terrorism, Myth, and the Power of Ethnographic 
Praxis’, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 30(5): 520-45. 
Makdisi, S. (2002): ‘Spectres of ‘Terrorism’’, Interventions, 4(2): 265-78. 
Mamdani, M. (2004): Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, New York: Pantheon 
Books.
Mayntz, R. (2004): ‘Hierarchie oder Netzwerk? Zu den Organisationsformen 
des Terrorismus’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 14(2): 251-62. 
Middle East Working Group (2002): ‘Summaries of the Papers presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association’, Mid-
dle East Policy, 9(4): 75-101. 
Morgan, M. (2004): ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters,
XXXIV(1): 29-43. 




Schiffauer, W. (2006): ‘Enemies within the Gates: the Debate about Citizen-
ship of Muslims in Germany’. In: T. Modood/A. Triandafyllidou/R. Za-
pata-Barrero (eds), Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: a Euro-
pean Approach, London: Routledge, pp. 94-116. 
Schmitt, C. ([1932] 1963): Der Begriff des Politischen, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot. 
–––– ([1934] 1979): Politische Theologie, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
Scott, J. (1998): Seeing like a State: how Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Steinberg, G. (2005): ‘Entwicklungstendenzen im militanten Islamismus’. In: 
Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, Abteilung Verfassungsschutz (ed.), Isla-
mismus: Diskussion um ein vielschichtiges Phänomen, Berlin: Senatsver-
waltung, pp. 44-59. 
Stevenson, J. (2001-2): ‘Pragmatic Counter-terrorism’, Survival, 43: 35-48. 
Tilly, C. (2004): ‘Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists’, Sociological Theory, 22(1): 
5-13.
Tsoukala, A. (2004): Democracy and Security: the Debates about Counter 
Terrorism in the European Parliament, September 2001 - June 2003, at: 
http://www.libertyandsecurity.org/article137.html (accessed 29 November 
2004).
Tucker, D. (2001): ‘What is New about the New Terrorism and how Danger-
ous is it?’ Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(3): 1-14. 
Waldmann, P. (2004): ‘Islamistischer Terrorismus; Ideologie, Organisation 
und Unterstützungspotenzial’, Kriminalistik, 12: 740-45. 
Wæver, O. (1995): ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’. In: R.D. Lipschutz 
(ed.), On Security, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 46-86. 
31

Liberalism versus Terrorism: Warfare, Crime 
Control,  and the United States after 11 
September
THOMAS M. HAWLEY
The United States’ ‘war on terror’ has drawn widespread criticism in the years 
since the attacks of 11 September 2001. For some, it not only entails major 
violations of human rights but signals an active effort to dismantle legal pro-
tections refined over the course of centuries and is therefore a mortal threat to 
the liberties enshrined in the Constitution. For others, it demonstrates the con-
tinued ascendancy of the executive branch in a manner at odds with the prin-
ciple of checks and balances. Still others resent the United States waging war 
against a country with no demonstrable relationship to the horrors of that day. 
By contrast, those fighting the war on terror argue that the president enjoys 
sweeping powers during wartime that constitutional protections are reserved 
for Americans who choose to obey the law, and that international legal 
frameworks improperly limit the sovereignty of nation-states under attack. 
While these issues are undoubtedly important, they also tend to assume the 
relevance of the classically defined liberal state for purposes of understanding 
the United States’ war on terror. That state, so the story goes, exercises sover-
eignty over a given territory and hence has certain rights and responsibilities 
which are simultaneously limited by a social contract that requires the protec-
tion of the natural rights and freedoms of its citizens. This framework, of 
course, sets the stage for the heated debates since 11 September about the use 
and abuse of state power in the war on terror. It also inhibits a more compre-
hensive analysis of the changing nature of political power and the citizen-state 
relationship in the early twenty-first century. 
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In this chapter, I argue that the American response to 11 September can-
not be adequately understood if we assume the continued relevance of the 
classically defined liberal state and the accompanying division of state vio-
lence into an external warfare mode and an internal domestic crime control 
mode. Instead, we must recognize the ambiguities that trouble the liberal 
state’s use of violence and take seriously the ways in which these uncertain-
ties reshape the relationship of citizens to their state. Terrorists figure promi-
nently here because they pose a unique challenge to the credibility of the 
state’s exercise of sovereignty over a given territory as well as its claim to se-
cure the lives of its citizens against external aggression. As we know from 
Locke and Weber, among others, the legitimate use of violence in accom-
plishing these tasks is one criterion by which the liberal state is distinguished 
from other sources of authority whose violent possibilities have been gradu-
ally expropriated over time (Kaufman-Osborn 2002). When this is a question 
of either arresting criminal activity within or of combating aggression from 
without, the use of liberal violence is a relatively straightforward matter. In 
the former, the state exercises its statutory right to detain offenders and de-
prive them of either life or liberty (the state in crime control mode as ensurer 
of domestic tranquility), while in the latter the state combats acts of war 
against it by matching force with force in a manner that can be provided by no 
other entity within the polity (the state in warfare mode as provider of com-
mon defense). 
Things become more complicated, however, when the categorical distinc-
tions upon which liberal violence is predicated become blurred as they do 
when the danger to which the state must respond comes from ‘unlawful com-
batants’, meaning those whose violence fails to come from within the con-
fines of state sovereignty. Matters are complicated still further when the com-
batants in question are also citizens who have allegedly sided with non-state 
terrorists, as was the case with Yaser Hamdi, John Walker Lindh, and Jose 
Padilla. The problem lies not so much in identifying the perpetrators as in 
how to think about them. Not quite domestic criminals (calling the cops 
seems a bit feeble), not quite soldiers fighting in war (sending the military 
seems oddly inapplicable), citizen terrorists, theoretically speaking, are some-
thing of a paradox. Simultaneously members of the commonwealth and alleg-
edly committed to its destruction, they are those whom the liberal state prom-
ises both to protect and destroy. That the United States chose the second of 
these two options has understandably been criticized as a departure from lib-
eral principles that accord citizens certain legal protections. Yet it is important 
to situate this departure within the increasing tendency to regard liberalism’s 
warfare mode as the default response to disorder. In other words, the tactics 
employed against Lindh, Hamdi, and Padilla indicate not simply a frustration 
with the constraints imposed by the contractual dimension of liberalism – the 
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dimension that requires governmental protection of individual rights as a con-
dition of legitimacy – but also the conviction that responding to terrorists as if 
they were mere criminals is insufficient. The terrorist is simply too evil, too 
radically ‘other,’ to qualify for law’s privileges and the sorts of correctionalist 
interventions that have for many decades been the standard response to do-
mestic malefactors. The preferred result involves a shift away from the liberal 
state’s crime control mode and towards the tactics peculiar to warfare that 
have come to characterize American society more generally (witness the ‘war 
on cancer,’ the ‘war on drugs,’ the ‘war on terror,’ etc.). 
It is in light of the increasing application of warfare to disorder that we 
should understand the United States’ response to the events of 11 September. 
Among other things, this approach trivializes liberalism’s legal rights and pre-
sumptions of innocence as cumbersome at best or even aids to the enemy 
when applied to accused terrorists like Hamdi, Lindh, and Padilla. So too does 
it render ‘quaint’ the protections of the Geneva Conventions concerning pris-
oners of war in the eyes of U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (Cohn 
2004). It also entails a qualitative shift in the nature of the citizen’s relation-
ship to the state, one whose defining elements were perhaps best captured by 
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer when he issued his immediate 
post-11 September warning ‘to all Americans that they need to watch what 
they say, watch what they do’ (White House 2001b). Presented thusly, indi-
vidual reaction to 11 September boiled down to a choice between the freedom 
of expression or cautious silence. Americans, Fleischer implied, should assess 
the options and then reason their way to appropriate modifications of their be-
haviour or else risk some unspecified reprisal. Orwellian overtones notwith-
standing, Fleischer was on familiar liberal ground when he insisted on reason 
as the unique faculty that impels man to forsake the state of nature in favour 
of life in the commonwealth. Presented with the inconveniences and risks that 
accompany life without government, humans voluntarily accept certain re-
strictions on their liberty in exchange for the superior freedom that occurs in a 
society governed by laws. Newly liberated, citizens are now free to pursue 
their self-interest without worrying about attacks from their neighbours or ex-
cessive meddling by their government. What makes this work, in turn, is the 
neutrality of the government that then enforces those laws. It must not be-
come a participant in the affairs it claims to regulate, nor can it have a pre-
determined interest in the outcome of those disputes it must from time to time 
resolve. The state, therefore, relate to citizens as an umpire to players: there 
when needed, silent and unobtrusive when not. 
It is precisely this relationship that gets perverted when the state’s warfare 
mode is employed as a response to disorder. Most noticeably, the forms of ra-
tionality specific to warfare become goods in themselves. Not only must citi-
zens reason correctly between competing alternatives, so too must the state 
become a rational actor, its erstwhile regulatory function transformed by the 
norms appropriate to combat. So too does the state increasingly participate in 
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the affairs it claims to supervise, as when it establishes incentive structures 
that reward citizens who reason ‘correctly’ while punishing those who do not. 
Still more, disorder-as-warfare reorients the liberal compass away from pun-
ishment and rehabilitation and towards repulsion and destruction. An ethic of 
absolute enmity gradually transforms difference into alterity, with conse-
quences for those who depart (willfully or otherwise) from accepted forms of 
personhood. Citizens now relate to the state not as players to an umpire but as 
choosers whose efforts to reason through what they say and what they do is 
represented as a matter of life or death. Accordingly, I think it helpful to con-
ceptualize the war on terror not so much as a complete dismantling of liberal-
ism but as a strategy for the administration of disorder in late-modern society, 
one that not only mocks liberalism’s traditional limitations on power but fun-
damentally reframes critical components of the social contract. 
By way of contextualizing these developments, I begin by presenting a 
version of liberalism attuned to the ways in which the social contract ampli-
fies precisely the forms of enmity it claims to minimize when it puts forth the 
state as a mediator of disputes. The social contract, in other words, worsens
the seriousness of domestic conflict and external aggression when it embodies 
the citizenry in an imagined community that now thinks in terms of inside and 
outside. Because citizens are members of a group defined by territorial bor-
ders and specific identity configurations, threats are no longer simply threats 
to an individual as was the case in the state of nature but to the political order 
as a whole. Abetting this tendency to inflate the threat posed by disorder are 
recent criminological theories which emphasize the absolute otherness of the 
criminal temperament. In particular, the ‘criminology of the other’ (Garland 
2001) explicitly favours retributive punishment in the belief that illicit behav-
iour arises out of dispositional factors that are beyond the reach of the inter-
ventionist strategies of penal welfarism. As will be shown, it is the interaction 
between the criminology of the other and liberalism’s warfare mode that en-
ables the unsavoury practices of the war on terror and contributes to the 
changing nature of the citizen’s relationship to the liberal state. 
By way of example, I briefly discuss the indefinite detention of unlawful 
combatants at the United States naval facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. De-
spite being a clear departure from liberal principles in the eyes of the United 
States Supreme Court, this tactic has nevertheless been accepted as a neces-
sary element in the war on terror by substantial majorities of the American 
public. This apparent necessity is fueled by endless fear-inducing warnings 
from government officials that characterize terrorism as not only a pure form 
of evil but a permanent feature of life in the twenty-first century that requires 
both a militarized response and measures designed to curb forward behaviour 
before it occurs. Accordingly, I conclude with some reflections on the impli-
cations of the war on terror for the future of the citizen-state relationship. As 
indicated, that relationship is decreasingly amenable to comprehension solely 
on the basis of the liberal social contract and increasingly governed by norms 
proper to the marketplace that fetishize reasoning choosers while simultane-
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ously constricting (for those who make the wrong choices) the liberty which 
social contract theory promises will follow. 
John Locke’s Discipl inary Liberal ism 
In The Second Treatise of Government, John Locke argues that what differen-
tiates men living in the state of nature from those living in society is the ab-
sence among the former of a neutral means of settling disputes. The term 
‘disputes’ is undoubtedly meant to have wide-ranging applicability but it is 
instructive that Locke draws his examples from activities that are distinctly 
criminal, as opposed to, say, economic or athletic. In other words, the sorts of 
conflicts for which Locke seeks a remedy are serious to the point of death and 
have a conspicuously Hobbesian feel. Not surprising, therefore, is Locke’s 
(1988: 278) use of an overtly martial vocabulary in describing them. Occur-
ring in either nature or society, the ‘state of war’ arises when someone exhib-
its ‘a sedate settled design upon another man’s life,’ a problem for which 
Locke sees very few alternatives. He argues (1988: 279) that ‘when all cannot 
be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may de-
stroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his be-
ing, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men 
are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule, but 
that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dan-
gerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he 
falls into their power.’ While Locke is clearly no Hobbesian, one can nonethe-
less see that the fear of violent death so familiar in Leviathan plays an equally 
pivotal, if smaller, role in Locke’s account of the virtues of the social contract. 
Said contract is the mechanism by which humans are able to exit the state 
of nature and enter into society, that unique form of fellowship which permits 
a modulation of the state of war by providing for third-party resolution of 
conflict. I say modulation because of Locke’s insistence, pace Hobbes, that 
the state of war can still exist in society. Locke, in other words, acknowledges 
that some will have ‘sedate settled design[s]’ on the lives and property of oth-
ers regardless of whether they live within the confines of civil society.1 The 
                                             
1 Locke’s imagery again illuminates just how seriously he regards these conflicts. 
As he says (1988: 280) by way of example, ‘But force, or a declared design of 
force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth 
to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gi-
ves a man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho’ he be in society and a 
fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for 
having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but 
of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, 
where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is 
capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a li-
berty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our 
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all-important difference lies in how those designs are to be met, which is by 
society as a whole serving as the maker and enforcer of laws which are ‘indif-
ferent, and the same to all parties’ (Locke 1988: 324). Now, when confronted 
by an aggressor, citizens must defer to the authority of the government and 
the laws created thereby rather than draw their swords. The result, ideally, are 
conflicts mediated by the community for whom the common good (under-
stood as the protection of property), is the highest priority and under which is 
subsumed the private interest of any single member. Put differently, Locke 
does not see the social contract as a means by which force and violence are to 
be eliminated. Rather, they are to be redressed through superior versions 
thereof, both in terms of overall strength and in terms of the legitimacy be-
stowed when government settles disputes according to neutrally administered 
laws.
By virtue of his contractarian approach to conflict resolution, Locke can 
now make a distinction unavailable in the state of nature, namely between in-
side and outside.2 Those who have given their express consent to the contract 
are properly understood as members of the commonwealth and therefore on 
the inside, while those on the outside are either members of a different com-
monwealth or remain in the state of nature. The importance of this distinction 
lies in the way it conditions the understanding of disputes, which, in a manner 
that I doubt Locke quite realizes, become more acute and fundamental than 
the disunited confusion that characterizes violence in the state of nature. In 
other words, conflict is now a far more totalizing ‘us against them’ sort of 
scenario. Attacks from without become a calculated form of aggression by 
one commonwealth against another, while domestic criminal activity morphs 
into an attack on the social body as a whole rather than the individual victim 
per se. The authors of disorder become wholly alien and fundamentally other, 
as indicated by Locke’s claim that such people do not live under the common 
law of reason and hence may be treated as beasts of prey. Such circumstances 
are not mitigated by the legal mechanisms of dispute resolution put forth as 
one of the prime virtues of civil society. Instead, those mechanisms become 
weapons that must necessarily be deployed when Locke commits to managing 
inter-human conflict by folding it within the institutional complex we call the 
liberal state. 
                                                                                                                              
common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mi-
schief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men 
in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man’s person, makes a state of 
war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.’ 
2  Locke (1988: 325) argues in this context that the principal role of government is 
‘to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when commit-
ted within the commonwealth; and also to determine, by occasional judgments 
founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without 
are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the mem-
bers, when there shall be need.’ 
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Derived from the opposition between inside and outside is a second dis-
tinction that has long been one of liberalism’s hallmarks, namely that between 
the violence brought to bear on external aggressors and that employed against 
domestic criminals. Because those on the inside are members of the com-
monwealth, they enjoy certain rights and privileges the protection of which is 
the state’s responsibility. Consequently, the liberal state cannot simply de-
stroy the body of the criminal as was routine under the ancien régime without 
jeopardizing, among other things, its sovereign pretenses and the clear line of 
demarcation between public and private violence.3 Instead, the state’s power 
to punish must be grounded in laws that recognize the offender’s status as a 
member of the commonwealth and consequently a bearer of natural rights 
which the state exists to protect, and all this no matter how heinous the crimi-
nal act in question. The liberal state’s warfare mode, however, knows no such 
limitations.4 There, it is understandable, and Locke gives ample support for 
thinking, that the state should regard external aggressors as radically other. 
After all, what else could such aggression portend but an end to the social 
contract and a return to the state of nature? Liberal states thus tend to wage to-
tal warfare because their theoretical foundations incline them to view such 
conflicts as a matter of life or death. Issues of justifiability aside, the point is 
that liberalism intends a qualitative distinction between the forms of violence 
employed in the crime control and war making contexts. It is ultimately this 
difference that enables the escape from the state of nature to take on the char-
acter of a reasoned act. 
From Welfare to Warfare 
With this brief sketch of Lockean liberalism in mind, we can now take stock 
of changes in the American approach to crime that help explain many of the 
tactics now being brought to bear in the war on terror. Throughout most of the 
twentieth century, that approach embraced the doctrines of penal welfarism, 
which argued that the punishment of criminal activity ought to take the form 
of rehabilitative interventions rather than retributive sanctions. Accordingly, 
                                             
3  As Foucault (1995: 58-69) has pointed out, the public executions of the ancien 
régime often devolved into festivals of illegal and other insubordinate behaviour 
that actively contested the sovereign’s right to punish. Rather than reconstitute 
the sovereignty injured by the criminal act, such events showed just how fragile 
the king’s authority actually was. As for public versus private violence, Kauf-
man-Osborn (2002: 70) argues that the line separating these is blurred when, as 
sometimes occurred during public executions, members of the condemned’s fa-
mily intervened to ensure a quick death for their loved one by pulling down on 
his feet as he swung from the gallows. 
4  Theoretically speaking, at least. Clearly, international accords governing state 
conduct in times of war have led to practical modifications of this point. 
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imprisonment was generally de-emphasized in favour of social and psychiat-
ric inquiry, criminological research and social work, and sentencing laws that 
could be tailored to the individual in question. When used, prison in the penal 
welfare model was designed to be corrective and to include the possibility of 
early release and parole supervision (Garland 2001: 34-35). Such strategies 
were supported by two maxims that were as unquestioned as they were influ-
ential. The first held that social reform and economic prosperity would even-
tually reduce the incidence of crime. Criminal activity was caused not so 
much by corrupt character but by economic and social deprivation, particu-
larly among the lower classes. Fix these underlying problems, the thinking 
went, and you solve the problem of crime. The second axiom held that the 
state was responsible for the care of criminals as well as their punishment and 
rehabilitation. In an overtly Lockean sense, the state was figured as something 
like a parent, responsible for both reform and repression, care and control, 
welfare as well as punishment. In lieu of retribution, ‘one needed expert 
knowledge, scientific research, and flexible instruments of intervention, as 
well as a willingness to regulate aspects of life which classical liberalism had 
deemed beyond the proper reach of government’ (Garland 2001: 40). The 
Lockean idea of third-party dispute resolution was broadened to include a 
range of social services aimed at reducing the problem of crime by eliminat-
ing its causes. 
In the years after 1970, however, what David Garland (2001) has called 
the ‘criminology of the other’ gradually began to supplant penal welfarism. 
This new way of thinking about crime resulted in part from the gradual de-
mise of penal welfarism, itself prompted by major losses of faith in the power 
of the state to address social problems (Garland 2001: 55-57). If anything, the 
civil rights and anti-war movements had starkly revealed the state’s complic-
ity in causing widespread social problems through its often unconscious ten-
dency to promote class and racial biases. Crime rates in the United States also 
rose dramatically in this period, peaking by the early nineteen-eighties at three 
times what they had been twenty years previously (Garland 2001: 90). The 
significance of these changes lies in the responses that were deemed neces-
sary as a result. Virtually everyone from policy makers on down to prison 
wardens blamed the failure to control crime on the theory of penal welfarism 
itself rather than with faulty implementation (Garland 2001: 115). Wholesale 
changes in both philosophy and strategy were needed, changes which drew far 
more heavily from the control side of the authority coin than did penal welfa-
rism with its more explicitly liberal ethos. 
Grounding this change in attitude was the ‘assumption that certain crimi-
nals are “simply wicked” and in this respect intrinsically different from the 
rest of us’ (Garland 2001: 184). Rehabilitation and therapeutic intervention 
were essentially wastes of resources because there could be no rapprochement 
between good and evil. Penal welfarism could therefore be represented as a 
‘failure of moral nerve,’ an unwillingness to judge and condemn, and a strat-
egy that had ‘unleashed the floodgate of crime, disorder and social problems 
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that have characterized the late modern period’ (Garland 2001: 184). In place 
of investigations into causation and prevention, the criminology of the other 
substituted the desire to punish. High crime rates generated an emphasis on 
control and discipline rather than the penal welfarist concern with etiology 
and reform because criminal activity resulted from the voluntary choices of 
essentially evil people.5 Resentment was transformed into a political project 
as the victims of crime came to be regarded as ‘righteous figure[s] whose suf-
fering must be expressed and whose security must henceforth be guaranteed’ 
(Garland 2001: 11). 
Here again it is worth recalling the ways in which the Lockean social con-
tract generates this sort of totalizing response. As seen, that contract tends to 
inflate the seriousness of disorder by lending it an ‘us versus them’ quality. 
The criminology of the other, while distinctly illiberal in many respects, is 
nonetheless highly dependent on the liberal notion of an essentially embodied 
collectivity, united by contractual consent, which can then be understood as 
threatened either from within or from without. Yet even this, I would argue, is 
not the most distinctive feature of the current approach to crime. What should 
also catch our attention is the susceptibility of this framework to an ‘us versus 
us’ mindset. Because domestic criminals are already on the inside, they are 
arguably even more dangerous than those who would wage war from without. 
The citizen terrorist, of course, ratchets up the threat still further by having al-
lied, in the case of al Qaeda, for example, with those on the outside who have 
declared a sedate settled design on the American body politic. 
Yet it is equally important to note that the Lockean social contract is not 
ideally suited to this ‘us versus us’ mentality. In other words, Locke’s overrid-
ing concern is with the solidarity generated by express consent to the laws of 
the commonwealth rather than with drawing up elaborate lists of potential 
threats to it. Accordingly, lawbreakers are still members of the compact de-
spite their untoward behaviour.6 It is because the criminology of the other 
substantially alters this arrangement that it becomes key to an understanding 
of the war on terror and the many objectionable practices that have become its 
hallmark. By virtue of the interaction between the ethic of absolute enmity 
that belongs to liberalism’s warfare mode and the belief in the radical alterity 
of the authors of disorder characteristic of the criminology of the other, the 
terrorist (citizen or otherwise) becomes the most mortal of threats to the body 
politic. It is the ‘us versus them’ outlook supplied by liberalism’s in-
side/outside distinction and embraced by liberalism’s warfare mode adapted 
                                             
5  The enthusiasm for the death penalty in the United States can be understood 
along these lines. 
6  The contrast with Hobbes (1996: 106) is noteworthy in this regard. According to 
his Fifth Law of Nature (Compleasance), citizens are to strive to get along with 
each other. However, he who ‘for the stubborness of his Passions, cannot be cor-
rected, is to be left out, or cast out of Society, as cumbersome thereunto’. 
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for use both within and without the body politic as a general response to dis-
order. In this context, penal interventions aimed at rehabilitation are reserved 
for the naïve, those who do not understand the true nature of the threat posed 
by terrorism. 
In what follows, I document the application of this strategy in the years 
since 11 September. I begin with the aforementioned citizen terrorists, Hamdi, 
Walker, and Padilla, to show how the rationality specific to warfare results in 
the jettisoning of basic legal protections such as habeas corpus and the right to 
counsel even though the danger allegedly posed by these three individuals has 
never been adjudicated before a neutral arbiter. I then briefly discuss the in-
definite detention of unlawful combatants at Guantanamo Bay to show how 
warfare’s violence can be inflicted without a shot being fired. In these in-
stances, the thoroughgoing antagonism characteristic of liberal warfare trans-
lates into the creation of spaces entirely outside the law where terror suspects 
can be kept indefinitely and where the freakish violence of the state of nature 
masquerades as policy. It is here where we see with alarming clarity just what 
President Bush means when he talks of the ‘sacrifices’ necessary to secure 
freedom (Fox News.com: 2005). 
Cit izen Terror ists:  Hamdi,  Lindh,  and Padi l la  
In light of the pronounced shift towards the modalities of warfare inspired by 
the criminology of the other, an account can now be offered of the American 
response to 11 September that reflects the tensions within liberal violence 
noted earlier and shows how frustration with the legal protections extended to 
those on liberalism’s inside leads to reactions formerly reserved for those on 
its outside. Those tensions are revealed when, as the monopolist of legitimate 
force, the United States government seeks to eradicate terrorist violence 
through recourse to its violent prerogatives. But when those terrorists also 
happen to be citizens, the state opens itself up to the contractarian side of the 
legitimacy coin which includes the right of citizens to appeal state actions 
taken against them. This conundrum became apparent almost immediately af-
ter 11 September and the Congressional passage one week later of the Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which permitted President 
Bush ‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organi-
sations, or persons’ responsible for the attacks (Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force 2001). During the resulting invasion of Afghanistan in October, 
Yaser Esam Hamdi was detained by the Northern Alliance, turned over to the 
U.S. military and held first in Afghanistan, then at the U.S. detention facility 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
In the spring of 2002, Hamdi was designated an ‘unlawful combatant’, 
which meant he could be held without being charged, deprived of the ability 
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to challenge his detention in a court of law, and denied access to counsel.7
The sole basis for the designation was a statement by Michael Mobbs, Special 
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (now known as the 
‘Mobbs Declaration’). According to Mobbs, Hamdi travelled to Afghanistan 
in July or August 2001, affiliated himself with the Taliban for purposes of 
military training, and then engaged in operations against the United States. In 
addition, Mobbs stated that because the Taliban and al Qaeda ‘“were and are 
hostile forces engaged in armed combat with the armed forces of the United 
States,” “individuals associated with” those groups “were and continue to be 
enemy combatants”’ (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2004: 5). This remains the only evi-
dence ever provided by the United States in support of Hamdi’s detention and 
enemy combatant status. 
In June 2002 Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus al-
leging that, as an American citizen, Hamdi enjoyed the protections of the 
United States Constitution, particularly those of the 5th and 14th amendments 
(Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2004: 2-3). The Eastern District Court of Virginia ini-
tially found in Hamdi’s favour, appointing him counsel and ordering access to 
Hamdi. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this order, 
arguing that the District Court ‘had failed to extend appropriate deference to 
the Government’s security and intelligence interests’ (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
2004: 4). It also ordered the district court to conduct an inquiry into Hamdi’s 
status, an inquiry which found that the Mobbs Declaration fell ‘far short’ of 
supporting Hamdi’s detention and was ‘little more than the government’s 
“say-so”’ (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2004: 5). The district court itself then ordered a 
far more comprehensive review of Hamdi’s status and the legality of his de-
tention, which the Bush administration appealed. Again the Fourth Circuit 
found in the government’s favour, arguing that the AUMF and the Mobbs 
Declaration were sufficient to render Hamdi’s detention constitutional. It con-
sequently directed Hamdi’s habeas petition to be dismissed (Hamdi v. Rums-
feld 2004: 6). In June 2004 the United States Supreme Court vacated the find-
ings of the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the due process requirements of the 
Constitution did, in fact, apply to Hamdi and that ‘the threats to military op-
erations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as 
to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s 
case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator’ (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2004: 
28-29). Further, while not invalidating the government’s right to indefinitely 
detain unlawful combatants, the Court asserted its right to review such deten-
tions in spite of the Bush administration’s strident opposition on the basis of 
                                             
7  According to the Department of Defense, an enemy combatant is ‘an individual 
who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces 
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. 
This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly 




the separation of powers doctrine. Lacking the ability to keep Hamdi legally, 
the United States agreed to release him to Saudi Arabia (where he was also a 
citizen and had lived since childhood) on condition that he gives up his U.S. 
citizenship and agrees to certain travel restrictions for the rest of his life. 
The situation can hardly be said to have improved for John Walker Lindh, 
the other American captured in Afghanistan during the United States’ 2001 
invasion and who subsequently came to be known as the ‘American Taliban’. 
Indeed, it was Lindh rather than Hamdi who became the public face of Is-
lamic radicalism in the American imagination, thanks in no small measure to 
his conversion to Islam during high school. This conversion eventually led 
him to Afghanistan in the spring of 2001 where, at the age of twenty, Lindh 
joined the Taliban in its struggle against the Northern Alliance. According to 
the United States, he also attended a military training camp affiliated with al 
Qaeda, twice met with Osama bin Laden, and remained on the front lines 
even after the events of 11 September and the American invasion of Afghani-
stan (United States v. Lindh 2002). Though he was not designated an enemy 
combatant, the details of Lindh’s capture, interrogation, and prosecution sug-
gest that the United States also regarded him as someone so threatening as to 
be ineligible for the legal protections of citizenship. Captured with his Taliban 
unit, Lindh was held incommunicado for the next fifty-four days as he was in-
terrogated by agents of the U.S. government. During this time, Lindh’s par-
ents hired a lawyer and sought to inform him of this through the State De-
partment, the Department of Defense, and their Congressional representatives. 
All these efforts were blocked by American officials. In the meantime, Lindh 
gave a confession to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation which 
Lindh was not allowed to read or sign, was not taped, and which, in violation 
of FBI protocol, did not include the presence of a second agent (Mayer 2003: 
57).
Lindh was subsequently indicted on ten federal charges related to his 
Taliban activities, including aiding the Taliban, conspiracy to kill nationals of 
the United States, and providing material support to al Qaeda, offenses for 
which he faced three life sentences plus an additional ninety years in prison if 
convicted (Mayer 2003: 50). In July 2002, two days before Lindh’s defense 
planned to challenge the legitimacy of his confession in court, the government 
abruptly offered Lindh a plea bargain which entailed his serving a twenty-
year prison term on one of the charges (aiding the Taliban) in exchange for 
the other nine being dropped. Since early 2003, Lindh has been at a medium-
security federal prison in California, where he will remain until 2022 (Mayer 
2003: 50). 
While Lindh’s circumstances certainly differ from Hamdi’s, the space he 
occupies in the American response to 11 September does not. Not simply de-
nied the privileges of citizenship, Lindh became one of ‘them,’ an American 
Taliban whose ‘allegiance to those fanatics and terrorists never faltered, not 
even with the knowledge that they had murdered thousands of his country-
men’, to quote Attorney General Ashcroft (in Mayer 2003: 50). Never mind 
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that none of these allegations was ever proven in a court of law, that Lindh’s 
Islamic fundamentalism bears a strong resemblance to its Christian counter-
part so fashionable in the United States, or the possibility that Lindh may 
simply have been tremendously naïve and consequently in the wrong place at 
the wrong time. Each of these interpretive possibilities was outweighed by the 
threat he allegedly posed to the body politic and obscured by the inflationary 
pressure of the social contract that transformed his deviance into a mortal 
danger. It is the ethic of destruction that belongs to warfare. As one of Lindh’s 
attorneys remarked, ‘It’s part of the change in approach to the law in this 
country, to prevention. You can detain people without evidence, make allega-
tions, then develop the evidence later. If you have no evidence, you drop the 
charges. The only problem is, you’ve destroyed someone’s life in the process’ 
(in Mayer 2003: 59). 
A third American caught up in the American offensive against terror is 
Jose Padilla, apprehended on 8 May 2002 by federal officials in Chicago as he 
stepped off a plane recently arrived from Pakistan. Padilla was initially held 
in federal criminal custody as a material witness in a grand jury investigation 
into the 11 September attacks. Accordingly, an attorney was provided for him 
by the Southern District of New York. On 9 June, however, President Bush 
designated Padilla an enemy combatant and ordered him into military custody 
for detention at the naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina. The basis for the 
designation was Padilla’s alleged conspiracy to detonate a ‘dirty bomb’ in the 
United States, as well as his suspected links to al Qaeda. Like Hamdi, Padilla 
was a United States citizen and therefore sought to challenge the legitimacy of 
his detention via a habeas petition filed in district court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York alleging violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ment rights. The petition ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which in 
June 2004 rejected Padilla’s claim on a jurisdictional technicality (Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla 2004). 8  During the appeals process, however, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals declared that the president lacked constitutional authority to 
detain citizens indefinitely without charge. When Padilla refiled his habeas 
petition, the South Carolina district court agreed with the Second Circuit 
Court concerning the president’s lack of constitutional authority. On appeal in 
September 2005 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, setting the 
stage for another review by the Supreme Court. 
It is here where things get interesting. Facing another challenge to its 
practice of indefinitely detaining citizens without charging them with a crime, 
the government accused Padilla of conspiracy to ‘murder, kidnap and maim’ 
people overseas and requested that he be transferred from military to civilian 
custody to stand trial. No mention was made of the dirty bomb allegation or 
                                             
8  Padilla filed his habeas petition in the Southern District of New York, which is 
where he was held immediately after his arrest. The Supreme Court found, how-
ever, that because he was transferred to South Carolina, he should have filed his 
petition in that state. 
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any of the other circumstances that had led to his enemy combatant designa-
tion. Unimpressed, the Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s transfer peti-
tion while pointedly criticizing the government’s bizarre legal maneuvering. 
Judge J. Michael Luttig observed that the ever-shifting rationale behind 
Padilla’s detention created the impression that ‘Padilla may have been held 
for these years, even if justifiably, by mistake’, and that the government 
seemed to believe it could engage in such behaviour ‘with little or no cost to 
its conduct of the war against terror’. Luttig concluded with the warning that 
such conduct might in fact entail ‘substantial cost to the government’s credi-
bility before the courts’ (in Frieman 2006). Undeterred, in January 2006 the 
United States government asked for and received Supreme Court permission 
to transfer Padilla back to civilian custody, where he now awaits trial sched-
uled for January 2007 (JURIST Legal News and Research 2006). 
Noteworthy in each of these cases is just how little the privileges of citi-
zenship actually helped the individuals in question, a circumstance indebted 
to the criminology of the other and its tendency to view the authors of disor-
der as fundamentally evil. No longer offenders from liberalism’s inside, 
Hamdi, Lindh, and Padilla became part of the outside when they affiliated 
with those who, by attempting to harm the body politic, intended its death by 
definition. Yet the paucity of actual evidence in support of the government’s 
contentions suggests that the real offence here is betrayal of the norms and 
ideals that define what it means to be an American and of which citizenship 
has increasingly become the legal expression. Lindh, as an upper-middle-class 
white male, is especially instructive in this regard. As the government’s 
strangely evaporating case against him suggests, Lindh was quite likely never 
a material threat to the United States and was most certainly not threatening to 
the degree suggested by the ten crimes with which he was initially charged. 
However, with his conversion to Islam, he departed from the view that sees in 
Christianity divine inspiration for the existence of the United States. His act 
of religious difference (admittedly more thoroughgoing than most), was trans-
formed in the aftermath of 11 September into a total repudiation of the repub-
lic and effortlessly linked to the horrors of that day. As a result, claimed the 
Bush administration, Lindh forfeited the rights that belong to citizens (despite 
this being a legal impossibility absent a judicial procedure). Likewise might 
Hamdi’s and Padilla’s transgressions be seen as less significant for the threat 
they posed (quite little in the former, as it turned out; still to be seen, in the 
latter), than for what they indicated about the status of Islamic Americans, 
who rightly fear the very real possibility of being cast into a zone beyond the 
law at least partly on the basis of who they are. Such responses are animated 
by the belief that liberalism’s warfare mode is the appropriate solution to dis-
order and that such disorder permits the exclusion of citizens from the legal 
and political order of which they are nevertheless members. Citizenship itself 
becomes an artifact of executive branch determinations made in response to 




Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been under United States jurisdiction since the 
conclusion of the Spanish American War in 1898 and, since 2001, has served 
as a prison for suspected Taliban and al Qaeda members detained during the 
war on terror. From the beginning, Guantanamo detainees have been denied 
basic legal protections, including access to counsel, knowledge of the charges 
against them, and the right to file habeas corpus claims in the court system of 
the United States. Likewise have Guantanamo detainees been denied Geneva 
Conventions protections as prisoners of war. Despite international outrage 
over these circumstances, the United States have consistently claimed that 
foreign fighters captured in the war on terror do not deserve Constitutional 
protections because they are not citizens and are ineligible for Geneva Con-
ventions protections because they are non-state enemies. They are, in a very 
concrete sense, no longer persons. Instead, Guantanamo detainees are unlaw-
ful combatants, a legal non-status beyond the reach of law that has made it 
nearly impossible for them to contest the circumstances of their detention, 
much less to defend themselves or secure their release. 
Legally speaking, the practice of indefinite detentions is rooted in both the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force and in an executive order signed by 
President Bush on 13 November 2001 authorizing him to detain persons who 
are members of al Qaeda, who engaged in or conspired to commit acts of ter-
rorism against the United States, or who have harboured anyone in these two 
categories. While such authorisation might be seen as more or less legitimate 
considering the circumstances, it is language near the end of the order which 
signals the administration’s conviction that belligerents on the wrong side of 
the war on terror deserve nothing less than the full force of liberalism’s war 
making capacity. In particular, the order stipulates that ‘military tribunals 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the individual,’ 
and that ‘the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy […] in any 
court of the United States, or any state thereof, any court of any foreign na-
tion, or any international tribunal’ (White House 2001a). In short, no judicial 
review of unlawful combatant status or the indefinite detentions that result. 
During legal proceedings pursued on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees 
by American legal rights organisations, both the district court and the Wash-
ington DC circuit court of appeals agreed that the courts of the United States 
lack jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions filed by aliens held outside the 
sovereign territory of the United States. In June 2004 the United States Su-
preme Court vacated these findings, arguing that American courts have the 
power to determine the legality of alien detentions regardless of where they’re 
held, and that at any rate, the United States government exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay, thus bringing it within the purview of the 
American court system. The Supreme Court further pointed out that nothing 
in any of its previous decisions categorically excluded aliens from invoking 
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habeas privileges, again irrespective of whether they are held by the military 
or by the civilian criminal justice system (Rasul v. Bush 2004, Center for 
Constitutional Rights 2006). 
Thanks to Hamdi and Rasul, it momentarily appeared as though the war 
on terror and the Bush administration’s efforts to keep accused terrorists in a 
zone beyond the law would be reined in by liberalism’s traditional limitations 
on the power of government. Faced with this prospect, Congress in 2005 
elected to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees 
via passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. According to Section 
1005(e)(1), ‘no court […] shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider […] an 
application for […] habeas corpus filed by […] an alien detained […] at 
Guantanamo Bay’ (Detainee Treatment Act of 2005). Of even greater con-
cern, from the detainees’ perspective, at least, was the Bush administration’s 
intent to interpret the act as applying to all pending Guantanamo habeas peti-
tions, thereby jettisoning the legal protections recently conferred by Rasul.
However, a second Guantanamo-related case was gradually making its 
way towards the Supreme Court, one that would not only bear directly on the 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act but other ele-
ments of the war on terror as well. Broadly speaking, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
(2006) pertained to that part of the president’s 13 November executive order 
creating military tribunals for the trial of Guantanamo detainees. The peti-
tioner in the case was Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni national captured in Afghani-
stan in 2001 and who, it turned out, had formerly been Osama bin Laden’s 
driver. The circumstances of Hamdan’s detention were familiar: he was held 
without charge for a year at Guantanamo, at which point ‘the President 
deemed Hamdan eligible for trial by military commission for then-unspecified 
crimes’ (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006: 1). Another year passed, at which point 
Hamdan was charged with conspiracy ‘to commit […] offenses triable by 
military commission’ (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006: 1). Via pro bono counsel-
ors acting on his behalf in the United States, Hamdan argued that Bush’s mili-
tary commissions lacked authority to try him because such commissions were 
not created by a specific act of Congress and that the procedures adopted for 
purposes of his trial violated both military and international law. 
The Bush administration’s initial response was to seek dismissal on the 
basis of the Detainee Treatment Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision. The 
Supreme Court demurred, arguing that the act failed to specifically include 
pending cases. The Court also had much to say concerning the substantive 
points raised by Hamdan. First, it found that Congress’ Authorization for Use 
of Military Force did not contain specific language authorizing the creation of 
military tribunals and that therefore the president’s 13 November executive 
order could not be justified through reference to that act. Accordingly, the le-
gally binding provisions for military tribunals were those provided by the 
UCMJ, which are in turn bound by the Geneva Conventions. However, the 
Court found numerous violations of the provisions of these two laws. In par-
ticular, the commissions not only enabled the admission of hearsay evidence 
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but provided that the accused and his attorney could be denied access to evi-
dence presented during any part of the proceedings declared ‘closed’ by the 
presiding officer, the grounds for which included vague ‘national security in-
terests’ (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006: 4). Still more to the point, the Court con-
cluded that ‘there is a basis to presume that the procedures employed during 
Hamdan’s trial will violate the law: He will be, and indeed already has been
excluded from his own trial’ (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006: 5). As for the Ge-
neva Conventions, the Court cited Common Article III’s ‘prohibition on “the 
passing of sentences […] without previous judgment […] by a regularly con-
stituted court affording all the judicial guarantees […] recognized as indispen-
sable by civilized peoples”’ (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006: 6). Further, the Court 
pointed out that while Common Article III’s requirements ‘are general, 
crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems […] they are re-
quirements nonetheless’ (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006: 7). 
In late September 2006, however, Congress once again joined the fray 
with passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006). Acting as though the Supreme Court had uttered nary a 
word on the subject, the Act gives Congressional support to precisely the sort 
of military commissions so roundly criticized in Hamdan. In particular, the 
Act specifically authorizes the president to establish such commissions, pro-
hibits an individual subject to trial by commission from invoking the Geneva 
Conventions as a source of rights, and permits the admission of hearsay evi-
dence at the discretion of the presiding officer. As for habeas corpus, the Act 
specifically prohibits any court, judge, or justice from considering a habeas 
petition related to any aspect of the detention by the United States of unlawful 
combatants anywhere in the world. Further, the new law applies this provision 
to all pending habeas claims. On 20 October 2006, (the day after President 
Bush signed the measure into law), the government informed the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia that it no longer had jurisdiction over 196 
habeas petitions brought by Guantanamo Bay detainees. At a minimum, the 
new law indicates that the legislative branch is now also committed to mar-
ginalizing the judiciary’s role in the ‘war on terror’. Despite repeated judicial 
opinions concerning the right of detainees to access the federal court system, 
Congress has decided to bypass those rights by providing legislative valida-
tion of executive fiat. It also indicates that the particulars of the United States’ 
conduct of that war will remain shrouded in secrecy, which is to say that the 
war on terror will be waged outside the parameters of the law. Only the over-
whelming force of the state’s war making capacity, so it seems, is adequate to 




Certainly it is tempting to explain the United States’ response to 11 Septem-
ber in terms of an enthusiasm for wild west-style justice on the part of Presi-
dent Bush or through reference to the extreme version of Christianity and its 
simplistic division of the world into good and evil which guides his conduct. 
Alluring though this may be, it fails to describe how an established system of 
national and international laws has been so easily subverted for purposes of 
waging war against those deemed responsible for the attacks of that day or 
how an entire nation can accede to acts of torture and abuse committed in its 
name. It is for these reasons that I have highlighted the importance of recent 
developments in the national attitude towards domestic criminals. Only when 
the authors of disorder are represented as fundamentally other and therefore 
implacably opposed to the social order does it become possible to imagine the 
suspension of basic human rights which domestic and international law for-
merly regarded as sacrosanct. As threats multiply and become increasingly 
atavistic, so too does the horizon of possible responses expand, even to the 
point of discarding the very rules for managing interhuman conflict laid down 
in the social contract. Yet the United States has faced grave threats in the past 
without having to torture, indefinitely detain, abuse, or otherwise compromise 
the principles in defense of which it was allegedly founded. Accordingly, in 
the space that remains I wish to highlight some of the implications of these 
developments, particularly as they concern the future of the citizen’s relation-
ship to the decreasingly liberal state. 
I say ‘decreasingly liberal’ because of the ways in which the state’s dis-
pute resolution function has been displaced by the norms of the neoliberal 
marketplace in which rationally informed ‘choice’ serves as the orienting 
principle of both individual and state behaviour. Locke’s use of the term ‘um-
pire’ in describing the state’s function is instructive here because it implies a 
state that regulates the realm of rational decision-making without itself par-
ticipating in that realm or endorsing one version of rationality over others. It 
is by virtue of this neutrality that the state can make good on its promise to 
protect the members of the commonwealth even when they make poor deci-
sions. Simply put, from the state’s point of view, protection is the higher 
value. In the agent-centric orientation of the criminology of the other, how-
ever, crime is explained as the outcome of a flawed calculus that can and 
should be punished. It’s less the deed itself that matters than the calculations 
that led up to it. After all, choosing between competing alternatives is what 
liberal, reasoning man does, and the social contract is clearly preferable to the 
state of nature in the eyes of any rationally thinking being. Accordingly, said 
beings choose to abide by its mandates and the modification of their behav-
iour these entail. No coincidence, then, that the criminology of the other 
represents criminal behaviour as a similar type of choice made in the opposite 
direction by fundamentally wicked people. 
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As Wendy Brown (2005: 39-40) has argued, this neo-liberal version of 
citizenship involves ‘extending and disseminating market values to all institu-
tions and social action’ as well as the development of ‘institutional practices 
and rewards for enacting this vision’. Even decisions made in what Locke 
would undoubtedly regard as the private sphere come to be viewed in terms of 
market criteria, with all the associated rewards and penalties. So, for example, 
individuals’ ‘moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for “self-care” – 
the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions. In 
making the individual fully responsible for her/himself, neo-liberalism 
equates moral responsibility with rational action […] no matter how severe 
the constraints on this action – for example, lack of skills, education, and 
childcare in a period of high unemployment and limited welfare benefits’ 
(2005: 42). Along the way, the citizen-state relationship is radically trans-
formed. The state is no longer that unique associational form for the resolu-
tion of disputes but an actor like any other which ‘must not simply concern it-
self with the market but think and behave like a market actor across all of its 
functions, including law’ (2005: 42). Not surprisingly, the model citizen in 
this context ‘is one who strategizes for her/himself among various social, po-
litical and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organ-
ize these options’ (2005: 43). 
The effect of extending the mores of the marketplace to liberalism’s for-
mally non-political spheres is twofold: the production of subjects for whom a 
highly depoliticized version of rationality becomes the highest priority, and 
the implementation of controls for those deemed incapable of adhering to the 
dictates of reason. After all, the criminology of the other presumes that the 
capacity to reason correctly is not equally present in everyone and therefore 
takes for granted the existence of a class of people who are ‘strongly attracted 
to self-serving, anti-social, and criminal conduct unless inhibited from doing 
so by robust and effective controls’ (Garland 2001: 15). Accordingly, behav-
ioural interventions ‘should centre not upon individuals but upon the routines 
of interaction, environmental design and the structure of controls and incen-
tives that are brought to bear upon them. The new policy advice is to concen-
trate on substituting prevention for cure, reducing the supply of opportunities, 
increasing situational and social controls, and modifying everyday routines’ 
(Garland 2001: 16). That the state has become an active participant in the im-
plementation of these controls ought not come as a surprise given the increas-
ing fluidity of liberalism’s inside/outside distinction. Now itself a rationally 
calculating ‘being’, and consequent to its enthusiasm for looking upon war 
and crime as flip sides of the same coin, the state now has little choice but to 
regard everyone as a potential combatant/criminal. 
Of course it is precisely within the context of the ‘war on terror’ that the 
embrace of an overtly martial and therefore highly restrictive rationality 
comes to seem most necessary and most logical. Especially for those citizens 
raised on the virtues of the social contract as a mechanism for resolving dis-
putes, terrorism – and especially that perpetrated by citizens – is the most 
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comprehensive repudiation of the body politic and therefore the ultimate irra-
tional act. Consequently, it becomes rational to reduce the opportunities for 
terrorist activity through constraints on personal freedom, the hardening of 
public spaces, and the spending of untold billions on the military. So too does 
warring against terror further abet the tendency of the criminology of the 
other to regard acts of disorder as rooted in dispositional factors rather than 
concretely situated political circumstances. In what has become an interpre-
tive double standard, ‘we’ are waging war in the sedate, settled sense implied 
by liberalism, whereas ‘they’ are akin to Locke’s ‘dangerous and noxious 
creatures’ beyond the pale of civilisation and who must therefore be elimi-
nated because they cannot be rehabilitated to the norms of liberal reason. The 
recent fondness for civilisational comparisons can thus be read as shorthand 
for the rationality/irrationality divide that allegedly differentiates those com-
mitted to freedom and those not. Criminology’s ‘evil other’ becomes applica-
ble on a global scale, embodied in the person of the ‘terrorist’. 
The modifications to the citizen-state relationship entailed by these devel-
opments are therefore far from haphazard. The citizen needs the state now 
more than ever, not simply as a protector from external dangers and as a regu-
lator of internal affairs but also as a bulwark against the irrationality now re-
garded as omnipresent and implacably opposed to the interests of those rea-
soning choosers who remain committed to the social contract. Yet there is ul-
timately an additional paradox here, insofar as the fear inspired by the war on 
terror is so utterly irrational. After all, the chances of dying in one’s bathtub 
are many thousands of times greater than that of dying in a terrorist attack. 
But fear, of course, has a way of inducing its own forms of rationality, such 
that the citizen can be forgiven for occasionally relating to the state as some-
one in need of protection might, and whose contractual obligation now in-
cludes acquiescence to whatever forms of behaviour are deemed necessary. In 
such an environment, passivity, too, becomes a rational, reasoned act de-
signed to ensure one’s survival. 
Predictably, fear also stimulates a pronounced turn towards the executive 
branch and its version of events, versions that are as damaging as they are 
fantastical. I refer here to the July 2006 Harris poll which found that half of 
all Americans still believe Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction at the 
time of the United States’ 2003 invasion. Analysts and pundits put forth all 
sorts of explanations, including repeated assertions to the effect of same by 
the White House, right-wing talk radio, and a general need to justify the war 
in Iraq (New York Times 2006). Undoubtedly each of these explanations is 
plausible in its own way. Yet they each fail to account for the ways in which 
belief in such ephemera is the concomitant of the state’s monopolisation of 
what it means to be rational and of the highly restricted options for thinking 
about threats and dangers that result as a consequence. Increasingly deprived 
of the ability to fashion the reality to which they now relate as consumers, 
citizens frequently have little choice but to acquiesce to the version of truth 
formulated by those at the helms of control. Accordingly, along with the legal 
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protections ideally afforded by liberalism, we might also list a meaningful 
sense of citizenship as an additional casualty in the war on terror. 
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Suspect Subjects: Muslim Migrants and the 
Security Agencies in Germany 
WERNER SCHIFFAUER
Ever since 9/11, security political questions have increasingly been dominat-
ing the discussion about the integration of Muslim immigrants into German 
society. This is a result of the new security policy, which is characterized by 
an expansion of ‘repressive’ measures and their supplementation and exten-
sion through ‘preventive’ measures. In the jargon of the security agencies, 
‘repressive’ measures are those which – as did the laws enacted in the first se-
curity package issued shortly after 9/11 to increase air travel security – target 
direct prevention of crimes and/or improvement of criminal prosecution. To 
the extent that measures are adopted in advance of an incident, they are to de-
flect immediate danger. ‘Preventive’ measures, on the other hand, are con-
cerned with abstract danger situations. In this context, matters preliminary to, 
and associated with, possible crimes are interpreted in a significantly broader 
manner. The emphasis placed on such measures recently is the expression of a 
‘comprehensive approach to domestic security which is not limited to repres-
sive intervention’ or of an ‘all-encompassing’ concept of security.1 Preventive 
measures are not concerned with criminals or crimes, but with ‘extremists’ as-
sumed to be capable of becoming potential criminals, with ‘milieus’ produc-
ing or providing escape for criminals, and with ‘discourses’ which could in-
cite crimes. The need for a new concept of security, as Julia Eckert has 
shown, is based on two figures of thought: the supposed unpredictability and 
                                             
1  Volker Homuth, Director of the Lower Saxony Agency for Internal Secu-




irrationality of the new terrorism, which can apparently hit anywhere and any-
time; and the extent of the danger,2 which made new measures necessary 
(Eckert 2005). 
In this paper, I will turn to the consequences preventive measures have on 
integration policy. At the same time, it is of particular importance to me to 
show that the results do not merely consist in a new legal situation. Of far 
greater consequence is the fact that a new atmosphere has been promoted, 
which has an extensive influence on the application of laws in practice. This 
atmosphere leads to a new and close cooperation among various agencies – 
especially the Verfassungsschutz [the internal security agency for the protec-
tion of constitutional order], the immigration authorities, and the courts. As 
Didier Bigo puts it, a security field with a high degree of internal coordination 
develops (Bigo 2000). This coordination is only in part consciously created; 
rather, it seems to develop almost on its own as various partners agree on a 
common threat scenario, which can be summarized as follows: The central 
danger facing our state comes from Islamistic terrorism which is penetrating 
Germany through immigrants from Muslim countries. The acceptance of this 
scenario has two consequences. The first is that, as far as Muslim immigrants 
are concerned, the usual checks and balances of various state authorities – vi-
tal for the functioning of the rule of law – are reduced. This increases the dan-
ger of false decisions, and thus of injustice. The second consequence consists 
of Muslim residents being increasingly stigmatized, accelerating the dynamics 
of the isolation by others and self-isolation. Both together lead to unintended 
consequences which give rise to new dangers. 
In the first section, I will deal with the significance of the Verfassungss-
chutz (Internal Security Agency) in the context of prevention and discuss the 
specific ways it constructs knowledge with regard to the supporting milieus of 
terrorism. In the sections to follow I will show how this information directs 
and structures practices of state agencies, with regard to naturalisation, to ex-
pulsions, and to the surveillance and disciplining of Islamic organisations. At 
the same time I will devote particular attention to the cooperation among 
various state agencies. In a concluding section I will go into the unintended 
results of new security policies on the integration of Muslims. 
                                             
2  The mathematical definition of risk refers to probability times extent of danger. 
If the danger is considered extremely high, such a risk estimate is required, even 
to take measures for a situation whose probability of occurrence is considered 
relatively unlikely. The problem with this calculation lies in the fact that quite 
far-reaching measures can be legitimized by it. 
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The Knowledge of  the Verfassungsschutz
The German Internal Security Agency plays a key role in the implementation 
of the security policy inasmuch as it provides the information on whose basis 
other state instances act. 
In accordance with its assigned duties, the agency is obliged to observe 
not only groups and efforts which – such as the prohibited organisations ‘Hizb 
ut Tahrir’ and ‘Caliphate State’ – are in open opposition to the German con-
stitution, but also those who profess allegiance to the constitution in their pub-
lic statements, obey the laws, and distance themselves from acts of violence, 
if there is a justified suspicion of anticonstitutional efforts. Among Islamic 
communities, this applies to the Islamic Community of Germany (IGD), and 
especially to the Islamic Community Milli Görüs (IGMG). For them, the 
‘suspicion’ of anticonstitutional efforts is based primarily on their Islamistic 
past and on the transnational relations both organisations maintain, the IGD 
with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, and the IGMG with the 
Saadet Party of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey. Both of these organisations are 
pursuing the goal of Islamisation of their respective homelands and societies. 
IGD and IGMG admit to these connections, raise the point, however, that 
meanwhile they are pursuing a different agenda in Europe. The change of 
generations, they say, has led to a shift in perspectives in the European divi-
sions of the organisations. They are committed to Europe with the long-term 
goal of establishing Islam as a minority religion in the framework of the legal 
systems of European states. Both organisations claim to have changed and/or 
to be in the midst of a process of change. 
Now, there is a significant interest of society on the whole in an unbiased 
examination of this claim. For if that should indeed be true, this would mean 
that in these two organisations’ positions have been developed, which attempt 
to overcome Islamism from within. Such a process would promise a certain 
sustainability and provide intellectual answers to radical and terrorist Islam. 
This would signify the chance of preventing young people from drifting off 
into the sectarian and violent scene. 
An independent examination, however, is hindered by the Verfassungs-
schutz’s claim to be ‘the Federal Republic’s institutionalized distrust of itself’ 
(Claudia Schmid, Director of the Berlin Bureau of the Verfassungsschutz).
Reading the federal and state Internal Security Agencies’ reports, one gets the 
impression that the agencies’ assignment of duties does not result in an unbi-
ased examination of the positions of the organisations observed, but rather in 
a systematical attempt to counter the public claims made by these organisa-
tions – which amounts to showing that ‘actually’, a secret agenda is indeed 
being pursued despite constitutional rhetoric. A precise reading of the reports 
highlights the fact that the Internal Security Agency is very selective with the 
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information it provides. Whatever fits the picture is quoted (anti-Semitic 
statements in sermons, for instance); what doesn’t fit the image (for example, 
active contacts with the Jewish Community or engagement in inter-religious 
dialogue), however, is sorted out. The fact that the youth work in these com-
munities attempts to promote Islamic self-confidence is criticized as anti-
integrationist; the fact that the communities at the same time encourage send-
ing children, both sons and daughters, to German upper schools, all are not 
mentioned in any report. When interpreting quotes, the reading most unfavor-
able for the IGMG is chosen. If contradictory statements from the organisa-
tion appear, the agencies only in exceptional cases examine whether this is a 
result of factional struggles;3 rather, they are quite simply explained by the 
image of speaking with a forked tongue (to the outside world, they speak in 
accordance with the accepted German public opinion, while maintaining other 
positions internally). Occasionally, statements are turned into their exact op-
posite.4 Under the distrusting gaze of the Verfassungsschutz, communities are 
stylized and are portrayed as significantly more extremist and closed off than 
an unbiased examination of them would indicate. 
A specific problem area is to be found in those sections of Internal Secu-
rity Agency reports dealing with the IGD and the IGMG, in that they quite 
simply equate the accusation of behaving in an anti-integrational manner, of 
carrying out ‘identity policies’, and/or of creating ‘parallel society structures’ 
with anticonstitutionalism. Here, the points of view dominating the examina-
tion have nothing to do with the constitution. One may indeed have political 
objections to parallel societies, but no constitutional qualms can be deduced 
from them. Thus, the line between constitutional and anticonstitutional is 
completely blurred and the door to arbitrariness is opened wide. For example, 
Internal Security Agency reports portray activities which are in complete con-
formity with the constitution, such as the creation of a legal department,5 as 
problematic.6
Indeed (and this has so far been taken into consideration far too little), the 
far-reaching assessments of the Internal Security Agency rely on a limited 
data basis. Analysis is based primarily on the evaluation of written material, 
but not on systematic interviews, field research, or questioning. ‘For legal rea-
sons, Internal Security Agencies are not authorized to conduct broad studies 
                                             
3  The single exception is the Berlin Internal Security Agency report from 2004. 
4  Cf. Schiffauer (2004). I have indeed had the personal experience of witnessing 
the complete perversion of my text. An appraisal I wrote, which was very criti-
cal of the Internal Security Agency, was evaluated by that same agency in public 
as a confirmation of its own position. 
5  This assessment of a legal department is particularly touchy considering the se-
rious legal consequences membership in the IGMG entails. 




on the “Islamic milieu”; these are and remain primarily the tasks of academic 
research’, claims the Cologne staff member of the Internal Security Agency, 
Tania Puschnerat (2006). 
Another limitation must be stressed. The Verfassungsschutz creates the 
impression of being an independent authority charged with investigation on 
‘enemies of the constitution’. This impression is deceiving. The reports are 
prepared, according to the official explanation, ‘on the basis of the results of 
the Internal Security Agencies after subjection to a political evaluation by the 
Ministry of the Interior’. Political considerations thus influence which organi-
sations are mentioned in the report and which are not, and what the extent of 
the coverage is.7 Political intervention also appears to penetrate through to the 
content of what is said. Agency staff members have reported to me that a su-
pervisor’s expectations may indeed have an influence of the reports drafted. 
There is no mention of these limitations in the reports of the Internal Se-
curity Agencies, nor in agency decisions. Instead of providing a differentiated 
picture listing arguments for and against anticonstitutionalism and pointing 
out the limitations related to the narrow data basis, authoritative judgments on 
the constitutionality of an organisation are passed. 
In recent years, apparently in connection with security political considera-
tions, Internal Security Agency evaluations have been placed in a new con-
text. Connected with radicalisation scenarios and a broader notion of security, 
communities such as the IGMG and the IGD are increasingly being portrayed 
as supporting milieus of radical and terrorist Islamism. What was depicted as 
anticonstitutional, but not dangerous in any real sense, before 9/11 is now 
considered a first step towards a security risk. Since then, it was stressed 
again and again that, in terms of a broader concept of security, investigations 
of Islamism must not be limited to radical and/or violent organisations.8
The link between (inferred) ‘anticonstitutionalism’ and (vaguely defined) 
‘security risks’, produced in radicalisation scenarios, has a very strong impact 
because a demand for concrete measures is connected to it. It may lead to a 
situation in which other agencies are ever less willing to critically examine the 
statements contained in Verfassungsschutz reports, because the fear of making 
a political mistake is growing. In case of imminent danger, it is better to act 
overcautiously. 
                                             
7  According to Heribert Landolin Müller, Director of the section responsible for 
Islam at the State Agency for Political Education in Berlin: ‘Islamism – a jour-
nalistic challenge’ (2/3 February 2006) 
8  According to the director of the Lower Saxony agency, Volker Homuth, at the 




This new dominance of security policy has led to a U-turn in the area of natu-
ralisation policy. This shift in the practice of the naturalisation authorities re-
quired no change of legislation. Its legal basis instead rests on a new interpre-
tation of the new law on national citizenship passed in 1999. One component 
of the law was the introduction of new requirements for obtaining citizenship 
in addition to the ones already in existence (i.e. long residency, no criminal 
record, etc.). These consisted of the ability to provide economic support for 
oneself and one’s family. Additionally, linguistic competence and loyalty to 
the constitution were included as prerequisites. Concerning the latter, the law 
states: ‘No claim for naturalisation exists if […] actual indications justify the 
assumption that the naturalisation candidate is pursuing or supporting efforts 
[…] which are directed against the free and democratic basic order of the state 
or against the continued existence or security of the federal state or any of its 
component states […]’ (Bundesgesetzblatt, Jg. 1999 Teil I Nr. 38; 23 July 
1999, p.1620). 
Interestingly enough, the debate at the time focused on insufficient lin-
guistic competence as grounds for an exclusion from naturalisation. There 
was an intense discussion of the question as to whether older immigrants can 
be compelled to learn German. However, what hardly anyone paid any atten-
tion to is the stipulation that ‘actual indications’ for the assumption that 
someone pursues efforts directed against the free and democratic basic order 
of the state are sufficient; this clause introduced a very elastic formulation in 
the text of the law. In order ‘to affirm “actual indications for the assumption”, 
no specific factual situation must be proved; rather, the mere possibility that a 
given situation might exist and that certain evidence provides indications for 
this indeed suffices’ (Bender 2003: 135). 
By means of a microanalysis of administrative practice I shall demon-
strate in the following how this formulation was turned into a sharp sword 
with which the original intent of the law was transformed into its very oppo-
site.
On 28 June 2002, the city of G. decided to reject Ayhan Celik’s (name 
changed) application for naturalisation. In its presentation of grounds, the city 
of R. quotes the above cited paragraph 85 of the law and makes this decisive 
point: 
‘Though you indeed professed allegiance to the free and democratic basic order of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany in writing on 12 January, 2002, 
you actually pursue and/or support activities which are directed against that free and 
democratic basic order. […] According to information from the Interior Ministry of 
the State of North Rhine Westphalia of 13 May, 2002, you have been on the board 
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of the local IGMG organisation since the year 1998. […] According to the current 
Internal Security Agency report of the State of North Rhine Westphalia for the year 
2001, the efforts of the IGMG are directed against the free and democratic basic or-
der of the Federal Republic of Germany, by which you fulfil the exclusion grounds 
of § 86 No. 2 AusG (Foreigner Law) and thus have no claim to nationalisation into 
the German Federation of States under § 85 AusG (Doc.1).’9
Mr. Celik appealed this decision. He argued that he would never support ef-
forts directed against the free and basic order and that the agency had no proof 
whatsoever to the contrary. The agency rejected the appeal on 22 October 
2002. It was argued that his engagement in the Milli Görüs was an ‘actual in-
dication’ for the assumption of anticonstitutional efforts. This, it went on, was 
determined by the Internal Security Agencies of the federal and state govern-
ments. ‘It is not the task of the Naturalisation Agency to make judgments 
about the information collected or evaluations made by federal and state In-
ternal Security Agencies’ (Doc. 2). 
There are two remarkable aspects of this correspondence. 
• The naturalisation authority expressly cedes to the Internal Security 
Agency the right to define whether an organisation, which has not been 
prohibited, is anticonstitutional or not. Thus, everyday bureaucratic rou-
tine undermines the intended legal procedures which entail a prohibition 
pronounced by the Interior Ministries of the states or the federal govern-
ment, against which legal proceedings can be initiated. 
• An examination of individual cases is neglected. If you are a functionary 
in an organisation which an Internal Security Agency deems not to be in 
conformity with the constitution, then the actual indication for your sup-
port of anticonstitutional efforts is considered manifest. 
In the case mentioned, a person was concerned who was actively, even if only 
on the local level, involved. In some federal states (for example Rhineland 
Palatine), however, also ordinary members are affected. Here, organisation 
membership and support for the local mosque are presented as grounds for 
denying naturalisation. Even mere contact is enough to arouse decisive suspi-
cion. Mr. Yildirim (name changed) was denied naturalisation by injunction, 
again with reference to ‘actual indications’: His ‘vehicle was observed during 
an event conducted by the IGMG Community of Völklingen-Luisenthal in the 
local culture center on 27 January 1998’ (Doc. 4). 
                                             




In cases of this sort, a hearing occurs. The following document, a written 
rejection after conclusion of a hearing, casts a light on the character of such 
conversations.
‘On the occasion of your personal appearance on 22 May, 2003, you made a state-
ment to the effect that you are not a member of the IGMG. Where the Internal Secu-
rity Agency obtained the information that you were a member of the above men-
tioned organisation in the years 1998 and 1999 is unknown to you. It was, however, 
known to you that the mosque you attended for prayer sympathizes with the IGMG 
[…]’
‘Through your membership in the above mentioned organisation, you declared your 
agreement with its goals and adopted them as your own. The profession of alle-
giance you made to the free and democratic order can, in view of your membership 
in the IGMG, only be regarded as empty talk (Doc. 3).’ 
Two things are important about this document. Firstly, the hearing is obvi-
ously only concerned with the question of IGMG membership. Attending the 
mosque infers membership, and membership infers agreement with the (sup-
posed) goals of the organisation. This chain of inferences is problematic. 
There can be very different motivations for membership in a Milli Görüs 
mosque community. In addition to members who feel politically at home in 
the Milli Görüs movement, i.e. support actively or passively Necmettin Er-
bakan’s Saadet Party or Tayyip Erdogan’s AK Party (about half of all mem-
bers, by my personal estimates), there is a large segment of completely apo-
litical members. Also, mosques are centers of social life as well, and it is in-
deed possible for someone to join the Milli Görüs because he wants to meet 
friends and acquaintances there. Many second-generation members were quite 
simply born into the community. And finally, not everyone who attends a 
Milli Görüs mosque is a member of the community. Unless you have strong 
reservations, you go to the mosque that is easiest to reach.10 Even if donations 
are made to the local mosque community, this is not necessarily a proof of 
membership in the IGMG. It is a matter of decency to provide financial sup-
port for the mosque community whose services you make use of, for these 
communities, unlike churches, must support themselves. 
Secondly, this document shows how the logic of fact-based indications 
shifts the burden of proof. There is no information in the text about the appli-
cant’s arguments, but apparently, the claim that he only went to the mosque to 
pray was considered mere denial self-defence. A similar helplessness can be 
deduced from the minutes of a hearing which is in my possession. The appli-
                                             
10  All observers emphasize this heterogeneous nature of motives. On the second 
generation, cf. Tietze (2001) or Meng (2004). 
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cant’s statements, distancing himself from violence, anti-Semitism, and reli-
gious intolerance as well as his profession of allegiance to democracy prove 
to be of no use to him. 
The impression that an applicant hardly stands any chance in a hearing to 
disprove the suspicion of being anticonstitutional can be drawn from the other 
minutes. Those questioned must give detailed information about cross-
connections between mosques, about previous memberships, etc. They must 
describe their reading habits. It is not unusual for the persons questioned to be 
confronted with statements from Verfassungsschutz reports about the IGMG 
and to have to take a stand on them. The hearings rather resemble cross-
examinations; it is very obvious that the aim is to get the persons questioned 
tangled up in contradictions. During questioning in Nuremberg, an applicant 
was asked to take a stand on the following extremely confrontational state-
ments: ‘What do you have to say about the discussion on veils? The prohibi-
tion of symbols has nothing to do with the free practice of religion.’ Or: ‘If 
state laws run counter to your understanding of free religious practice, you 
don’t like it. You place the Koran above state laws according to your interpre-
tation of the Koran.’ 
The developments described up to now concern the executive branch. 
Within this domain, it is hardly surprising that the interplay among the agen-
cies becomes ever more coordinated. It is, however, remarkable, and can ul-
timately only be explained by the dominance of security policy, that the judi-
cial branch also increasingly bows to this logic. For example, on 2 June 2003, 
the Bavarian Administrative Court in Munich (AZ M 25 K 00.5269) dis-
missed the suit of a Munich IGMG member who had argued that the material 
presented by the Internal Security Agency provided no support for the charge 
that he himself had participated in violent activities or called for them to be 
supported, nor for the claim that the IGMG views the use or approval of vio-
lence as a legitimate means for the advancement of its goals. The member 
claimed that he is highly integrated into his local German community. The 
court contested none of this, but declared it irrelevant. The plaintiff’s argu-
mentation, according to the court, was based on the ‘old legal situation’. The 
new legal situation excludes nationalisation when ‘actual indications’ are at 
hand. Proof of anticonstitutional activity is no longer necessary, ‘instead, fact-
based suspicion of crime suffices’ (p. 11). And as far as that was concerned, 
the court was of the opinion ‘that the information presented in the Verfas-
sungsschutz reports can in and of themselves be deemed actual indications in 
the terms of § 86 No. 2 AusG n.F. The Verfassungsschutz assessment and 
evaluation in the annual reports are admissible evidence and are to be ac-
cepted by an organisation as long as they are not obviously based on improper 
considerations’ (p. 16). The court did indeed concede that the ‘interests of the 
younger generation today dominating the IGMG are predominantly directed 
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at improving the social, political, and legal conditions of residents of Turkish 
origin and, in that regard, are oriented along the guidelines of Islamic law 
concerning Muslims in the diaspora, calling for obedience to the local legal 
system of the host society and affirmation of the values delineated in its con-
stitution’ (p. 20). However, the fact that the activities are only predominantly 
and not totally constitutional provided sufficient ‘actual indications’ for the 
denial of naturalisation. 
With this argumentation, the court confirmed the naturalisation authori-
ties’ practice of neglecting to examine individual cases. Instead, the concept 
of fact-based indications is used to treat two in fact loose connections based 
on suspicion as firm fact-based linkages. 
• If the Internal Security Agency suspects an organisation of being anticon-
stitutional, it is, in the opinion of the court, permissible to treat it as an an-
ticonstitutional organisation. 
• If someone is a member of a suspected organisation, he, too, is to be 
treated as someone who ‘pursues or supports efforts […] directed against 
the free and democratic basic order or against the continued existence or 
security of the federal state or any of its component states […]’ § 86 No. 2 
AusG.
Admittedly, court judgments are, for the time being, not unanimous. In its de-
cision of 28 February 2003, the Administrative Court of Karlsruhe followed a 
different assessment. The court argued that the Islamic community of Milli 
Görüs could not unequivocally be classified as extremist or anticonstitutional 
on the basis of the information sources provided. Therefore, an evaluation of 
the individual case was mandatory. The Administrative Court of Hamburg ar-
gued along similar lines in its decision of 1 October 2003. This decision was 
also remarkable because it was not dealing with a simple IGMG member, but 
with a functionary, the deputy chairman of a mosque community. In its writ-
ten opinion, the Hamburg court set down more stringent conditions for a ‘sus-
picion based on actual indications’. ‘General incriminating factors not sup-
ported by demonstrable concrete facts’ were insufficient in the eyes of this 
court.
These verdicts show that other interpretations of the law are possible, dif-
fering from the Munich judgment. Though the legal situation still remains un-
settled on the whole, there does seem to be a tendency to follow the Munich 
neglect of strict examination of individual cases. For example, the Superior 
Administrative Court of Rhineland Palatine may not have explicitly cited the 
Munich opinion, but it did adopt its contents. In essential passages of their 
opinion, the judges adopted the arguments of the Verfassungsschutz reports. 
Judicial opinion took another step when the Administrative Court of 
Wiesbaden, on 19 May 2005, upheld a decision of the Governing Committee 
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of Gießen to revoke the citizenship of three men, a novelty in the history of 
the German Federal Republic. In the written opinion (6 E 2225/04(2)), the 
state of Hessia was declared correct in arguing that the men had deceitfully 
acquired citizenship because in their application for naturalisation they had 
declared never to have supported efforts ‘which are directed against the free 
and democratic basic order of the state or against the continued existence or 
security of the federal state or any of its component states’. They should have 
mentioned their membership in the IGMG. In the proceedings, the IGMG 
members argued that in their opinion the IGMG did not pursue any anticonsti-
tutional goals and that no one had informed them that the IGMG was consid-
ered an anticonstitutional organisation by any state authorities. The plaintiffs 
also pointed out that they had actively participated in integration efforts, 
namely in ‘informational events for school students, German courses for 
women, the coordination of training programmes among students’, and ‘under 
the aegis of Caritas (the Catholic charity organisation in Germany), in infor-
mation sessions on youth crime and so on’ (17). The court did not contest 
their personal engagement, but declared it irrelevant as the Verfassungsschutz
report had evaluated the IGMG’s youth work in toto as disintegrative (17). 
Here, too, we can again witness the development of a special logic. In this 
case, the double linkage upheld by the Munich Administrative Court (i.e. that 
any organisation the Internal Security agency suspects of being anticonstitu-
tional indeed is anticonstitutional; and that any member of such an organisa-
tion is to be treated as someone acting or expressing himself anticonstitution-
ally) is consistently applied in reverse. Anyone who does not apply this logic 
to himself has thus ‘fraudulently’ obtained citizenship. 
The dominance of security policy may well explain why courts increas-
ingly tend to accede to the Verfassungsschutz, rather than to the Federal Su-
preme Court for Constitutional Matters, the authority actually responsible for 
declaring organisations in conformity with the constitution or anticonstitu-
tional. The observation of an attorney who was involved in asylum proceed-
ings for many years is significant: ‘In quiet times, judges tend to ask the Ver-
fassungsschutz to simply present the facts it has. In tense times, there is, on 
the contrary, a tendency to simply take over the assessments of the security 
agencies. The worry about making political mistakes becomes dominant.’11
An IGMG trial observer formulated another point of view: ‘You get the im-
pression that the people on the judge’s bench are trembling with fear of being 
tricked by particularly clever Islamists and later appearing naïve. Those in-
volved in the trial can talk about their inner social commitment as much as 
they want, it will be viewed with distrust simply on principle.’ Aggravating 
the situation is the fact that the law text is not unequivocal and permits a vari-
                                             
11  Gottfried Plagemann in a personal communication with me. 
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ety of interpretations. In making decisions in this wide area, ideas about val-
ues and preconceived opinions play a major role. The atmosphere in the soci-
ety on the whole, as it currently exists with regard to Islam, indeed has a deci-
sive influence on the judgments, according to former Supreme Court Justice, 
Bertold Sommer.12
This agreement on a definition of security shows quite clearly how a far-
reaching coordination of the independent executive and judicial branches 
takes place through a security definition and the constitution of a concept of 
the enemy, namely the Islamist. Each on their own, the different agencies start 
to go down the same path without any directive needed. ‘We see that the se-
curity realm is not so much defined by a power of coercion, as Weber and 
Hobbes suggest, as by the ability to produce images of the Other who can 
then be controlled […]’ (Bigo 2000: 93). 
The Law on Foreigners as a Weapon: Expulsion 
One consequence of the more restrictive naturalisation policy was indeed in-
tentional, keeping Muslim immigrants under the control of the law on for-
eigners. For example, Representative Grindel, in a Federal Parliament hear-
ing, referred to the initiatives for naturalisation started by the IGMG as early 
as 1999, ‘which limit our possibilities to get rid of some of the ringleaders and 
thus to stop activities directed against integration’ (Representative Grindel, 
CDU. Deutscher Bundestag, Bandabschrift. Public Hearing on 20 September 
2004, p. 66). The Bavarian Interior Minister, Günther Beckstein, according to 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung of 3 February 2006, declared, ‘he is “firmly con-
vinced” that the security interests of the citizens of Germany can better be 
served by a strict application of the foreigner law than by the enforcement of 
criminal law’ (p. 6). 
The severity of this weapon becomes particularly clear in connection with 
expulsions and denials of stay permits. Both methods hit the affected hard and 
permanently in their personal sphere and are often ‘worse than criminal sanc-
tions’ (Bender 2003: 132). Here, the foreigner law operates as a pseudo-
criminal law punishing with banishment. This is especially precarious, given 
that foreigner law, as an administrative law, does not recognize the liberal 
protection of the accused, which is so highly developed in criminal law (e.g. 
with regard to presumption of guilt or rules on evidence). Also, the principle 
of official investigation valid in administrative law is limited and/or sus-
pended inasmuch as the foreigner himself is obliged to provide verifiable evi-
                                             
12  On the occasion of a professional talk on 8 March 2006, at the German Institute 
for Human Rights, ‘Recognition and revocation of legal titles’. 
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dence for what is most favorable for him (oral information from Heiko 
Habbe). In short, the burden of proof is reversed. 
It is interesting that the debates conducted in 2001 on the second package 
of security laws took the far-reaching consequences of expulsions and denials 
of stay permits into account (Bender 2003). The government’s proposal for 
expulsion merely on the grounds of ‘actual indications’ of anticonstitutional-
ism was therefore voted down and a proof of actual anticonstitutional activity 
required. It is then interesting that administrative practice has, in this respect, 
not followed the intentions of the lawmakers. As I will show in the following, 
authorities have also deemed fact-supported indications for a lack of loyalty 
to the constitution as sufficient for decisions to expel. As applies to naturalisa-
tion, you don’t even have to be a member of an organisation which is consid-
ered dangerous, it’s enough to be a member of an organisation which is under 
suspicion of being anticonstitutional to prompt an expulsion, and this is so, 
even though the two legal matters are not at all on the same scale. 
For example, the expulsion order of the city of Frankfurt against Mr. Öz-
turgut (name changed) on 16 June 2005, was served on the grounds that there 
was knowledge of activities of his indicating he was an active member and 
functionary of the IGMG. (There was said to be verifiable evidence that he 
had provided his mobile phone for a Saturday meeting of the youth organisa-
tion of the IGMG district Frankfurt am Main-West, that he was cashier for the 
umbrella organisation of Hessian IGMG associations, that he had moderated a 
competition for oral Koran readings, etc.) Since there were indications that ef-
forts against the free and democratic basic order of the Federal Republic of 
Germany originated from the IGMG, an expulsion had to be ordered (Doc. 7). 
The fact that at that time a proof of anticonstitutional activity was required for 
expulsions, unlike the requirements for naturalisation, was simply ignored by 
the authorities. 
As with the naturalisation proceedings, here, too, the impression arises 
that the system is becoming ever more consistent. The County of Schaum-
burg, for example, argued on 16 September 2005, that the denial of a stay 
permit to a woman who, at the time of the decision, had been living in the 
Federal Republic for 12 years, was ‘urgently’ necessary because of her activ-
ity in the Board of Directors of the IGMG. The foreigners’ office claimed that 
it had to act in accordance with the security authorities and had no ‘manoeu-
vring room’. With this decision, they not only neglected to examine the indi-
vidual case; the alleged lack of manoeuvring room also categorically dis-
misses any possibility of weighing legal alternatives and rights. According to 
the County of Schaumburg, obviously an activity as a functionary in an or-
ganisation that has not been forbidden necessarily requires the destruction of 
the framework of a person’s life whose focal point of life has been in Ger-
many for the past 12 years. 
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In this context, again increasing use is being made of the weapon of ret-
roactive cancellation of a stay permit. Mr. Akkaya (name changed), for ex-
ample, was notified by the County Administration of Germersheim on 8 Feb-
ruary 2006, that his stay permit granted on 16 August 2005, was being re-
scinded because it had been an ‘illegal administrative act’. His activity as 
chairman of the local IGMG community gave rise to ‘security concerns’ 
(Doc. 9). Inasmuch as the foreigners’ office here clearly goes beyond the 
terms of the Verfassungsschutz report, this means an intensification, since 
constitutional concerns with regard to the IGMG are mentioned in the report, 
but no security concerns. Aggravating Mr. Akkaya’s situation is the fact that 
he is affected by the rescission of his stay permit despite belonging to the sec-
ond generation, born and raised in Germany. 
With this argumentation, the radicalisation scenario developed by the In-
ternal Security Agencies is put into practice. A further turning of the screw 
occurred on 20 July 2005, with an expulsion decree of the Mayor of the City 
of Wiesbaden. During a so-called security interview, the affected party had 
failed to mention membership in the IGMG when asked about connections 
with organisations suspected of supporting international terrorism. 
‘Thus, in the course of questioning serving to clarify concerns about entry 
or further residency, you made false or incomplete statements to my agency 
on major points. Thus, you have fulfilled the grounds for expulsion under § 
54 Nr. 6 AufenthG, and it is my intention to expel you from the territory of 
the Federal Republic.’ 
Here, the criminalisation inherent in the logic of the radicalisation sce-
nario is carried out once and for all. The chain of associations leads from sus-
picion of anticonstitutionality through accusation of anticonstitutionality, 
through the supposition of security concerns, all the way to the suspicion of a 
support of international terrorism. At the same time, anyone who doesn’t bow 
to this logic is accused of making false statements. 
There is something undeniably offensive about these decisions. The bu-
reaucrats go beyond the letter of the existing laws, or are expected to do so by 
superior agencies. They apparently consider themselves in part justified by 
the concept of a ‘democracy that can defend itself’. In addition, there is a cer-
tain passion for action in response to public pressure on politicians ‘to do 
something’. This is, of course, directed against groups and individuals who 
officials, on the basis of Verfassungsschutz reports, personally suspect of be-
ing anticonstitutional. This selective procedure, contradicting the ideal of state 
neutrality, does not interfere with their sense of justice, since their decisions 
can ultimately be reviewed by the courts (just as those who drafted the Baden-
Wurttemberg questionnaire were very aware of the fact that it might not be 
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kept up by the courts).13 Precisely this extremely widespread practice, how-
ever, makes a judicial practice which cedes the power of definition to the re-
ports of the Internal Security Agencies especially problematic. For this way, 
any counterbalance to measures which acquiesce in injustice for the individ-
ual on the grounds of what is good for the state, or for political reasons, dis-
appears.
In Islamic circles there are fears that the IGMG and the IGD could be only 
the first victims of the bureaucratic strategies described. Newspaper reports 
such as the one about the expulsion of three members of the Quietist (and ex-
plicitly pacifist) organisation Tabligh-i-Jamaat by the Bavarian state in Sep-
tember 2004, nourish these fears. 
All these cases clearly show the dangers which arise when the foreigners’ 
law is employed as a juridical weapon in political debates. It is increasingly 
turning into a weapon against individuals active in disliked, but not prohib-
ited, organisations. At least in some federal states, they must expect the de-
struction of their social and professional context of life through expulsion, 
practical banishment. Increasingly, not deeds, but convictions are being pun-
ished.
Survei l lance and Control  
Muslim organisations had to a remarkable extent already been the object of 
surveillance by the Internal Security Agencies and police even before 9/11. 
After 9/11, the intensity of surveillance practice increased. A new method 
consisted of the Verdachts- und Ereignisunabhängige Kontrollen (‘checks un-
related to suspicion or event’) and raids. There had indeed been raids before 
(against Caliphate State mosques, for example), but the goals had always been 
specific. Today, the raids seem to be mainly directed against the mosques of 
the Milli Görüs and the IGD, but they also include other mosques, without the 
selection criteria being obvious to outside observers. The majority of raids oc-
curred in Baden-Wurttemberg. I personally know of eight larger operations. 
The following summary listing, produced on the basis of police reports, re-
veals a remarkable discrepancy between the mission conducted and the results 
achieved.
• On 13 December 2002, 750 police officers were involved in a mission in 
Baden-Wurttemberg which examined over 600 people. It was called a 
‘raid against criminal Islamists in Stuttgart, Mannheim, and Freiburg’. 
                                             
13  ‘Of course nobody now knows what the courts will say. But let’s just stay calm, 
wait, and not give up in advance.’ This can be found in the ‘minutes’ of talks 
with naturalisation agencies, p. 15/16 (AZ 5-1012.4/12 Doc. 11). 
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They discovered ‘eight crimes and/or misdemeanors against stipulations 
of the foreigners’ law (illegal residency, violation of location restrictions), 
two forgeries of documents, and one offence against property’ (Press re-
lease from 16 December, 2002). 
• On 28 November 2003, 380 police officers on a mission in Baden-
Wurttemberg checked 360 individuals. They detected ‘one violation due 
to illegal residency, one violation of the law on asylum procedures, two 
insults of police officers, and two traffic violations’ (Press release from 2 
December 2003). 
• On 6 February 2004, controls took place in Rhineland Palatine to combat 
international terrorism. 270 officers examined 168 individuals. They were 
able to find one violation of the law on narcotics, four violations due to il-
legal residency, and two misdemeanors (violations of the restrictions on 
localities for asylum seekers). 
• On 23 July 2004, a mission was conducted in Rhineland Palatine for a 
‘combat against international terrorism’, in which 230 police officers were 
involved. 235 individuals and 102 vehicles were examined. Five crimes 
(suspicion of illegal residency) were registered. 
• On 23 July 2004, about 400 officers in Baden-Wurttemberg inspected 18 
organisation sites and mosques. Four crimes were registered, namely one 
violation of immigration law, one violation of asylum law, one violation 
of weapons law, and one misuse of identity documents (Press release from 
27 July). 
The state government of Lower Saxony, in reply to a parliamentary inquiry by 
representative Dr. Lennartz (GRÜNE), was unable to document a single 
search success. To the question as to the state government’s estimation of the 
relation between the costs of the measures and their results, the laconic reply 
was that the cost of the measures conducted could not be calculated (Lower 
Saxon State Parliament – 15th legislative period. Printed document 15/60). 
Politicians like the CDU Commissioner for Integration, Bosbach,14 occa-
sionally try to play down the raids by comparing them to traffic checks. This 
is deceptive. These police actions take place in an incomparably more severe 
manner, as the description of one such mission by the Bochum police shows: 
Bochum, 16 April 2004 
‘Well, no one could leave the mosque or the mosque’s courtyard. The driveway is 
maybe 20 meters wide and three or four VW police vans were standing there 
                                             
14  During a discussion with graduates of the Axel Springer Journalist School in 
Berlin on 16 November 2005. 
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bumper to bumper so nobody could climb over, and everywhere somebody might 
have been able to get out there were at least two police officers in full gear, with 
helmets, not on their heads, but attached, billy clubs, but not drawn yet, handcuffs, 
and of course these completely puffed-up jackets. Those weren’t regular police offi-
cers; they belonged to these special troops like for riots on 1 May in Kreuzberg […] 
You had to line up. Then two of those troops took you to a mobile office where they 
checked your identity, checked whether each one was really registered at some ad-
dress and if his identity papers were in order. Then they sent it out over radio and 
walkie-talkie, whatever, and they probably compared the data with those of the city 
of Bochum. Because a couple of computers were down, this took from quarter past 
three till nine-thirty in the evening. Then they finished up the last ones […]’ (Inter-
view with Mohammed Nabil Abdulazim, Berlin, 25 October 2004). 
Waiblingen and Fellbach, 23 July 2004 
‘[…] Our mosque and the DITIB mosque are in an industrial area. After Friday 
prayers, the gates to the industrial area were blocked by about forty or fifty police 
officers and their police vans. They stopped everyone leaving the mosque […] The 
names and addresses of every Muslim leaving the mosque were taken down. Two 
young men who didn’t have their IDs with them were taken to the police station and 
kept there for five hours. They were photographed. These two young men reported 
that another 25 Muslims were held at the police station […]’ 
‘During the same raid, the mosque in Fellbach […] was checked. According to our 
information, barricades were set up at a distance of 150 to 200 meters from the 
mosque […] Our people panicked. Because of these procedures, they couldn’t get 
back to their jobs on time […] The controls lasted until four o’clock in the after-
noon. If you asked, different reasons were given. 1) They were looking for Islamists; 
2) they were searching for criminals; 3) it was only a normal traffic check; 4) they 
weren’t allowed to give any information; 5) it was a search for drugs’ (Minutes of a 
conversation with Ugur Ataman, 23 July 2004). 
The general problem with these ‘checks unrelated to suspicion or event’ is, of 
course, that by definition they affect innocent citizens belonging to a certain 
category of individuals. These measures were therefore, not surprisingly, per-
ceived as extremely discriminatory by the faithful. ‘They would never dare do 
that in a church’, said one Muslim student. Many viewed the procedures as 
being specifically directed against Islam. ‘They won’t be satisfied until we 
completely give up Islam.’ ‘They want to scare people off so they won’t go to 
a mosque at all.’ (Interview with Mohammed Nabil Abdulazim) 
Particularly in smaller cities, where they had struggled for years for rec-
ognition of their mosque community, people find it embarrassing and humili-
ating to be subjected to controls openly on the street for everybody to see after 
attending mosque services. The Waiblinger and Fellbacher Muslims viewed 
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themselves as being portrayed as Islamists in the public eye. The report about 
the action in the local newspaper, the Rems-Murr-Rundschau (24 July 2004) 
bore the headline: ‘Search for Criminal Islamists’. ‘Once the police are there, 
whether you’re innocent or not, people say the police were at your place.’ 
(Mohammed Nabil Abdulazim op.cit.) The investigations were especially 
traumatic for individuals who had been subject to political persecution in their 
homelands. ‘They now feared the worst; that just has to well up inside them. 
And you had to get them to calm down first. There was an old man crying and 
he didn’t want to go outside. He saw the police and turned around and went 
back in. One man, he is 50 or 60 years old, was just bawling because he was 
afraid and said, “I haven’t done anything, I’m innocent, they shouldn’t take 
me”, and such things.’ (Mohammed Nabil Abdulazim) 
After the raid in Bochum, those attending the mosque were divided into 
two factions. Some said, ‘They don’t have anything on us.’ And the others 
said, ‘Yeah, they’ve got lists now of who’s comes to the mosque. They organ-
ized the whole shebang to get that kind of list together.’ This fear exists. The 
ones with a German citizenship are therefore less worried […] but everybody 
here who’s a foreigner could be expelled tomorrow. Statements from the 
community after the raid in Braunschweig on 30 July 2004, are typical: ‘Soon 
they’ll give us all a crescent moon sticker like they did with the Jews and the 
Star of David in the old days.’ (Report of an eye-witness) For the people at-
tending mosques of the Islamic Community Milli Görüs, the situation is ag-
gravated by the fact that they must fear substantial disadvantages, for the rea-
sons mentioned earlier, if they are registered during such controls. 
Checks without regard to individuals or grounds for suspicion are, mean-
while, not the only type of data collection. In Bavaria, for example, communi-
ties of the IGMG and the IGD are increasingly being treated as foreign politi-
cal organisations and required to hand over names and addresses of members 
as well as information about their citizenship. 
How vague the term ‘political’ is can be seen in the answer to an appeal 
from the County Administration Office of the state capital of Munich on 20 
October 2004. The community was first informed that, as a member of the 
IGMG, it belonged to an organisation directed against the free and democratic 
basic order and one which is considered a political organisation. More inter-
esting is the second argument: 
‘According to its bylaws, the goal of the organisation is the representation of the 
common interests of Muslim organisations in Bavaria, the protection of the rights of 
Muslims living in Bavaria, as well as the advocacy of the social, religious, legal, and 
cultural interests of Islam. In addition, one declared goal of the organisation is to at-
tain state recognition as a religious community and thus to be entitled to state sup-
port […] The representation of these interests in the society as a whole, in its all-
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encompassing manner, in fact represents a political activity which, in view of the 
close link between Islam’s religious message and its concept of the state and the 
lawmaker and public life, can in principle not be separated from the rest’ (Doc. 14). 
For all practical purposes, this argument contains the claim that Islamic or-
ganisations are per se political, and that their activities are thus not protected 
under the right to freedom of religion.15 In connection with the denials of 
naturalisation and expulsion decrees described above, the demands for mem-
bership lists appear to be a massive form of interference in the freedom to or-
ganize and assemble peaceably. They appear to be primarily motivated by the 
desire to pressurize unpopular groups, about which the authorities lack suffi-
cient materials for proceedings for prohibition, for as long as it takes to de-
stroy them. 
In connection with the genesis of the security realm, then, it is interesting 
that not only the agencies subordinate to the Interior Ministries, but also the 
tax offices meanwhile tend to put pressure on Islamic organisations. I am in 
possession of a letter from the tax office of Rheingau-Taunus which shows 
that the tax-free charitable status of the local IGMG community was revoked 
because of the Verfassungsschutz reports. 
The impression arises that the population does not perceive, and does not 
want to perceive, either, the intense feeling of insecurity such measures pro-
duce among Muslims. Muslim immigrants are confronted with the precarious 
status that many of them have. They are unashamedly placed under the gen-
eral suspicion of being enemies of an open society and therefore subjected to 
special procedures for naturalisation. The foreigners’ law is increasingly used 
as a weapon against them. They suffer restrictions on freedom of religion, of 
opinion, and of assembly. And finally, they are placed under an irritating ex-
tent of surveillance as well as controlled, and registered. 
With all this, they are treated as enemies of an open society and lumped 
together with violent criminals. This leads to Muslims feeling unprotected and 
homeless. ‘Since 9/11, many Muslims are incredibly frightened of ending up 
on some list or other’, says Burhan Kesici to describe the atmosphere. Ever 
more often in discussions with Muslims, they refer to the fate of the Jews. 
‘Before 11 September, I had the feeling I was simply supposed to break with 
Turkey. What do I have to do with Turkey anymore? That country has be-
come foreign to me. In the meantime, I no longer believe it would be a good 
                                             
15  This is no single case. A letter from the Administrative Office of Miltenberg, for 
example, states, ‘In its bylaws, in § 10, the general principles of the organisati-
on’s work is formulated. At least those principles formulated in no. 7 and no. 8 
prove that the organisation is politically active by taking positions on current so-
cially relevant questions from an Islamic point of view as well as by publishing 
violations of law against its members in suitable form.’ (Doc. 16) 
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idea for us to burn our bridges to Turkey. Maybe we’ll need that country one 
of these days.’ (Minutes from memory of a conversation with Mustafa Yen-
eroglu)
Unintended Results of  Securi ty Pol icy 
Because of security authorities’ broadened concept of security and radicalisa-
tion scenarios, security policy is increasingly concerned with the ‘preliminary 
stages’ of revolutionary and/or violent Islam, i.e. with communities defined as 
‘legalistic Islam’. For it can of course be argued that, in view of the immen-
sity of the terrorist danger, a balancing of legal interests must be undertaken. 
Restrictions on the freedoms of one group of the population would be accept-
able, if a larger legal interest, namely prevention of bodily injury, could this 
way be secured. The question is whether the measures described can at least 
achieve what they promise in terms of security policy. Since not even the se-
curity authorities believe that communities of legalistic Islam pose any dan-
ger, the radicalisation scenarios presented must be examined especially in this 
context. They may be summarized as follows: In communities of legalistic Is-
lam, socialisation takes place within an ‘isolated Islamic view of the world’ 
which, if appropriate chances and structures are present, makes a transition to 
more radical forms of Islam possible or even likely. Communities of legalistic 
Islam are, so to say, regarded as the milieu in which revolutionary, or even 
violent, Islam finds a protected space and can recruit. Here, common ideas are 
produced which permit access to more radical circles. 
First of all we should note that despite having some points in common in 
terms of their view of the world, there are radical differences between legalis-
tic Islamists and revolutionary Islamists, related to the overall context. On the 
one hand, an ethical conviction of ideological purity is to be found which re-
gards any compromise with the West as treason (cf. Schiffauer 2000); on the 
other hand, a practical politics logic of compromise which insists that a Mus-
lim can engage in the Western system as a Muslim without relinquishing his 
character, that basically the ‘West’ [democracy and the legal system] and Is-
lam can be combined. Representatives of the first position will reject all co-
operation and dialogue; representatives of the second position tend to seek 
them. While an ‘isolated’ Islamic image of the world can indeed be assumed 
in communities of revolutionary Islamism, the legalistic communities are 
characterized by a clear plurality of opinions.16 Just as important is the fact 
that communities of legalistic Islamism place key terms (such as jihad or 
Sharia) in a new overall context and thus ‘redefine’ them. This way, the fas-
                                             
16  This is also confirmed by the observations of Tietze (2001) and Meng (2004). 
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cination with revolutionary Islamism finds a counter position, inasmuch as it 
is demonstrated that Islam can also be understood differently. 
Even more important are the sociological differences between communi-
ties of ‘legalistic Islamism’ and those of ‘radical-revolutionary Islamism’. 
While the former are characterized by an open network structure and maintain 
relations with other Islamic communities (for example, in umbrella organisa-
tions, by mutual assistance, or through cooperation in foreigner advisory 
councils), revolutionary communities close themselves off. During my study 
of the Caliphate State (2000), I detected a circle constitutive of a sect. Demar-
cation from other communities, elitism, the pronounced development of a 
view of the world contrary to that of other communities, inner authoritarian-
ism, and a cult of revolutionary purity increasingly went hand in hand. Here, 
largely isolated ‘in groups’ develop which ‘get themselves worked up about 
something’ and formulate an ever more deviant view of the world. This sec-
tarian circle increasingly caused members of the Caliphate State to regard the 
communities of the Milli Görüs, which were closest to them in their ideas, as 
their biggest enemies, namely the ones who had deviated from the pure teach-
ings and against whom they should therefore fight the most decidedly (Schif-
fauer 2000: 197). In fact, there were only violent altercations between mem-
bers of these two communities (in the form of fist fights). The Caliphate 
State’s distancing itself from the ‘compromisers’ was met with a response 
from the IGMG. They viewed the followers of the Caliphate State as deluded 
and dangerous nuts, who in essential points (especially in terms of their revo-
lutionary intolerance) had deviated from Islamic teachings. This mutual re-
sentment led to the two communities largely avoiding contact with each other. 
On this basis, quite distinct organisational cultures developed. While the 
communities of legalistic Islam confronted the world, acted with political 
pragmatism, and were therefore in principle ready to compromise, the com-
munities of radical-revolutionary Islam are inimical to the world, have ethical 
convictions, and maintain a rhetoric of radical opposition. 
All indications are that there is no continuity between the communities of 
‘legalistic’ and ‘radical-revolutionary’ Islam, but rather a clear divide. Of 
course it can never be ruled out that conversions from conservative to revolu-
tionary communities may occur, but this is not a ‘natural’ step, and it is not 
even a likely one. Value conservative Islam must not be considered a prelimi-
nary stage of radical Islamism, but instead as an alternative to it. The pressure 
the state exerts in this area affects precisely the conservative Islamic milieu 
which promises integration of young Muslims. The advantage of a policy that 
apparently aims at drying out the ‘Islamistic swamp’ seems to be at least 
doubtful.
While the advantage of this security policy is doubtful, some very clearly 
unintended results of the policy may be encountered which have negative 
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consequences for the struggle against violent and revolutionary Islam. They 
all tend to undermine the plausibility of the conservative answer to the revolu-
tionary spirit and may be summarized in four points. 
Increasing pressure on the communities leads to an increasing distance 
towards German society. There always have been voices (primarily from the 
faithful of the first generation) in value conservative communities who saw 
them as islands in a sea of infidels. For some time, the second and third gen-
erations of the communities appeared to have overcome this view of the 
world, but experiences with security policy have reversed this process. At the 
moment, the advocates of the existence an unbridgeable gap between the 
Christian majority and the Islamic minority are again increasing in number. In 
terms of security policy, this is particularly problematic, since any factional 
dispute increases the pressure on loyalties. Reluctance to cooperate with secu-
rity forces also grows with increasing distance to society. 
This is aggravated by the experience of public humiliation through police 
actions. It is regularly reported that in raids, older community members must 
make an effort to calm down younger ones, to prevent them from seeking 
confrontation with the police. We know that the experience of (supposed or 
actual) state discrimination often has a more decisive effect than discrimina-
tion from the civil society and that it can be the cause of radicalisation.17
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This article examines policies on Islam in France and the United Kingdom 
with a particular focus on their relation to and their embeddedness in strate-
gies countering urban violence and terrorism. It is based on the assumption 
that policies concerning the incorporation, regulation and administration of Is-
lamic institutions and Muslim practices are connected to counter-terrorism 
policies and a variety of policy measures directed against phenomena of urban 
violence and delinquency. Starting with a rethinking of our understanding of 
power in the context of European Islam, my principal aim is to outline an ana-
lytical framework for state policies which will replace the hitherto dominating 
analytical focus on national juridico-political orders with a Foucaldian per-
spective on the functioning of political rationalities in a governmentalized 
state. The application of the framework proposed here will bring into focus a 
type of counter-terrorism policy which is not based on mechanisms of surveil-
lance and exclusion of suspected individuals or groups, but instead on target-
ing the milieu within which these individuals and groups supposedly operate 
through a policy which is partly conducted ‘beyond the state’, and notably by 
Muslims themselves. Fundamentally, this policy reconfigures its erstwhile ob-
ject – the abstract category of Islam conceived as one ‘religion’ defined in law 
– as an Islamic milieu, an understanding of how social conditions in the long-
term determine interrelated Muslim practices, beliefs and institutions. This 
policy is thus not based on a distorted legal framework, but on evaluations of 
79
FRANK PETER
feasibility and costs, prognostics of future developments in the Islamic milieu, 
and shifting standards of acceptable religious practices and beliefs by Muslim 
citizens.
My attempt to broaden our understanding of policies on Islam beyond an 
analysis of the national jurido-political order1 – defined through citizenship 
legislation, state-religion regimes, and, more generally, national political cul-
tures and underlying political theories – is motivated by two aims. First, by 
considering the juridico-political order as merely one of several mechanisms 
of power, I seek to foreground the questions of whether those state policies 
which deviate from this order are commanded by a specific rationality (and 
are not merely deviations) and how we can study this rationality in relation to 
the law. Second, the line of investigation pursued here aims at contributing to 
our understanding of discrimination against Muslims – a crucial topic in stud-
ies on Muslims in France and the U.K. – and possible remedies against it. The 
discursive rendering of the concept of power used here will lead us to study 
discrimination as being partly constitutive of Muslim understandings and 
practices of Islam, and not only as the enactment of constraints. This, in turn, 
will entail a different appraisal of remedies against it and help to illuminate 
the ways in which the latter are constrained by and possibly reiterate the con-
ditions which enable discrimination in the first place. 
My approach to the study of policies on Islam in France and the U.K. is 
grounded in Foucault’s conceptualization of mechanisms of power and his re-
flections on those mechanisms specific to the exercise of bio-power in a gov-
ernmentalized State (Burchell et al. 1991; Foucault 1997 and 2004). My point 
of departure is the assumption that the functioning of politics stems from three 
distinct rationalities of power which coexist, namely juridical and disciplinary 
rationality and, finally, what Foucault calls the security apparatus (dispositif
de sécurité), which I want to elaborate here as ‘anticipatory rationality’. In 
this article, I will limit myself to analysing the functioning of this specific po-
litical rationality, which has come increasingly, in the last decade or so, to un-
derlie policies on Islam in France and the U.K. 
In a first step, this rationality can be characterized by its object, the Is-
lamic milieu within which racialized Muslims live, that is the group of those 
whose personal or inherited roots in Islamic countries have been naturalized 
and biologized and who now constitute the ‘Muslim community’ of France 
and the U.K., usually equated with immigrants (and descendants) from major-
ity Muslim countries. Following Silverstein, I define racialisation here as ‘the 
process through which any diacritic of social personhood – including, class, 
ethnicity, generation, kinship/affinity, positions within fields of power – 
                                             
1  For studies who seek to transcend this orientation in ways other than mine see 
for example Maussen (2004 and 2006). 
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comes to be essentialized, naturalized and/or biologized’ (Silverstein 2005: 
364). Anticipatory rationality can be characterized furthermore by its usage of 
an anticipatory – or prospective – analysis which aims to discern future risks 
of social or political conflicts arising from this part of the population which it 
conceives as part of an Islamic milieu. Finally, it can be characterized by its 
attempt to incorporate Muslims into the fight against ‘radicalization’. As 
stated above, this anticipatory rationality will be considered one instantiation 
of a security apparatus. While this anticipatory rationality is closely inter-
twined with the legal order, it puts in operation a reconfiguration of the latter 
by adjusting the legal system – and the subject of law – to varying and indeed 
often conflicting knowledge claims about the social citizen, in this case the 
racialized Muslim conceived as part of an Islamic milieu. Put differently, this 
anticipatory rationality sets in motion a specific politicisation of difference in-
side the population which triggers variegated effects. While this movement of 
politicisation aims at the normalisation of Muslims, it does so by breaking up, 
at least momentarily, the universalism of law and political representation 
based on the relative subordination of particulars to the abstract ‘we’ of the 
universal community of the liberal state (Brown 1995). 
In the following analysis, I will seek to identify the divergent policy con-
sequences of this reordering of the uneasy balance between universalism and 
particularism and the concomitant shift in the combination of political ration-
alities and explore how we can study Islam both as an effect of this double 
movement of politicisation and normalisation and as its vehicle. More particu-
larly, I will argue that the increased importance of a anticipatory rationality 
underlies the emergence of what I will call civil Islam, Islam understood as a 
set of discourses and practices which aim to ‘sacralize the living-together of a 
specific collectivity’ (Willaime 1993: 571) against the threat of ‘radicalisa-
tion’ of ‘young Muslims’ and, more generally, various forms of urban vio-
lence among the racialized Muslim population. The emergence of civil Islam 
– as policy aim and as specific remaking of the Islamic tradition by Muslims – 
implies, and this is the second argument advanced here, that the application of 
legal norms underlying policies on Islam and enabling or disabling Muslims 
practices is increasingly based on a specific non-legal rationality which in-
duces various reconfigurations of concepts such as laïcité, Establishment, Re-
publicanism or Multiculturalism. Finally, in a comparative perspective, I will 
argue that the heightened role of this anticipatory rationality is a major factor 
in the limited realignment of policies on Islam in France and Britain which we 
can observe during the last decade. Put another way, the study of this rational-
ity provides one means to grasp the commonalities of European policies on 
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In his study ‘Security, Territory, Population’ (2004), Foucault distinguished 
between three mechanisms of power – juridical system, disciplinary system, 
security apparatus – all of which Foucault defines indirectly by contrasting 
them to each other. In ‘Security, Territory, Population’ he begins to do so by 
giving a simple and illuminating example, namely that of state policies con-
cerning theft. 
In the context of a legal rationality, theft is to be punished simply accord-
ing to the law which contains a number of prohibitions and specifies the re-
spective punishments. The rise of disciplinary systems ‘frames’ the applica-
tion of the law on the one hand by various practices of surveillance – which 
aim to detect the thief even before he passes to act – and on the other, by a 
complex of penitentiary practices which aim at the correction and transforma-
tion of the delinquent. Finally, inside a security apparatus, the functioning of 
both the legal and disciplinary systems are reordered in reference to a new se-
ries of questions concerning theft, such as statistical evidence on occurrence 
of theft; the impact of famine or any other social crises on the number of 
crimes committed; the costs incurred in the punishment of thieves; the cost 
and efficiency of re-educating criminals; and so forth. The rise of security 
mechanisms partially reconfigures the legal apparatus; while it enables a spe-
cific application of the law, no longer does this application follow directly 
from the binary code of prohibition vs. permission which underlies legal ra-
tionality. Instead, the security apparatus operates on the basis of a reasoning 
based on evaluations of what is socially and economically acceptable and fea-
sible. In the course of the application of its policies, prior understandings of 
law are either suspended, even while continuing to determine the aims which 
these policies seek to actualize, or they are redefined – through new legisla-
tion and/or the application of laws – with reference to what is acceptable and 
feasible. The security apparatus is furthermore characterized by the fact that 
its matrix incorporates cost calculations as one of its constituent elements. Fi-
nally, specific phenomena are not considered in an isolated way, as in law or 
disciplinary institutions, but as part of a probable series of events; this is so 
since the security apparatus is fundamentally concerned with the problem of 
uncertainty. This problem of uncertainty is tackled to an important degree by 
relying on a reasoning in terms of what Foucault calls ‘milieu’: ‘The specific 
space of security refers then to a series of possible events; it refers to the tem-
poral and the uncertain which have to be inserted into a given space [which] 
[…] one can call the milieu’ (Foucault 2004: 22). Fundamentally, thinking in 
terms of milieus is an attempt to tackle the problem of uncertainty by under-
standing and calculating ‘the action at a distance of one body on another’ and, 
more generally, by grasping how, inside of a space conceived of as ‘milieu’, 
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causes and effects loop. In brief, milieu designates a new ‘space of interven-
tion’ for state power ‘in which instead of affecting individuals as a set of legal 
subjects capable of voluntary action – which would be the case of sovereignty 
– and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capa-
ble of performances, and of required performances – as in discipline – one 
tries to affect precisely a population’ (Foucault 2004: 23). 
In the following analysis, I will study how policies on Islam in France and 
the U.K. have been reshaped, to different degrees, by a rationality which pre-
cisely is based on considerations of feasibility and acceptability, on calcula-
tions of costs, and on the notion of milieu, here Islamic milieu. Before exam-
ining the functioning of anticipatory rationality, one remark on the role of ex-
pert knowledge in this process is necessary, since the reliance on anticipatory 
analysis and the reasoning in terms of an Islamic milieu attribute a significant 
role to what I will refer to as expert knowledge on Islam.2 This assertion 
raises the question of the scientific status of this expert knowledge. Now, it is 
clear that a lot of what is said today by the proliferating group of experts on 
Islam and what is referred to in public – by politicians, journalists, intellectu-
als, Church leaders, […] – as expert knowledge is not considered scientific by 
scientists, whether they be from the social sciences or humanities. However, 
there is no need to enter into the debate on the question how we can classify 
the content of expert knowledge on Islam and, more generally, which factors 
– internal or external to science, scientific factors proper or social ones – 
make that specific artefact count as science. My point here is simply that a 
group of experts, a group which is larger than that of scientists, provides 
and/or legitimates a specific idiom for making reality amenable to delibera-
tion and planning (as, e.g., in the case of the terms integration, radicalisation, 
‘young Muslims’, etc.).3 While the scientific status of this expert knowledge 
is often contested, this does not allow us to dismiss it as mere talk and irrele-
vant to a study of policies on Islam. These contestations are part of the politi-
cal field which has been opened up by the increasingly prominent workings of 
anticipatory rationality. They co-determine the latter’s functioning and thus 
need to be studied as such. Furthermore, expert knowledge not only serves to 
plan policies, but also, as I said, to make matters Islamic simply amenable to 
deliberation. Finally, importantly, expert knowledge on Islam – and not least 
the type of rationality which it enables and disseminates – is an important 
                                             
2  The specific contribution of academic research on European Islam and immigra-
tion to expert knowledge cannot be dealt with here, but see, for the case of Fran-
ce, Peter (forthcoming), ‘French Scholarship on Islam in the Republic’, paper 
presented at Forum for Islamforskning-Workshop ‘Research on Islam Repositi-
oned’, Copenhagen, May 2007. 




element in policies on Islam, since it directly reshapes the ways in which 
Muslims think of Islam and Islamic conduct in the context of France and the 
U.K. Put another way, expert knowledge on Islam is the primary vector 
through which state policies reconfigure what they target. 
The Case of  the United Kingdom 
In the case of the United Kingdom, anticipatory rationality becomes signifi-
cant for policies on Islam after 2001. As stated above, this rationality func-
tions next to other mechanisms of power, some of which are politically nar-
rowly defined (electoral tactics), others not (anti-discrimination politics and 
legislation; communitarian policies). The following analysis will touch only 
briefly upon them4 and concentrate on the emergence and functioning of an-
ticipatory rationality in relation to a legal rationality which notably underlies 
anti-discrimination policies. Anti-discrimination policies were formally intro-
duced for the first time in 1965 following the restriction on immigration insti-
tuted in 1962, and were considerably extended in 1976 with the creation of 
the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) which was authorized to conduct 
race relations audits of companies, government agencies, etc. (Anwar 1986: 
17-20; Lester 1987: 22; Crowley 1992: 88 f.). These policies are first of all 
noteworthy for our discussion, since they institutionalize, from the 1960s on, 
the racial prism of British perception of the post-migratory reality. Society 
was divided into ‘black’ and ‘white’, the term ‘Asians’ being little used until 
the 1990s (Bensons 1996; Alexandre 2002; Modood 2005: 46 f.). As concerns 
Muslims, the limitation to racial groups, as has often been noted, excluded 
them from anti-discrimination measures and thus created a situation of ine-
quality and furthermore directly contributed to redirecting the process of in-
corporation of Islam from the national to the local level (Lewis 1997; Rath et 
al. 2001: 227-29; Ansari 2004: 340-88). 
I consider these policies as an outcome of a legal rationality not only be-
cause they largely – though not exclusively – work to ensure equality by legal 
means, but because the recognition of racial difference and discrimination by 
these policies aims at reaffirming equality of all citizens beyond these differ-
ences. Fundamentally, they consider difference as normalizable and they seek 
to normalize and neutralize it as a mere individual attribute that is irrelevant 
to national identity, through legal protection and measures of positive dis-
crimination. Importantly, these policies are founded on the assumption of a 
stable identity, whether it is black, Asian or Muslim, which they themselves 
obviously contribute to stabilize. Both the emphasis placed on the normalisa-
                                             
4  For a more detailed study of these see Peter (2006c). 
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tion of difference on the one hand and the assumption of stable difference and 
identity on the other distinguish this rationality in contrast to anticipatory ra-
tionality, as we shall see. 
Policies on Islam, before 2001, have largely functioned in this framework 
which was slowly but not fully extended from racial groups to Muslims over 
the course of the 1990s, particularly after the Labour party came to power in 
1997. While these policies are clearly not uniform, but inspired by various 
factors, notably electoral considerations responding to the increased articula-
tion of British Muslim identities (see Peter 2006c), they rely on notions of a 
stable Muslim identity and they are also deeply concerned, in reaction to 
Muslim demands, with issues of legal equality and the normalisation of the 
Muslim presence through the latter’s recognition. The central role in policies 
on Islam in the 1990s, of the equal treatment of Muslim confessional schools, 
realized by Labour, of debates on legislation against religious discrimination, 
of Muslim demands for amendment to the exclusively Anglican law on blas-
phemy and, later on, of the debate around the law against incitement to reli-
gious hatred (adopted in 2006) demonstrate this. 
After 2001, under the impact of the riots in Northern English towns impli-
cating young British Pakistanis, and September 11, this begins to change and 
anticipatory rationality becomes more important. The influence of this antici-
patory rationality is visible already in the influential Cantle Report which con-
tains the results of one of the government ordered enquiries made into the dis-
turbances and its causes. The Cantle Report is important in two respects: first, 
because it makes a contribution to establishing the use of an anticipatory 
analysis in the elaboration of policies for governing ‘modern multi-racial 
Britain’ (Home Office 2002: 9); second, because it insists strongly on the 
normative dimension of the disturbances and the need for more ‘cohesion’. 
The main message of the report, i.e. that it is necessary to define and to dis-
seminate a common set of values in order to guarantee ‘community cohesion’, 
is precisely the result of an anticipatory analysis of Britain’s multicultural so-
ciety. According to the report, the absence of common values has strongly 
contributed to the disturbances in northern England. The entire report is thus 
basically an attempt to discern and to relate the diverse causes – political, so-
cial, cultural – underlying this absence of shared values in order to devise a 
strategy for preventing similar incidents in the future. Among the report’s 
manifold recommendations, a substantial number thus relates to the need to 
enhance social cohesion through increased ‘cross-cultural contacts’. This is 
reflected for example in the demands to confessional schools to take in more 
pupils from other confessions and the proposition to make funding of cultural, 
religious or ethnic associations dependent on their contribution to social cohe-
sion (Home Office 2002). 
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While the report is relatively vague about many issues and deploys antici-
patory rationality only in an incipient form, the latter soon becomes used 
more fully and more directly in relation to British Muslims. The reasons lead-
ing some British Muslims to join the Taliban in the fight against the allied 
forces in Afghanistan have been debated since 2001 in British media.5 Very 
soon, the disaffection of Muslims towards British politics, a phenomenon 
which is regularly measured in opinion polls,6 is also being debated in antici-
pation of a terrorist attack in England.7 The perpetration of the first suicide at-
tack by a Briton in Israel, in early 2003, contributes to nourishing these reflec-
tions.8 In the course of these public debates, a variety of positions are de-
fended. Generally speaking, we can discern two dominant positions which are 
to a large degree complementary. First, there are those who reason in terms of 
simple defence, notably through the police and military apparatuses, against 
the terrorist threat and, second, there are those who demand a more compre-
hensive and preventive approach to this threat. This latter approach is based 
on an anticipatory analysis. Government policies are informed by both ap-
proaches simultaneously. 
The anti-terrorist strategy put into practice in 2002, Contest, aims not only 
at hunting terrorists and preparing how to deal with the aftermaths of future 
terrorist attacks, but also at reducing the number of individuals supporting ter-
rorism or eventually becoming terrorists themselves (Intelligence and Security 
Committee 2006). On the one hand, the government thus introduces, in late 
2001, a new anti-terror legislation (Bamford 2004: 747-49) and puts into prac-
tice a new police strategy which effectively discriminates against British citi-
zens of Asian origin.9 On the other hand, there are attempts to develop a more 
preventive approach to the terrorist threat and it is in this context that policies 
concerning the incorporation and administration of Islam enter. This second 
approach is based on the anticipatory analysis of the ‘milieu’ which allows 
disaffection and terrorism among Muslims to grow. Since 2001, the discus-
sions in the public and among policy-makers are thus concerned with the rela-
tive impact which British foreign policy in the Middle East, discrimination 
and segregation and the activities of extremist Islamist groups have on the 
radicalisation of ‘young Muslims’ in order to devise an efficient policy to 
prevent this latter development in the future. 
                                             
5  See for example ‘Why Brits fight for the Taliban’, The Observer, 4 November 
2001.
6  See for example the opinion polls conducted for The Guardian at www: icmre-
search.co.uk.
7  ‘Inside the Mind of a Terrorist’, The Observer, 9 March 2003. 
8  ‘Making of a Martyr: From Pacifism to Jihad’, The Observer, 4 May 2003. 
9  ‘Muslims face increased stop and search’, The Guardian, 2 March 2005. 
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Fundamentally, this implies a shift in the configuration of political ration-
alities and, more precisely, the decline of the legal rationality. The latter’s 
epistemology, presupposing the existence of relatively stable (ethnic or reli-
gious) communities, is strongly put under strain by the events of 2001 – indi-
cating both the divergences between communities and their transformation – 
and the government’s outlook, in the subsequent period, is certainly character-
ized by a stronger awareness not only of the internal plurality of religious and 
ethnic communities, but also of their constant evolution in relation to society. 
I would argue that in the post-2001 context, the government defines its task 
increasingly as controlling and guiding the range of processes which are con-
tinually shaping ethnic and religious identities inside the milieu circumscribed 
by immigration and ascribed Islamity. It is because of this new focus that ex-
pert knowledge begins to play a crucial role in policy-making and debates re-
lating to it. Certainly, the question of equality has not simply been abandoned 
by British politicians. To the contrary, social, economic or legal equality is 
seen to varying degrees as a crucial factor – but insufficient on its own – to in-
fluence positively the development of the Muslim community. The Home Of-
fice’s insistence in its 2005 programme on the need to strengthen equality and 
in turn community cohesion can be cited as one example here (Home Office 
2005a).10 However, today, this policy of equality and normalisation to a large 
degree is commanded by and embedded in an anticipatory rationality. This is 
no mean change to preceding times: in the context of such an anticipatory ra-
tionality, the principle of equal treatment of various religions, including Is-
lam, can be suspended, openly or not, as a function of the results of such an 
analysis. The policies in favour of disseminating civil Islam are just one ex-
ample of it. 
What then are the effects of this development on policies on Islam and, 
more particularly, how does it relate to and lead to the government’s support 
for civil Islam? In a first step, civil Islam can be defined here as a state policy 
aiming to refashion a certain number of institutions and practices among im-
migrants from Islamic background in order to reduce the risk of socio-
political conflicts and terrorism in the future. In its attempt to identify the 
causes of the mentioned phenomena and adequate counter-policies, this state 
policy reasons in terms of an Islamic milieu. As introduction to the analysis of 
these policies, a reading of a series of leaked government documents, emanat-
ing essentially from the Home Office11 and presenting reflections on the gov-
ernment’s anti-terrorism strategy, provide one example of such a reasoning.12
                                             
10  The results of this policy cannot be evaluated in this article. 
11  The role of the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Islam policies in Bri-
tain is certainly of very limited importance. Nevertheless, it should be pointed 
out that the ministry is concerned with some aspects of this policy on a see-
mingly regular basis. For example, a FCO unit created in 2004 and in charge of 
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It should be noted first that the government’s reasoning in matters of ter-
rorism is in several ways incomplete. Policy-makers continue to struggle, for 
instance, with the question of whether there is an unambiguous correlation be-
tween terrorism and socio-economic deprivation.13 Also, the precise trajectory 
of extremist Muslims14 and terrorists is to a large degree unclear, apart from 
the fact that a certain number of extremist (non-violent) Islamic groups sup-
posedly facilitate this process (Timesonline 2005). While these points are left 
in limbo, the Home Office report clearly identifies other causes and possible 
remedies to the radicalisation of young Muslims. The report relates the new 
British policies in the field of incorporation of Islam to three causal factors of 
radicalisation: the auto-segregation of Muslims; the absence of a strong rejec-
tion of extremism and terrorism by ‘moderate’ Muslims; weak or missing 
control by state authorities of Muslim activists, notably because of their trans-
national activities. What are the solutions proposed here? These consist in 
stimulating Muslim institutions and actors to interact more with majority so-
ciety, notably via inter-religious dialogue; bringing ‘moderate’ Muslims who 
are to be supported by the state to reject and fight against extremism and ter-
rorism; increasing the ratio of nationally rooted or trained activists in British 
Islam in order to facilitate its control and its adaptation to the British context. 
This report also recognizes, as others have done,15 that British foreign pol-
icy (in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, […]) is a factor of alienation of Muslims 
which is to be countered by a more efficient communication strategy with 
Muslims. This analysis has been strongly rejected by members of the British 
government, notably Prime Minister Blair. However, it would be wrong to 
take this rejection as indicating simply the limits of anticipatory rationality. 
Rather, it points more generally to the latter’s profoundly ambivalent nature 
                                                                                                                              
reinforcing contacts with the Islamic world is also assigned the task of promo-
ting a positive image of British foreign policy among Muslims in order to reduce 
the risk of alienation (Home Office 2005c: 16). 
12  The following remarks refer to an internal report, co-written by the FCO and 
HO for the Prime Minister, and leaked to the press after the bombings of 2005. 
In this report, written essentially in 2004, one finds an analysis of the different 
strategies applied or to be applied in the government’s striving to keep ‘young 
Muslims’ from radicalisation and terrorism (Timesonline 2005). 
13  While evidence is so far lacking to support this connection, this is, however, not 
seen as an argument against anti-discrimination policies. Given that the aim is to 
enlist support of ‘moderate’ Muslims in the fight against extremism (see below), 
the Home Office argues that Muslim leaders’ perception that discrimination is a 
cause for the radicalisation would constitute in itself a reason to pursue such an-
ti-discrimination policies. 
14  See below on the Home Office’s definition of ‘extremism’. 
15  See, e.g. ‘Leak shows Blair told of Iraq war terror link’, The Observer, 28 Au-
gust 2005; ‘Don’t treat us like patsies, say Muslim MPs’, The Guardian , 15 Au-
gust 2006; Home Office 2005d. 
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which stems from the fact that the causal reasoning (in terms of milieu) is 
both a modality of power and a means for various persons and groups – in-
cluding Muslims – to hold power accountable for the negative effects of poli-
cies, here those of British foreign policies on the ‘radicalisation’ of Muslims. 
Pointedly said, instead of seeing in this rejection by Blair and others the limits 
of anticipatory rationality, this rejection marks its presence in a specific form 
of opposition which it enables.16
Inter-religious Dialogue and the Imams 
After 2001 and even more so after the bombings of July 2005, civil Islam is 
being institutionalized and this is done primarily via policies concerning inter-
religious dialogue and imams. 
First, the government decides upon giving more support to inter-religious 
networks (Home Office 2005a: 12; Inter Faith Network 2002, idem 2005 and 
cf. idem 2003 for the situation on the local level). While it is too early to 
evaluate the results of this attempt to insert Islam more firmly into the multi-
religious landscape, it is reasonable to assume that this policy will, generally 
speaking, prove to be an accelerator of Islam’s institutionalisation while at the 
same giving advantage to those Muslim actors, institutional or individual, 
who have the necessary profile, in terms of professional, social and cultural 
competencies, in order to fully participate in inter-religious activities. 
The reasons for granting this support to interreligious groups are indicated 
without ambiguity by the Home Office whose position here illustrates well 
the changed political approach pointed to in the discussion of the Cantle Re-
port. According to the ministry, ‘a more cohesive society needs more than just 
equality of opportunities for all individuals’ and also depends on ‘certain so-
cial conditions’ enabling citizens to get to know each other and to develop 
‘shared values’ (Home Office 2005a: 11). Now, British policy is conceived 
precisely as an effort to create the conditions necessary for the dissemination 
of ‘shared values’. Apart from measures such as funding for sport or artistic 
activities and the introduction of civic education in schools, inter-religious 
dialogue thus benefits from increased financial support. The justifications 
given for this support are to a certain degree distinct from the earlier objec-
tive, inspired by communitarian ideas (Bevir 2003; Smith 2004), to reinforce, 
on various levels, the consultation and cooperation with religious communi-
ties and to facilitate the access of these organisations to public funding (Home 
Office 2005b: 3-35). After 2001, the government’s aim is not simply to sup-
                                             
16  For a discussion of this point see Peter (forthcoming), ‘French Scholarship on 
Islam in the Republic’, paper presented at Forum for Islamforskning-Workshop 
‘Research on Islam Repositioned’, Copenhagen, May 2007. 
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port the activities of religious communities, but to orient them in their activi-
ties in order to turn them into forces of cohesion, and not factors of divisive-
ness. While the Anglican establishment – its ‘minimal nature […], its proven 
openness to other denominations and faiths seeking public space, and the fact 
that its very existence is an ongoing acknowledgement of the public character 
of religion’ (Modood 1994: 73) – might have facilitated at various points in 
time the process of incorporation of Islam into the United Kingdom, we 
should be careful not to consider it as implying a specific view of religion by 
government or the latter’s approval of the public character of religion. Rather, 
it opens up and legitimates a space for action between government agencies 
and Muslim (and other religious) groups which is commanded by varying ra-
tionalities and, after 2001, increasingly by an anticipatory one. 
Second, the government starts to prepare, since 2001, a new policy aiming 
to reshape Islam as it is practised in Britain through a number of structural 
measures or measures directly focussed at specific groups or institutions. This 
policy, in England as elsewhere in Western Europe, is concerned primarily 
with mosques and imams (see Birt 2006 for a detailed study). In 2001, the 
Home Office announces that the conditions of immigration for religious min-
isters will be revised, the aim being to guarantee a sufficient knowledge of 
English. The rationale behind this move is illustrated by the example given in 
the Home Office’s declaration where the importance of linguistic competen-
cies for a ‘religious leader’ is highlighted for the case of interacting with other 
religious groups. In this respect, the Home Office also points to the events of 
the summer 2001 as a case where such interaction has been made impossible 
because of language problems. The Home Office also declares its preference 
as ministers for persons with residence in Britain or holders of British de-
grees. Apart from the fact that the professional qualifications of these persons 
are easier to validate, the Home Office considers that these persons are, be-
cause of their knowledge of society, ‘better able to relate their particular faith 
to the context of the United Kingdom’ (Home Office 2001: 46). 
Put briefly, the function of an imam is conceived of here in the context of 
a policy of community cohesion. Given that the imam’s mission is henceforth 
supplemented by the obligation to preach an Islam in conformity with ‘British 
values’, the criteria for judging his qualifications change. Since 2004, candi-
dates for immigration into Britain as ministers of cult need to prove linguistic 
competencies whose standard has been raised considerably; other measures 
are being prepared in order to verify, after their entry into Britain, their 
knowledge of and engagement with British society (Home Office 2005b: 20 
s.). This policy of closure towards foreign imams is continued, as shows Birt 
(2006), in the field of chaplaincy where new posts subsidized by the state are 
exclusively destined for candidates who hold a certificate from one of the two 
existing institutes in Britain preparing Muslim chaplains. 
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The State’s Quest for ‘Moderate’ Muslims 
The government’s attempts to reshape British Islam are not limited to policies 
aiming at imams and chaplains, but also rely on a policy of support for spe-
cific Muslim groups. From the government’s point of view, one of the princi-
pal aims of its policy is to reinforce ‘moderate’ Islam and to support it – and 
be supported itself – in the fight against extremism (see for example Home 
Office 2005c; for a survey of related government activities see Timesonline 
2005 and Prime Minister 2006: 7). This raises of course the question of how 
the government goes about determining those Muslim groups which are ‘ex-
tremist’ and those which are suitable carriers of civil Islam? 
In this respect, the government’s reasoning is complex and does not sim-
ply reflect a division, which is supposedly that of the government, between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims (Bonnefoy 2003). The complexity of the decision 
by government agencies follows not only from difficulties in identifying cor-
rectly their Muslim interlocutors. In fact, the term ‘moderate’, as used by 
government agencies, comprises a broad range of groups with very divergent 
profiles in terms of resources and political outlook. Other criteria enter thus 
necessarily into the government’s choice of its Muslim partners. In absence of 
other sources, the report by the Home Office, cited previously, provides us 
with some evidence for discerning these criteria. Following this report, ex-
tremism is defined as  
‘advocating or supporting views such as support for terrorist attacks against British 
or Western targets, including the 9/11 attacks, or for British Muslims fighting 
against British or allied forces abroad, arguing that it is not possible to be Muslim 
and British, calling on Muslims to reject engagement with British society and poli-
tics, and advocating the creation of an Islamic state in Britain’ (Timesonline 
2005).17
A reading of this report indicates that among those Muslim groups which are 
not ‘extremist’ government agencies make supplementary distinctions. The 
essential criterion in this respect is the influence which a specific group or ac-
tor wields inside the Muslim community and the simple acceptance to enter 
into contact with authorities. Put differently, the government does not limit re-
lations with Muslims to those who are aligned on its policies. In fact, even the 
MCB, the main defender of an Islamic commitment for the ‘common good’ 
and for this reason and others regularly denigrated as ‘a government creature’ 
by other Muslims (Glynn 2002: 972 and, more recently, BBC News 2005), 
does not have, according to this report, satisfying relations with the govern-
                                             
17  See also Home Office (2005c: 1) for a similar definition. 
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ment. The government’s aim, in fact, is rather to make and intensify contacts 
with a more important number of Muslim actors whose openness towards the 
government might vary, but who need to be influential. In a second step, the 
task is to convince them, ‘in private’, as the report underlines, to adopt a more 
intransigent position towards ‘extremism’ while at the same time developing 
their human and material capacities (Timesonline 2005). Put another way, the 
government recognizes differences with respect to how the various so-called 
moderate Muslim groups relate to its policies. However, these differences do 
not determine the decision of whether to cooperate with them or not, but re-
flect the government’s ultimate policy aims regarding the transformation of 
Muslim groups. On the one hand, British policy towards Muslims is thus ex-
clusionist, as for example in the case of the Muhajiroun (and successor or-
ganisations) or Hizb ut-Tahrir (Taji-Farouki 1996; Wiktorowicz 2005), and, 
more generally, legally discriminating against Muslims and/or British Asians; 
on the other hand, this policy is based on a more prospective approach which 
aims to prevent the radicalisation of British Muslims by transforming, in a 
mid-range perspective, the field’s internal structure and relations between 
Muslims and the state. This latter policy has been challenged more recently 
following the reshuffle of the cabinet and the appointment of Ruth Kelly to 
the newly created Department for Communities and Local Government. 
While Kelly’s counter-terrorism strategy does not depart from that of the pre-
ceding period (Department for Communities and Local Government 2007), 
she has questioned the MCB’s commitment to Britain’s ‘shared values’ and 
seems disinclined to continue cooperating with it. How this will affect the 
MCB’s position in the long run and, more importantly, if this change signals 
the abandonment of a prospective approach in policies on Islam remains to be 
seen.
How then is the state support for civil Islam perceived by Muslim organi-
sations? Civil Islam emerges from the partial convergence of government ob-
jectives and aims pursued by various Muslim organisations concerning the in-
tegration of immigrants of Islamic background and the strengthening of reli-
gious institutions. From the point of view of Muslim groups, the new gov-
ernment approach can be beneficial, since it directly leads to an acceleration 
of the incorporation of Islam. A comparison of propositions and demands in 
this field made by diverse Muslim personalities after the bombings of 2005 
and government projects (concerning institutes for Islamic studies, the promo-
tion of ‘moderate’ Islam or the role of imams) suggests that there is a partial 
convergence of aims between the two groups (Home Office 2005d). However, 
in the course of consultations about specific measures to be taken, diver-
gences can emerge, as shown in the recent case of policies regarding mosques 
and places of worship in Britain. The government’s projects were strongly 
criticized by the MCB as a simple attempt to control Muslims, whereas the 
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Muslim Council was asking for government support for its work. For Muslim 
organisations, the cooperation with the government in fact regularly raises 
important problems of legitimacy (Home Office 2005c; Muslim Council of 
Britain 2006). Another major divergence should be mentioned in this respect. 
While state policies clearly aim at ensuring the population’s ‘devotion to the 
unity of the social body’ (Willaime 1993: 572), civil Islam, for many Muslim 
organisations, is part of a much broader (and older) tradition of understanding 
Islam as a public religion whose teachings certainly cannot be limited to the 
striving for social cohesion.18 From the point of view of government, civil Is-
lam can be considered a specific variation of the civil religion in Britain, a 
variation which is build upon combining the integrative function of religion 
with the idea of necessary reform of Islam. 
As for Muslim associations, their commitment to civil Islam partly results 
from political and public pressure which has increased formidably since 2001 
and which has contributed to reorienting the older civic engagement rooted, as 
for example in the case of the MCB and its constitutive members, in the tradi-
tion of Islamic movements (Birt 2005; McLoughlin 2005). In fact, the MCB 
has long since fought for facilitating social and political participation of Brit-
ish Muslims. After 2001, the Muslim Council reoriented its work to focus 
more on maintaining social peace. In statements made after that year, it thus 
recalls believers, notably the ‘youth’, their obligations as Muslim citizens and, 
addressing politicians and the broader public; it places increased emphasis on 
the role of mosques as social and educative centres and as means to prevent 
delinquency. More generally, the MCB is arguing in the interest of encourag-
ing public authorities to cooperate with Muslim associations.19 In 2004, after 
the bombings of Madrid, the MCB is taking a further step on this path and is 
explicitly asking Muslim leaders and activists to cooperate with security 
forces to prevent a terrorist attack (Muslim Council of Britain 2004). 
The Case of  France 
The incorporation of Islam in metropolitan France is, for the first time, just as 
in the United Kingdom, taking place on the local level and it proceeds, 
broadly speaking, in the absence of any political strategy. Contrary to the 
U.K., this process started relatively late. The Muslim presence in France has 
for a long time been seen as temporary both by many immigrants – with the 
important exception of Franco-Algerians who left Algeria after independence 
                                             
18  For this reason, I do not speak here of ‘civic religion’ (see Willaime 1993). 
19  See for example ‘Our Social Contract’, The Common Good – The Newsletter of 
the Muslim Council of Britain, vol. 1, n°4: 4 and the press releases of the MCB 
from 15 July 2001 and 6 August 2001. 
93
FRANK PETER
– and by the state. In fact, as is well known, the adoption of restrictive poli-
cies of immigration in Britain, in 1962, precedes by more than a decade simi-
lar measures taken in other European countries. This has led to a process of 
settlement which started much earlier in the United Kingdom than elsewhere 
and it also contributed to accelerating the creation of Muslim institutions 
(Nielsen 1992: 44). 
In France, Islam is perceived, until the 1980s, as an essentially foreign 
phenomenon which is not, with two exceptions, a concern of French policy-
makers. First, there are, as pointed out, the ‘French Muslims’ (Français 
Musulmans) from Algeria whose needs, including religious needs, are taken 
into consideration by the state who creates a number of administrative organs 
whose task is to facilitate the insertion of these groups into French society, 
since 1977 (v. Krosigk 2000: 169-71). Second, the French state puts in mo-
tion, during the 1970s, a policy aiming to help bring about the ‘return’ of im-
migrants. From this policy follows a stronger awareness of ‘cultural’ needs, 
including religious needs, of immigrant groups in France which need to be 
taken care of in order to facilitate their reinsertion in the countries of origin 
(Kepel 1991: 139-45; v. Krosigk 2000: 186-89). 
Apart from these points, however, Islam in France is administered basi-
cally according to three conditions: Muslims are seen as non-French; policy 
and/or administrative measures regarding Islam and Muslims are realized in 
cooperation with or simply by delegation to foreign friendly states in the 
Maghreb; ‘French interests’ are prioritized in decision-making in this policy 
field. The ‘Mosquée de Paris’, which is controlled by Algeria and which is the 
main interlocutor of the government in matters Islamic, is the symbolic ex-
pression of this approach (Kepel 1991; Boyer 1992). It is only during the 
1980s that France wakes up to the reality of its ethnic and religious pluralism. 
The important national debates about the reform of citizenship legislation bear 
witness to the turmoil this recognition creates in politics and the broader pub-
lic (Feldblum 1999; Weil 2004). As to Islam more precisely, its recognition as 
being somehow part of France is closely linked to the ‘affaire du voile’ of 
1989 (and subsequent affairs) whose chronology does not need to be laid out 
here (Baubérot 1996). It is from this moment onwards, in a demographic con-
text marked by the coming-of-age of new French-born generations of Mus-
lims that the incorporation of Islam becomes politically important and Muslim 
identities politicized to a degree hitherto unknown. 
Beyond Laïcité 
As is well known, policies on Islam have been conflicted almost from their 
outset, i.e. since the late 1980s. A large number of studies have examined 
these conflicts and while these studies often do diverge considerably, it is cer-
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tainly true to say that great emphasis has been placed by many of them on 
how different understandings of the appropriate policy relate to specific un-
derstandings of laïcité. More specifically, many studies have pointed to a fun-
damental opposition structuring these debates. Essentially, two different 
camps which seem to confront each other in the course of these debates are 
distinguished. On the one hand, there are the defenders of a ‘new’ or ‘open’ 
laïcité who demand that laïcité be adapted to a changed religious landscape 
and the sometimes new needs, in terms of religious practice and organisation, 
articulated by French Muslims. Furthermore, this process of adaptation, it is 
often argued, should be conducted in a way which reflects the peaceful rela-
tions between the state and religions today. On the other hand, there are those 
who defend an understanding of laïcité as being ‘not negotiable’ and who 
consider that its adaptation equals its dilution into supposedly Anglo-Saxon 
models of politics. As many studies have pointed out, these positions relate to 
often diametrically opposed policy proposals concerning Islam, as has been 
demonstrated notably with regard to the headscarf case.20 While the approach 
just outlined has proven its utility in the analysis of French Islam policies, I 
will suggest here a different approach to their study. Basically, I will consider 
the elaboration of policies on Islam and conflicts around it as the outcome of 
two distinct rationalities which do not simply oppose each other, although 
they sometimes do, but in many respects also necessarily function in combi-
nation. Conflicts about the course of policies on Islam, to a large degree, con-
cern the definition of the ways in which they should combine and the relative 
weight of each of them. 
In terms of rationality, we can say that those who defend laïcité as non-
negotiable give priority to an instance of a legal rationality which I will des-
ignate here as Republican. The Republican rationality can be characterized by 
an atomistic conception of its policy object, the citizen, and by its refusal to 
recognize particular identities (other than that particular identity configuration 
it proclaims in a given moment as universal). This rationality is justified by a 
discourse which makes social cohesion incumbent upon a type of normalisa-
tion subsumed in the principle of transcendance by citizenship (la transcen-
dance par la citoyenneté) (Schnapper 2003). The principle of separation of 
state and religion is a central mechanism for enabling this practice of citizen-
ship. Fundamentally, Republican rationality is based on the (obviously rela-
tively contingent) application of law as mechanism for identifying difference 
and making it indifferent. Now, this rationality often combines with an in-
stance of anticipatory rationality. This is so, since the outright refusal to rec-
ognize particular identities regularly conflicts with the state’s fundamental 
                                             
20  On this question see notably Amir-Moazami (2001); Rochefort (2002); Boua-
mama (2004); Tévanian (2005); Asad (2006). 
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aim of normalizing these identities, an objective which, furthermore, cannot 
be realized solely by enacting prohibitions. Anticipatory rationality, in the 
case of Islam and French Muslims, is based on an assessment of presently ex-
isting types of religious practice and religiosity. Furthermore, it inquires into 
their past evolution and future development as part of an Islamic milieu which 
is characterized notably by social and spatial exclusion, discrimination and 
the breakdown of social and religious authority. Whereas in the context of 
Republican rationality, the reference to legal norms is prioritized, anticipatory 
rationality takes as its starting point for determining its policy of normalisa-
tion an assessment of the relative distribution in the Islamic milieu of normal 
and deviant types of Muslim religiosity and an evaluation of the state’s possi-
bilities to change this state of affairs. To varying degrees, the application of 
law, broadly defined, and the (re)definition of normalcy are made dependent 
upon this process of evaluation. Also, law is applied by taking into account its 
effects on the milieu and, more generally, it is but one means within a broader 
policy which pursues normalisation with means other than that of prohibi-
tion.21
As I said, these two rationalities function in varying combinations. By 
combining, I mean that anticipatory rationality is either employed to realize in 
a mid-term perspective the ideals of Republicanism or it is employed on the 
assumption that the scope of application of Republican rationality is necessar-
ily limited. In the first case, normalisation aims ultimately at the dissolution of 
particulars through policies restructuring their specific milieu, in the second 
the impossibility of realizing this aim fully is acknowledged and some par-
ticulars are thus declared as normal and normalizable while at the same time 
the Islamic milieu as a whole is targeted by various measures aiming at nor-
malisation.
                                             
21  I cannot deal here with the headscarf law of 2004. While the proponents of the 
law (see for example the report of the Commission Stasi) study the practice of 
wearing headscarfs in the context of a specific milieu and regularly make use of 
prospective analysis, I consider the law by virtue of its enacting a prohibition an 
instance of Republican rationality whose primary justification for its proponents 
lies precisely in that it is ‘an exercise in sovereign power’ which confirms Re-
publican sovereignty (Asad 2006). A comparison of the debates concerning this 
law in 2003/04 with previous discussions (in 1989 and 1994) demonstrates the 
degree to which anticipatory reasoning has become indispensable to French po-




The Ethnicisation of the Republic 22
As I said, it would be wrong to consider the Republican rationality in isola-
tion. In fact, since the 1980s, the wilful denial of ethnicity and religion be-
comes increasingly difficult to maintain in France. The direct reason for this 
is the perceived failure of what is often called the Republican model of inte-
gration, i.e. a process of integration through state institutions which dissolves 
ethnic and other communities into the French nation. After the settlement of 
immigrants and as new generations of French-born Muslims come of age, 
France witnesses the ‘birth of a religion’ (Kepel 1991), namely Islam. The 
partly simultaneous emergence of Islamic institutions, notably since 1981,23
and the coming of age of French-born Muslims, increasingly practizing their 
religion, was mostly seen as the opposite of a desirable course of integration. 
In this context, the question of how to regulate the practice of Islam arose 
with a new urgency and Muslim identity became politicized to a degree hith-
erto unknown. 
This is in many respects a new and contested development as is illustrated 
in the introduction to the foundational study of French Islam, ‘Les banlieues 
de l’Islam’, published in 1987. The author, Gilles Kepel, a fervent defender of 
French laïcité, writes: ‘According to some, it is illegitimate or inappropriate to 
study Islam in France. Such a project is in fact suspicious. It would only end 
up displacing the tête de turc from fairs of earlier times to the intellectual 
field, it would offer a specious description of immigrant populations and the 
cultural pretext for discriminating against them.’ But, as Kepel points out with 
reference to the rise of the extreme right movement in France, ‘the circum-
spection of some becomes aphasia and opens up the space for the noisy phan-
tasms of the others’. And then ‘only a thorough analysis of social phenomena 
without any concessions can break this vicious circle’ (Kepel 1991: 10). 
Beyond the specificity of this case, the argument made here is interesting, 
since it illustrates the general predicament of adherents to the Republican ra-
tionality and outlines the configurations of forces which make it necessary 
and profitable, from their point of view, to espouse a more ethnicized perspec-
tive on French society. By doing this, their aim remains, of course, to work 
for a society where ethnic and other particular identities can be abstracted. 
Nevertheless, the effects of their discourse are ambivalent: it contributes indi-
rectly to legitimate a new conception of the French population, namely in 
terms of ethnic or religious groups, and thus also legitimates specific policies 
                                             
22  See Geisser (1997). 
23  After the victory of the socialists in the 1981 election, the law of associations is 
modified to allow foreigners to create associations. This strongly contributes to 




which, openly or not, are based on such a conception of France even when, 
which is the case, the policy-makers ultimately aim to create the conditions 
for successfully dissolving these communities. 
A variety of measures taken during the 1980s attest to this development. It 
is at that time that a wide-ranging system of ‘positive discrimination’ is cre-
ated (Calvès 2004). This policy is directly related to and part of what will 
soon be designated as ‘politique de la ville’, a policy field which slowly 
emerges in reaction to the so-called crisis of the banlieues, prefigured in the 
disturbances of 1981 in Lyon’s suburbs (Jobert/Damamme 1995). At the same 
time, the ministry of national education engages in similar measures and cre-
ates a complex system of priority education zones. In these zones, specific 
conditions regulate the functioning of schools in order to reduce the educa-
tional gap between the suburbs and other parts of France (van Zanten 2001). 
Finally, French policies, since the late 1990s, have made of the fight against 
discrimination, including discrimination based on ethnicity, an important ob-
jective (Fassin 2002).24
Without a doubt, these policies are discriminating, i.e. they recognize dif-
ferences and apply differential treatments to citizens in function of them. 
While they are not doing so openly all the time, there is a recognizable trend 
towards doing this since the late 1980s. From the late 1980s until today, the 
perceived crisis of the Republican model of integration and the fear of Islam 
are being debated in a variety of subfields while scientific expertise on these 
topics continues to increase. The religiosity of immigrants from Islamic back-
ground and their relation to the French political and legal system, problems of 
security and delinquency in the suburbs, the rise of anti-semitism among 
Franco-Maghrebis in particular, gender-relations among immigrants from Is-
lamic countries and, from a reversed perspective, the discrimination against 
them are the principal topics being debated, next to that of terrorism. 
Independent of the aims of individual contributors to these debates, they 
have together collaborated in the production of a (problematic) social identity 
of ‘Muslims’ in France which is distinct of a juridical one based on abstract 
rights of citizenship. In fact, the government itself has been directly engaged, 
since 1989, in this process through the creation of institutions, such as the 
Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI) in 1989 and the legal consecration of the 
Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH) in 
1990, and through assigning various public bodies the task of analysing the 
socio-economic profile of the immigrated population and monitoring dis-
crimination against them. In recent years, this development has clearly inten-
sified (see Centre d’Analyse Stratégique 2006). While the standardized col-
                                             




lection of ethnic data for policy-making is still strongly criticized, the refusal 
of such policies is increasingly linked to the endorsement of more indirect 
ways of collecting ethnic data (for one example see Haut Conseil à 
l’Intégration 2007). 
‘Young Muslims’ and Islam in France 
The point I want to make here is not that a specific type of expert knowledge 
provides the blueprint for policies on Islam, but that various types of expert 
knowledge on Islam in France have reconfigured Islam as an object of poli-
cies (and, to a significant degree, as a discursive object for Muslims them-
selves). Today, Islam is not just one religion among several nor is it simply 
‘the Other’, but Islam – as it manifests itself in modes of religiosity and prac-
tice – is also conceived as the outcome of an ensemble of interacting social 
factors which the state can and should to a certain degree influence in order to 
avert various threats ensuing from it. Put differently, the legal principles of 
equality of religions and separation of state and religion are partly suspended 
and policies are made dependent upon knowledge on Islam and Muslims. The 
effects of this development are, as in the case of the United Kingdom, am-
bivalent.
This reconfiguration of Islam as religion takes place by considering it as 
part of an Islamic milieu which is characterized notably by discrimination, i.e. 
the state’s failure to realize the Republican promise of equality, and the 
breakdown of authority, both being supposedly crucial factors in processes of 
‘radicalisation’. Today, a surprisingly varied and large group of Muslim activ-
ists, experts on Islam and politicians insists on the effects of the breakdown of 
parental, religious and state authority when explaining the rise of ‘radical’ Is-
lam: whether it is the alleged absence of religious authorities, the intergenera-
tional breakdown or the weak authority of parents and the failure of socialisa-
tion in schools – all these elements have supposedly contributed to the radi-
calisation of ‘young Muslims’. Underlying this view is the supposition that 
‘young Muslims’ are essentially immature and in need of guidance (Peter 
2006b). The effects of exclusion and discrimination which French Muslims 
suffer are also recognized by some as a factor alienating them from the Re-
public and possibly heightening the appeal of ‘radical’ trends in Islam. How-
ever, the importance of this factor is clearly valued differently. A significant 
number of actors agree upon the fact that exclusion and discrimination can be 
one cause for adopting ‘fundamentalist’ Islam and this has certainly added to 
the salience of anti-discrimination policies. However, the important role of 
Muslim actors – imams, preachers, associations, … – in this process of ‘radi-
calisation’ is also widely agreed upon. In the context of such a reading of 
‘radical Islam’, it is Muslim leaders who, to a large degree, decide if the ex-
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periences of discrimination by a believer lead to ‘radical Islam’ or not. In fact, 
given the limited possibilities for the state to put an end to discrimination, it is 
argued by some that Muslim associations fulfil a fundamentally important 
stabilizing role in society. One should add that the function of Muslim ‘lead-
ers’ becomes even more important due to the fact that a large number of Mus-
lims – together with the majority society – today hold that an effort to develop 
a specifically French reading of Islam is indispensable (Peter 2006a). In brief, 
in the context of the increasing importance of anticipatory rationality, policies 
concerning specific Muslim institutions and practices are debated by taking 
into account their role in processes of ‘radicalisation’ and their effects, direct 
or indirect, on the evolution of the Islamic milieu as a whole. 
Civil Islam à la Française 
The anticipatory analysis of Islam in France starts from the thesis that the 
breakdown of authority has strongly contributed to the rise of an ‘Islam
intégriste’ and it concludes from it the necessity to build solid structures of 
authority in French Islam. Hence the interest for Muslim federations and vari-
ous individual actors to cooperate with the state, in spite of all difficulties – 
the construction of authority structures is central to French policies on Islam 
and this implies significant opportunities or threats to many Muslim activists 
(Peter 2006a). This analysis is intrinsically related to the identification of 
those Muslims whose message is adequate to the French context. While such 
an identification can be realized simply by evaluating the conformity of Mus-
lim positions with so-called Republican values, my point here is that it has 
become increasingly common in French politics to abandon this type of rea-
soning in favour of a more complex thinking which is precisely anticipatory. 
The latter reasoning is based on the recognition that the state cannot regulate 
and/or directly refashion Islam in any desirable way without the cooperation 
of Muslim actors, including some of those often considered problematic. The 
inclusion of the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF) – 
usually considered part of the Muslim Brotherhood – into the state-created 
representative body of French Muslims, the Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman, illustrates this perfectly (Caeiro 2005). Such an approach is fun-
damentally argued in a mid-range perspective and it insists on the importance 
of realizing structural interventions in the Islamic milieu in order to initiate a 
progressive normalisation. Secondly, this approach is based, to varying de-
grees, on the idea that support to Islam, that is specific understandings of Is-
lam, can be a useful tool in the management of immigrant populations, both in 
the fight against urban violence and delinquency on the one hand and against 
terrorism on the other. It is in this latter respect, that ‘moderately Islamist’ 
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groups, such as the UOIF, are considered by some politicians particularly in-
teresting partners to the state (Peter 2006a). 
A variety of policies can derive from this approach and no exhaustive pic-
ture can be drawn here. Some examples of primary fields of application, con-
cerning the funding of mosques, Muslim associations and imams, will illus-
trate its relevance here. French policies concerning the construction of 
mosques have for a long time been a major obstacle in the establishment of 
community structures. Numerous mayors have been openly hostile to the con-
struction of mosques. In 2004, while many problems persist (FASILD 2006), 
it is clear that the basic outlook of many mayors has changed: it is estimated 
that the majority of mayors grants subsidies to the construction of mosques.25
Without doubt, these measures can partly be explained by electoral tactics. 
But this is clearly not the whole story. These measures also refer to the idea 
that the construction of ‘decent’ mosques (mosquées dignes) and/or the sym-
bolic recognition of Islam reduces the appeal of radical tendencies in Islam 
(see e.g. Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 1995: 33; Debré 2003, vol. 1: 131). It 
should be emphasized that this idea is underlying the ongoing national debate 
about the public funding of mosques initiated by former minister of the inte-
rior Sarkozy.26 In the course of these debates, Sarkozy’s propositions have 
been and are certainly very much criticized to the point that Sarkozy has 
backed away from his proposal to modify the law of 1905 while maintaining 
his basic aim to put ‘appropriate’ places of worship at the disposal of Mus-
lims.27 While this clearly indicates the limited capacity of anticipatory ration-
ality to effect legal change declared as such, it is important to note that many 
of his contradictors did not put into question the necessity to develop new 
readings of the law of 1905. These readings do not only displace the emphasis 
from the principle of separation of state and religion towards the legitimate 
means of intervention by the state in the religious domain, but they also un-
derstand these interventions as targeting a set of interrelated phenomena in-
side a variously conceived Islamic milieu. 
The granting of direct or indirect subsidies to mosques and Muslim asso-
ciations cannot be explained solely by a policy aiming to get rid of ‘radical’ 
Muslims. In fact, such an approach can also be based on a new conception of 
the educational role of associations, particularly religious associations, and its 
legitimate place in processes of socialisation and citizenship education in 
                                             
25  Libération, 8 December 2004. Concerning the various possibilities to finance 
mosques see Al Istichara. Le Journal de la consultation des Musulmans de Fran-
ce (2 May 2000: 7f.). Since 2000, the ministry of the interior has called upon 
mayors to support the funding of mosques. 
26  See e.g. L’Express, 18 September 2003. See also Kaltenbach/Tribalat (2002) 
and Machelon/Ministère de l’Intérieur (2006). 
27  Libération, 5 April 2007. 
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France. Put differently, such an approach is grounded in an implied or explicit 
new understanding of what counts as acceptable belief and religious practice 
of French Muslims. Whether on the local or national level, there are a signifi-
cant number of politicians who approve of the idea to involve Muslim asso-
ciations, not only ‘moderate’ Muslims, in their policies of ‘social appease-
ment’ and inter-community harmony. Likewise, there is an abundant number 
of Muslim groups who are willing to support such a policy (Peter 2006a), a 
policy which the state today feels unable to realize itself (Khosrokhavar 1997: 
295). The support granted to interreligious activities can be explained to a 
large degree by the same motivations (Lamine 2004). Finally, the political in-
terest in matters related to imams and their training (Frégosi 1998) clearly re-
flects the perception by politicians that these persons are no simple ‘ministres
du culte’, but also educators of ‘young Muslims’. Benefiting from a legiti-
macy which perhaps state agencies are lacking, they are sometimes consid-
ered better placed, by politicians, to make the youth adhere to certain values 
considered essential for the living-together in France. 
Conclusion
Drawing on Foucault’s reflections on political rationalities, I have attempted 
to outline a new framework for understanding policies on Islam in the United 
Kingdom and France. By distinguishing legal rationality from that of a secu-
rity apparatus, my aim was to bring into focus and analyse a different type of 
counter-terrorism policy which is played out in the incorporation, administra-
tion and regulation of Islamic institutions and practices. This perspective, I 
have argued, allows us to grasp not only the functioning of an important di-
mension of policies concerning Islam and Muslims. It also provides a way for 
understanding ongoing transformations in national juridico-political orders 
and, ultimately, a new starting point for an analysis of secularity in relation to 
European Islam. 
The approach outlined here also leads us to a different understanding of 
the power configuration within which Muslims practice Islam. While this 
configuration needs in part to be examined as one subordinating Muslims, this 
study has shown how the state also exercises power through the reconfigura-
tion of the category Islam as an Islamic milieu. Civil Islam as a specific un-
derstanding by Muslims of the Islamic tradition is largely enabled by this no-
tion of Islam as part of an Islamic milieu. In a certain sense, civil Islam thus 
defined is a factor of empowerment, since it allows Muslims to hold the state 
and society accountable for various problems in the racialized Muslim com-
munity and to demand policy changes. At the same time, however, by institu-
tionalizing Islam as a means for ensuring social peace and preventing radi-
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calisation, and by adopting anticipatory rationality, civil Islam risks entrench-
ing the perception of Islam as a potential threat. Finally, it certainly rein-
scribes the determination of ‘acceptable’ Islamic practices and beliefs through
expert assessment of the milieu in which they are embedded as well as prog-
nostics of its future development. 
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Documents, Security and Suspicion: the Social 
Production of Ignorance 
TOBIAS KELLY
In April 2005 Kamel Bourgass, described by the media as being of ‘North Af-
rican origin’, was found guilty of the murder of a British police officer and for 
plotting to ‘spread poisons’. Bourgass was implicated in a plot that, it was 
claimed, would have poisoned thousands of Londoners by spreading ricin, a 
toxin reportedly 6,000 times more deadly than cyanide, on car door handles 
across north London. Although the case against eight other suspects col-
lapsed, Bourgass was sentence to life in prison. Two of the other defendants 
were convicted of possessing false passports. During the trial it emerged that 
Bourgass had arrived in the U.K. on false papers which he had destroyed 
shortly before claiming asylum in January 2000 under the name of Nadir 
Habra. Habra was refused asylum in August 2001 and his appeal against the 
decision was dismissed in October 2001, when he became liable to be arrested 
and deported. In July 2002 he was arrested for shoplifting, but escaped detec-
tion as he used the name Bourgass rather than Habra. When he was finally ar-
rested he was found with several fake IDs and he is believed to have had up to 
four different documented identities. There was considerably confusion over 
whether he was Tunisian or Algerian, and indeed whether his real name was 
Bourgass at all. 
The conviction of Bourgass came just before the U.K. general election 
and amidst widespread fears over what was widely seen the threat from ‘Is-
lamic terror’. In this climate, the opposition Conservative party claimed that 
the Bourgass case showed the government had no idea who was in the coun-
try despite the ‘terrorist threat’ and that all people who arrived in the U.K. 
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with ‘suspect documents’ should be detained immediately.1 The governing 
Labour party’s response was to announce the electronic tagging of some and 
the fingerprinting of all asylum applicants to prevent ‘changes in identity’ and 
the issuing of ID cards to all visitors planning to stay in the U.K. for more 
than three months. Ian Blair, the most senior police officer in the U.K., waded 
into the debate, saying that ‘we have to go to a place where we do know who 
people are’ and called for the introduction of biometric identity cards.2 He 
went on to argue that it was a ‘danger to the state […] that the government did 
not know who some people were’. The U.K. government then announced 
plans to introduce biometric identity cards. A lengthy debate followed with 
proponents arguing that if people ‘had done nothing wrong they had nothing 
to fear’ from the new identity cards. According to the British Home Office, 
biometric identity cards would create a universal form of citizenship, free 
from racial and class distinctions, by showing ‘that everyone belongs to our 
society whether they were born here, have chosen to make their home here or 
are just staying for a while to study or work’ (Home Office 2003). Opponents, 
on the other hand, called biometric identity cards a fundamental invasion of 
privacy that heralded the rise of an all knowing surveillance state. People 
marched through London with supermarket bar codes tattooed into their bod-
ies, protesting at what they saw as the Orwellian future promised by the new 
cards. According to some, the new system of identity cards and databases 
would create a ‘total life history of every individual, to be retained even after 
death’.3
The plan to introduce identity cards is the first attempt to do so in the U.K. 
since the Second World War. For the past sixty years, and most of the years 
before that, British citizens and residents have not been forced to carry iden-
tity documents. Indeed, under British law there is no stand alone obligation to 
identify yourself to those acting in the name of the state. The spectre of a uni-
versal, or near universal, system of identity cards introduced in the name of 
security therefore raises important questions about the forms of knowledge 
produced by identity cards and how they transform the relationship between 
citizens-subjects and the state. In the absence of a history of identity cards, 
much of the debate in the U.K. about their implications has necessarily re-
mained speculative. In sharp contrast, everyday life in Israel/Palestine, where 
I have been carrying out research for the last ten years, is marked by a prolif-
eration of identity documents that are constantly checked and rechecked 
                                             
1  Daily Telegraph, ‘Milburn apology for Policeman’s death’, 15 April 2005. 
2  Public Service Review, ‘Britain’s senior policeman backs ID cards’, 18 April 
2005.
3  See the website of the anti-identity card group No2id, available at: 
http://www.no2id.net/IDSchemes/NO2IDSummaryBriefingMay2005.pdf (last 
accessed 17 January 2007). 
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(Kelly 2006, 2006a). In a context where not only are security threats seen as 
travelling across borders, but also the techniques and methods of security con-
trol are passed from state to state, a comparative approach to identification 
practices allows us to explore how seemingly technical forms of governance 
can be shot through with particular political and cultural assumptions. 
Fears over terror and migration have resulted in ever increasing attempts 
by states to produce knowledge about their citizen/subjects. The threat from 
‘terror’ is seen as clandestine and covert (see Eckert this volume), forcing se-
curity forces to come up with new ways of uncovering dangers. Identity cards 
play a crucial role in this ‘securitisation of citizenship’, as states try and dis-
tinguish between friend and foe. Through a comparison of Israel/Palestine and 
the U.K., this paper asks what types of knowledge do identity documents pro-
duce, and what are the implications for contemporary forms of citizenship? I 
argue that identity documents are an unstable and opaque method of produc-
ing knowledge about their holders, as whilst attempting to create ‘legible’ 
persons, they also hide people behind papers that are always potential forger-
ies. Rather than creating an all knowing state, documents create what might 
be called ‘known unknowns’, and thereby produce new grounds for uncer-
tainty and suspicion. Precisely because identity cards do not tell the state 
every thing they want to know, state officials are forced to resort to reading 
bodies for marks of suspicion, feeding into racialized notions of danger. Far 
from promoting the universal rights of citizenship, identity cards therefore 
promote cultural notions of belonging. 
Securi ty ,  Knowledge and Techniques
of  Ident i f icat ion 
The implicit logic of the global ‘war on terror’ sees the principle threat as 
originating outside Euro-American culture in a malevolent form of radical Is-
lam. As a result, security practices have often focused on attempts to control 
movement across borders in order to keep out dangerous persons and ideas. 
At the same time this threat is often also perceived as being clandestine and 
invisible. Traditional crime control methods based on detection and prosecu-
tion can not work in a situation where the threat is seen as being very real but 
largely unknown. The result is the promotion of preventative forms of secu-
rity based around perceived risks. As Eckert argues in this volume, particu-
larly when an enemy is perceived to be elusive the state takes preventative 
measures that involve the categorisation of whole populations. The default 
position becomes suspicion, and people have to prove their innocence. In this 
context, control over movement becomes an issue of security, and identity 
cards are used to sort out potential friends from enemies. The constant check-
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ing and rechecking of identity documents by officials over the world must 
therefore be understood as an attempt to make people more ‘legible’ (Scott 
1998; see also Torpey 2000) in order to determine the potential threat that 
they pose. In the face of large and largely unknown populations that are con-
stantly moving, identity documents help states ‘fix’ people in place. In this 
process Torpey argues that there has been move from identifying people’s 
rights and responsibilities from their physical appearance or social relation-
ships, to a determination of status through documents (2000).4 Identity docu-
ments seemingly offer a way of knowing who should be in particular places at 
particular times, and of separating citizens who need to be protected from 
those who would do them harm. 
It is an open question, however, as to what types of knowledge the check-
ing of identity documents actually produces. To begin to answer this question 
it is important to note that identity documents look in two directions. The first 
direction is towards legal status in order to establish entitlements and rights. 
The second direction is towards actual bodies in order to establish physical 
presence and individuality. However, in both directions the forms of knowl-
edge produced are marked by gaps and breaks. In practice, legal status is of-
ten far from self-evident, being made up of numerous contradictions and fis-
sures. Following EU enlargement for example, residency have become in-
creasingly complex, with uncertainties about the rights of Eastern Europeans 
to live work and claim benefit in Western Europe. Identity documents also 
only provide a partial form of knowledge about what these rights and respon-
sibilities might be, forcing low level officials to make numerous discretionary 
judgements (Calavita 2001). Furthermore, the production of identity docu-
ments can also hide actual bodies behind layers of administration and piles of 
paper, leading people to have both a physical and a legal presence. A migrant, 
for example, may ‘look like a Somali’ to the border guard, but his passport 
says that he is Finnish and therefore has rights of entry to the U.K. The result 
is that documents become objects to be manipulated as part of broader politi-
cal and economic strategies (Ong 1999; Caplan/Torpey 2001; Lyon 2001). 
People such as Bourgass can collect identity documents as a means of avoid-
ing police detection. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in a context of 
mass migration where fears are often expressed in cultural and racial terms, 
                                             
4  Identity documents become an essential prerequisite for recognition by state au-
thorities, even to the extent that new born babies are required to have a passport 
complete with photograph in order to move across borders. Without documents, 
states often do not know who they are dealing with. The difficulties that states 
have in dealing with people who do not have documents can perhaps most clear-
ly be seen in the case of immigrants who destroy their documents on arrival in a 
new state. Without proof of citizenship in another country, the receiving state 
has great difficulties in returning these people. 
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separating citizens from non-citizens does not necessarily distinguish between 
potential threats and responsible citizens who need to be protected. The map-
ping of nation, territory and citizenship, does not hold, if it ever has done. The 
soul searching in the British media that was caused by the fact that the perpe-
trators of the bombs in London on 7 July 2005 were British citizens is testa-
ment to the awkward relationship between formal citizenship and perceptions 
of security and threat. Against this background, identity documents do not 
help officials sort friend from foe, and may even confuse the issue. 
Given the seeming gap between the documented and the social person, it 
has been common to see identity documents as reifications or representations 
that distort or hide complex social relationships (cf. Gordillo 2006). However, 
such a view is open to two criticisms. First, identity documents are not de-
signed to identify the ‘whole person’, but are instrumental devices intended to 
uncover particular aspects of personhood in order to establish rights and enti-
tlements in particular contexts. Whether it is for reasons of welfare or secu-
rity, identity documents are a form of instrumental knowledge (Riles 2004). 
When an official at an airport checks your documents they are not interested 
in knowing about your complete social and cultural history, they are merely 
using the document to check whether you have the right to be in that place at 
that time, and whether they might represent threat or not. Second, documents 
are not removed from social and cultural processes, but rather are embedded 
within them. Instead of distorting social relationship, it is only through hold-
ing particular documents that people can act as agents, produce particular 
forms of knowledge and maintain social relationships (Serres 1982; Gell 
1998; Barry 2002; Coles 2007). Identity documents are not distorted represen-
tations of some already existing form of personhood, but produce particular 
forms of agency and knowledge (compare Keane 2005). After all, Bourgass 
was able to avoid police and immigration detection because of the documents 
he held, not despite of them. 
However, the forms of knowledge and action produced by identity docu-
ments are never complete or smooth, but filled with fissures and gaps. Instead 
of stabilizing, they can destabilize social relationships (Latour 1987; Ecks 
2003). Rather than creating an all knowing surveillance state, the very pres-
ence of identity documents creates its own forms of ignorance. Whilst at-
tempting to fix people in place and make them legible, documents simultane-
ously make this fixity impossible, creating new forms of illegibility.5 Not 
only are documents based on an assumption of deception, in that people such 
as Bourgass might not really be who they say they are, but they also create 
                                             
5  All attempts at fixity and stability arguably produce their own forms of instabili-
ty (Bauman 1993). The instability of identity documents is linked specifically to 
the tensions between legal and cultural notions of community. 
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their own possibilities for fraud. Far from creating a stable form of identifica-
tion, documents are therefore always a partial form of knowledge, obscuring 
as much as they reveal. David Lyon has famously argued that identity docu-
ments are ‘tokens of trust’ when we do not know who it is we are dealing with 
(2001). However, identity documents are perhaps best understood as artefacts 
of suspicion. In doing so they help to produce a shift towards cultural notions 
of belonging, where some groups are seen as being more suspicious than oth-
ers, resulting in security practices that produce their own forms of insecurity. 
Documents,  Suspicion and the Limits of  the Legal  
Person
From the moment you step foot in Israel/Palestine you are confronted with an 
array of document checks and questions. Indeed, amongst the many ‘interna-
tionals’ that live and work in the Palestinian Territories, the experience of se-
curity checks at Ben-Gurion airport are a constant topic of conversation. Eve-
ryone has their own story to tell and they get wheeled out regularly whenever 
the conversation lags at a diner party or over drinks in a café or bar. If a Pales-
tinian is present whilst these stories of passing through Ben-Gurion are re-
counted, they usually listen quietly, with a wry smile on their face. Since the 
late 1990s, as part of the wider restrictions that the Israeli state has placed on 
the movement of Palestinians in the name of ‘security’ (Kelly 2006, 2006a), 
Palestinians have been effectively forbidden from flying in and out of Ben-
Gurion airport. If they want to leave or enter the West Bank or Gaza Strip 
they must travel overland to Egypt or Jordan. This does not mean, however, 
that Palestinians do not travel through the airport. 
Some Palestinians have accumulated forms of legal documentation that 
have enabled them to pass through Ben-Gurion despite the formal restrictions. 
Many West Bank Palestinians hold foreign passports, especially from South 
America, and Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela, in particular. Palestinians who 
emigrated to South America in the 1920s and 1950s, returned in the 1970s 
due to the economic boom caused by the Israeli occupation. These people of-
ten hold foreign passports and use these to pass through checkpoints, border 
controls and fly through Ben-Gurion airport. Such people are amongst the 
richest in the West Bank, and they have used their passports to set up busi-
nesses in Israel or important goods and labour between the West Bank and Is-
rael. Dozens of people in the West Bank village in which I lived from 2000 to 
2002 held Venezuelan passports, and would fly out of Ben-Gurion airport, 
usually to Cyprus, every three months in order to renew their visas. Walid, 
one such person, used to joke to me that after these trips, usually just a few 
days long, he would chat and with the immigration control people who had 
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begun to recognize him. The fun of the trip was only added to by the fact that 
for many Palestinians a flight to Cyprus was associated with illicit dalliances, 
as it was to Cyprus that many people went to arrange the civil marriages that 
are unavailable in Israel/Palestine. 
My land lord, in the same West Bank village, held a British passport after 
he married a British volunteer on the kibbutz on which he worked as a la-
bourer during the 1980s. He had returned to the West Bank shortly after the 
start of the second intifada, hoping that his British passport would allow him 
to circumvent the restrictions that the Israeli military had placed on the 
movement of Palestinian identity card holders, and enable him to set up a 
small business importing roasted sunflower seeds. There were even more 
people in the village where I lived who had managed to obtain Israeli identity 
cards, usually through marriage to a Palestinian citizen of Israel, and these 
people would also travel through Ben-Gurion. Indeed, Nazmi, the man who 
picked me up from Ben-Gurion airport whenever I needed a lift, was born, 
brought up and continued to live in a West Bank Palestinian village. He had 
gained an Israeli identity card after marrying a Palestinian citizen of Israel, 
and had eventually found a job driving a taxi out of the airport. Whenever I 
make my way out the arrival lounge, I can usually guarantee to see his smil-
ing face greeting me. 
Given the advantages that holding Israelis identity cards or foreign pass-
ports give, West Bank Palestinians have attempted to accumulate and manipu-
late multiple forms of legal identification to enable them to travel through 
places such as Ben-Gurion, with all that implies to access to cultural and fi-
nancial resources (compare Ong 1999). I also made use of this ability to ma-
nipulate documents, having two British passports, one which I used for going 
into Israel, and another that I used for entering Arab countries. As people with 
stamps from Israel are banned from entering Syria and Lebanon, and can ex-
pect a great deal of questioning at other borders in the Middle East, many 
people who travel in the region have two identical passports that they swap 
around. As Susan Coutin has argued, documents are formally seen as merely 
representing an already pre-existing legal status, but in practice documents 
can have a ‘life of their own’ creating their own forms of rights and responsi-
bilities (2000: 54). The social life of identity documents allows them to be 
used and manipulated as people attempt to pass through international borders 
or internal checkpoints. 
It would be extremely naïve, however, to think that Israeli security offi-
cials, and officials elsewhere in the world, are not aware of such attempts to 
hide bodies behind documents. Indeed, an internal Israeli military investiga-
tion concluded that the use of checkpoints and identity cards could not pre-
vent Palestinians from infiltrating into Israel. Rather than bypassing check-
points and identity checks, most Palestinian ‘infiltrators’ into Israel pass 
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straight through them. Furthermore, following the start of the second intifada
in September 2000 Israeli soldiers were under explicit orders to be on the look 
out for Palestinians who were attempting to use foreign passports in order to 
pass. The fear that documents can be forged is a particularly persistent theme. 
The former Israeli cabinet minister Meir Shetreet has estimated that up to 
400,000 forged Israeli identity cards are in circulation.6 As in the debates that 
followed the conviction of Bourgass, the suspicion of possible fake identity 
documents is found at border crossing and checkpoints around the world. I am 
often called upon to write so called ‘expert witness report’ for the U.K. Immi-
gration tribunal on whether the documents presented by a particular asylum 
seeker are ‘genuine’. The basic assumption of the Home Office officials 
seems to be that the documents presented by asylum applicants are in some 
way forged. Indeed, writing in the context of the U.S.-Mexican border, Hey-
man has argued that immigration inspectors see one of their principle tasks as 
the uncovering forged identity documents (1995: 272). Similarly, in August 
2006 all U.K. ports and airports were warned by the British Home Office to 
be on the look out for people trying to enter the U.K. on false visas following 
the theft of the stickers that house the visas from a London printing plant. 
There were also reports that failed asylum seekers were using faked passports 
in order leave the U.K. before they were deported to their country of ‘origin’. 
Over 200 were reportedly sent back to the U.K. from France for trying to 
travel on such documents.7 In order to combat the perceived widespread use 
of forged documents, the U.K. government has created a new offence of hold-
ing false documents. Under this law, a person can be charged merely for hold-
ing forged forms of identification, irrespective of whether they try and use 
them.
In the context of suspicion over fraud produced by documents, Israeli se-
curity officials never take the documents that they are presented with at face 
value. Every time my landlord Juma flew into Ben-Gurion, with his wife and 
two young children, security officials questioned him about his British pass-
port, asking him he also had a Palestinian identity card as well. As Palestini-
ans, since the late 1990s, have been effectively forbidden from travelling 
through Ben-Gurion airport, this would have meant that he was unable to en-
ter Israel and return to his home in the West Bank. Israeli security officers can 
see from his passport that he was born in the West Bank, and therefore might 
hold a Palestinian identity card. On one occasion, his wife, nervous and tired 
after flying all night, admitted that Juma had a West Bank identity card. As a 
result Juma was forbidden from entering Israel via Ben-Gurion and had ‘From 
                                             
6  Ha’aretz, ‘Immigrations smash forgery ring’, 23 September 2002. 
7  In another case a Brazilian football player was accused of trying to enter the 
U.K. on forged Brazilian passport that his agent had apparently provided for 
him. 
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the Territories’ stamped in his British passport, preventing him from trying to 
use Ben-Gurion again. He had to return to the U.K. and fly to Jordan, entering 
the West Bank over land. 
The possibility of fraud, and hence suspicion, is inherent in identity 
documents. The extensive use of documentary practices by modern states to 
control, coordinate and stabilize, simultaneously produces possibilities for the 
forged and the fraudulent.8 The sense of fraud has two elements. The first is 
that the documents are counterfeit. The second, and perhaps more important, 
is that although the document may be genuine, it does not really tell you who 
the holder is, as legal notions of citizenship run up alongside cultural notions 
of belonging. Although Juma was a British citizen, for the Israeli security of-
ficers this merely obscured his more important Palestinianness. For this rea-
son, documentary forms of governance are never entirely trusted either by 
state officials or those subjected to their force.9 There is a pervasive sense
that the world is made up by ‘more than the play of documents’ 
(Coutin/Maurer/Yngvesson 2002) and that there is a self that ‘exceeds its 
documentation’ (Coutin/Yngvesson 2006: 179). This means that although 
documents may appear to have a social life of there own, there is always a re-
ferral to a seemingly more stable form of knowledge that stands beyond the 
documents. The inclusion of place of birth on passports for example, points to 
this sense of a more stable presence that exists elsewhere (Yngves-
son/Mahoney 2000). My landlord Juma may have been a British citizen and 
held a British passport, but his passport also said that he was born in the West 
Bank, alluding to a seemingly less transient origin, rooted in birth, that the Is-
raeli security official picked up on. The desire of the British media to find out 
if Bourgass was ‘really’ Algerian or Tunisian is also testament to this search 
for a seemingly more stable source of origin. Whilst identity documents may 
have been introduced in order to identify and fix in place in the face of a mass 
of seemingly changing and unknowable bodies (Torpey 2000), the instability 
of documents means that officials continue to look beyond the documents 
they are given, onto the bodies of the people that hold them. 
                                             
8  States can be complicit in the forgery of their own practices. As Calavita has ar-
gued, for example, U.S. immigration law in the 1980s required employers to re-
quest paper documents from immigrants, but did require employers to verify the 
authenticity of these documents (1990). The contradictions between political 
pressures to regulate illegal immigration demands from employers for cheap 
Mexican labour crated a situation where a blind eye was turned by immigration 
inspectors to all but the most obviously counterfeit immigration documents. 
9  Longman describes how during the Rwandan genocide people did not trust offi-
cial identity cards that distinguished Hutu from Tutsi, but sought to research into 
family histories and used phonotypical markers instead (2001). 
117
TOBIAS KELLY
Biometr ics,  Documents and Bodies 
In the face of the ever present possibility of fraud, biometric identity cards 
seem to offer the promise of binding transient documents to seemingly more 
stable bodies. 10  Indeed senior British Police officers have only supported 
identity cards on the grounds that they will contain biometric information, 
claiming that as otherwise they are actually an obstacle to countering potential 
terrorist threats. 11  According to their proponents biometric identity cards 
‘make counterfeiting virtually impossible’ as a ‘criminal may steal your card, 
but your unique biometric data cannot be taken from you’.12 The creation of a 
direct link between physical bodies and the documents that they hold, in the 
shape of information about physiological traits, creates the promise of 
increased ‘legibility’.13
The Israeli state has been at the forefront of attempts to introduce biomet-
ric technology. Since 2002 several terminals have been installed at Ben-
Gurion airport that seek to match hand prints to information stored on a card 
to a central database. Israeli citizens and international businessmen who fre-
quently fly in and out of Ben-Gurion can apply for the scheme and then have 
background checks carried out. If they are passed by the Israeli security ser-
vices, they then have their personal details and hand print recorded and join 
the estimated 250,000 other people on the scheme. The Dallas based producer 
of the system boasts that the system ‘eradicates human error’ and is ‘fool-
proof’ (EDS 2004). Similar technology has been used at some checkpoints 
used by Palestinians. In 2002 the Israeli military started to install a new bio-
metric scanning device at Erez, the largest checkpoint between Israel and the 
Gaza Strip, which on some years has seen tens of thousands of Palestinians 
passing through on a daily basis in order to work in the Israeli economy. As 
the Palestinian enters the checkpoint a gate closes behind him and he has to 
swipe his card through the reader and have his palm and face read by a scan-
                                             
10  The demand for biometric technology has grown so fast in the past few years 
that the industry has grown from being worth around $1bn to $4.5bn between 
2000 and 2004 (Guardian, ‘Biometrics – great hope for world security or tri-
umph of big brother’, 18 June 2004). 
11  They argue that the possibilities for fraud inherent in non-biotitic identity docu-
ments will actually hinder rather than help police work. 
12  See the website of the U.K. Identity and Passport Service, available at: 
http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/benefits-society-idtheft.asp (last accessed 30 
January 2007). 
13  Biometric systems work by attempting to create a match between information 
held on a card and the unique physiological traits, such as fingerprints or iris 
patterns, of the card holder. They do so either by matching information on an ID 
card with physical traits read off a body – known as verification – or matching 
an ID card, with physical traits on a body and a central data based – known as 
identification. Identification is a much more complicated and costly procedure. 
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ners. If a central database verifies that the information read off the card and 
the body match and that the card holder has the right to enter Israel, a gate to 
left opens. However, if the biometric data does not match or the computer re-
fuses the card holder entry, a gate to the right is opened up, where further in-
terrogation can take place. The Israeli security forces boasts that the system, 
known as Basel, can eradicate the ‘need for human intervention’ (Israeli Min-
istry of Public Security 2003). The use of biometric cards was included in the 
1999 agreement between the government of Israel and the PLO, designed to 
facilitate safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza. Although this 
agreement has effectively become moribund, there are eventual plans as the 
Wall, which the Israeli military is building across the West Bank, is com-
pleted, to roll out the technology across the region. The checkpoint at Beitunia 
to the west of Ramallah for example, which is reserved for businessmen, has 
required biometric identity cards since 2005. Several thousand Palestinians 
from the north of the West Bank have also reportedly been issued with similar 
cards. A new checkpoint unit was created within the IDF in 2004 whose 
members were specially trained in the use of biometric technology. 
Israel is far from being alone in the introduction of biometric identity 
documents. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has set new 
standards that require the inclusion of a biometric facial image in all new 
passports. Most EU states are moving towards the incorporating of fingerprint 
and facial biometrics in passports. The EU also increasingly requires 
fingerprint and facial biometrics for residence permits and visas for visitors 
from outside the European Economic Area. Similarly, the 9/11 commission in 
the U.S. recommended the introduction of biometric identity cards as a means 
of ‘strengthening security’ (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States 2004). The U.S. military has also started collecting biomet-
ric data on people detained in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. U.S. immigra-
tion now requires the routine face-scanning and finger printing of visitors 
from most states in the world. The U.S.-Visit (U.S. Visitor and Immigrant 
Status Indicator Technology) security system is meant to identify travelers 
who have violated immigration controls, have criminal records or belong to 
groups listed as terrorist organisations by the U.S. Visitors are also required to 
have a biometric passport or face more stringent security checks. In the past 
few years, biometrics, in the shape of a fingerprint, have also been included in 
the identity cards issued to U.S. residents who are non-citizens. 
In the U.K., after a heated debate in parliament and the press, new biomet-
ric passports and identity cards are due to be introduced from 2008. Biometric 
technology is already used on identity documents for asylum applicants and 
visa applications from citizens of specific states. The new U.K. passports will 
have fingerprint and facial biometrics, whilst the identity card will also carry 
iris biometrics. The biometric information recorded will then be registered on 
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a central National Identification Registry. Registration will be a mandatory 
for all U.K. residents. It will not however be compulsory to carry a card and 
there will be no new powers for the police to demand the card. The Home 
Office has claimed that biometrics represented a ‘cutting edge’ solution to 
identity fraud, arguing that recent advances in technology meant that a ‘truly 
effective and secure scheme is now possible’ providing a ‘hi-tech form of 
security for every citizen’14. The new Identity and Passport Service set up to 
administer the new cards has claimed that they will ‘help the security services 
in their investigations into organized crime and terrorist activities’ and help 
protect the U.K. against threats to ‘national security’, as well as ‘help to 
identify people who try to work here illegally and could deter potential illegal 
immigrants from coming to the U.K’.15 Biometric identity cards are being 
sold has a ‘hi-tech’ solution to security problems that would bind physical 
bodies to documents and therefore make the population more ‘legible’. Bod-
ies are treated as a source of biologically based information that can be bro-
ken down and read by electronic equipment in order to identify distinct as-
pects of a person (Ericson/Haggerty 2001: 613). The uncertainty of legal 
documents is seemingly overcome by the certainty of technology, creating 
new forms of what might be called ‘biosociality’ (Rabinow 1996; Rose/Novas 
2005).
The Limits of  Biometr ics 
Despite the claims of cutting edge technology, it remains an open question as 
to how revolutionary the introduction of biometric technology actually is in 
the processes of identification and knowledge production. After all, and de-
spite the more extreme fears of some of its critics, biometrics is not the stor-
ing of a part of a physical person in a card, but rather is the storing of an elec-
tronic representation of a physiological trait. In this sense, biometric markers 
have long been common on identity documents, in the shape of photographs. 
The ‘traditional’ nature of biometric technology means that, in many ways, it 
is as open to manipulation and problems as ‘old style’ identity cards. Indeed, 
according to the inventor of the algorithm used in most iris biometrics, all 
biometrics are vulnerable to fraud.16 Fingerprints can be faked with latex, 
faces can be altered through plastic surgery, and irises can be disguised with 
                                             
14  See http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/scheme-now.asp (last accessed 20 Ja-nuary 
2007).
15  See http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/benefits-society-immigration.asp (last ac-
cessed 24 January 2007). 
16  BBC, ‘Facing a biometric future’, 13 January 2004, available at: http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3389209.stm (last accessed 24 January 2007). 
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contact lenses. For the effective working of biometric technology, data on the 
physiological characteristics must be easily recordable. However, trials have 
found for example, that it is more difficult to take fingerprints from manual 
labourers. Contact lenses and eye conditions also mean that one in a thousand 
can not give iris scans, with a higher recognition rate for white and Asian par-
ticipants than those who are black (House of Commons Science and Technol-
ogy Committee 2006). No biometric system records a complete picture of the 
physiological characteristics, but creates a template containing key points. 
Small variations in the way this template is taken, such as angle, light or heat, 
can effect the recorded information. 
Even once biometric information has been gathered, the techniques for 
matching stored biometric information with physical bodies are far from one 
hundred percent reliable. Identification systems must be balanced between a 
high false acceptance rate – allowing more people to pass than should – and a 
high false rejection rate – rejecting genuine people. Fingerprints only achieve 
about a 98 percent accurate match rate. Facial recognition technology is be-
tween 95 percent and 60 percent accurate (Kong et al. 2005).17 Hand-shapes, 
another biometric in common use, are not unique in large populations and 
therefore potentially have a very high false acceptance rate. Human bodies 
also change over time. People grow beards, or put on weight, fingerprints 
change with age. This means that flexibility has to be built into the system, 
creating further space for error. At an airport such as Heathrow, with more 
than sixty million people travelling through each year, even a system with 
99.99 percent accuracy could still fail to recognize tens of thousands of peo-
ple a year. Furthermore, the facial biometrics put into new passports around 
the world are not designed to be checked against a central database, but still 
require a visual check from an immigration officer. They are therefore only as 
accurate as non-digital photographs. Indeed, a study by the Israeli military 
concluded that no single biometric technique provides an ‘acceptable’ meas-
ure of accuracy and that biometrics could not be relied on as a fail safe means 
of identification (Croft 2001). Despite the promise of a bright new ‘biosocial’ 
future, bodies can not be so easily read. 
Whilst biometric identity documents do not necessity represent a revolu-
tion in the accuracy of matching an identity document to the holder, they are a 
significant development in the ways in which that information is stored. 
Physiological data, rather than being simple stored in a photograph or a thumb 
print is encrypted into an electronic chip and in some cases, such as the U.K. 
identity card, on a central database, raising important questions about the 
management of information. At a global level however not all states will use 
                                             
17  See also: ‘UK National Physical Laboratory test report’, available at: http:// 
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~jgd1000/NPLsummary.pdf (last accessed 18 January 2007). 
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same databases, and access will depend on fluctuating alliances and influence. 
Furthermore, any encryption system is only as reliable as the initial registra-
tion. The best that any system can provide is a compelling connection with 
some previous verification of identity. The entire system is therefore reliant 
on the initial point of entry, when the person is registered. This in turn has to 
rely on other documents and personal statements that can be more easily 
forged. It is worth remembering that Bourgass came into the U.K. on forged 
documents. Biometrics, rather than creating a fail safe linkage between bodies 
and documents merely reproduce the same problems of fraud, forgery and de-
ception in new forms. The more profound sense of possible fraud – that 
documents might not tell you who some one really is and that cultural notions 
of belonging are more powerful than legal forms of citizenship – remains. 
Incomplete Knowledge and Reading off  Bodies 
As a form of knowledge, identity cards, whether biometric or not, are inher-
ently incomplete, and must therefore be accompanied with additional forms of 
knowledge. Despite all the biometric technology and the constantly checking 
and rechecking of documents, any passage through Ben-Gurion is also 
marked by incessant and often repeated questions by young airport security 
staff. Where have you been? Where are you going? Who did you stay with? 
Did you meet any locals? Who paid for your trip? Can I see your notes? 
These questions are often asked again and again as you are passed from one 
official to the next. In order to understand why these questions are asked 
alongside the checking of documents, it is important to remember that identity 
documents are not designed to identify every aspect of a person’s life history, 
but rather are created for specific purposes – they are a means to and end. In a 
climate dominated by fears over terrorism, these ends are primarily, although 
not exclusively, those of security. Identity cards are used therefore to identify 
whether somebody represents a particular threat. However, in very few cases 
can identity cards be used to reveal particular threats represented by known 
individuals. Even when Kamel Bourgass was arrested, it was not because po-
lice knew where he would be, but rather because they came across him in the 
course of a raid. To use identity cards to target specific individuals requires 
knowing that such and such a person was planning on doing such and such, 
and all too often this type of knowledge is not available. Identity cards there-
fore are primarily used to identify dangerous categories of person rather than 
known individuals. It is here that bodies re-enter the picture once again, as at-
tempts are made to identify possibly suspicious persons. 
Immigration officers and security officials have to make on the spot deci-
sions about whether or not to let somebody pass, and the documentary evi-
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dence they have is often incomplete or inconclusive, or not entirely trusted. 
According to Raphael Ron, the former head of security at Ben-Gurion airport, 
security staff are therefore trained to detect suspicious behaviour, in a tech-
nique known as ‘behaviour pattern recognition’ or BPR (Croft 2001). Accord-
ing to Ron, officials would question a person buttoned up in a trench coat on a 
100-degree day, or a person with no baggage buying a ticket at the interna-
tional travel counter. Questioning patterns are designed to reveal inconsisten-
cies in stories and suspicious forms of behaviour. Similarly, in her ethnogra-
phy of Israeli security practices, Juliana Ochs describes how Israeli civil 
guards are trained to read ‘bodily signs of suspicion’ that can include ‘being a 
youngster who is trying to blend but do not belong to that group’, ‘running 
suspiciously’ or ‘wearing unsuitable clothes’ (Ochs 2006). Such reading off 
bodies is not as crude as straightforward racial profiling. Indeed any security 
system would be naive to do so, as it would create new opportunities to pass 
as non-threatening. However, a context where fears often take a cultural and 
racialized form, some bodies are more suspicious than others. As Josiah 
Heyman argues, when faced with such situations, officials at U.S. border 
crossings use markers often read off bodies or clothes, based on overt national 
stereotypes, in order to decide whether someone represents a threat, whether 
they really are who they say they are, and whether they should be allowed to 
pass (2001; see also Gilboy 1991). 
Perceptions of legitimate presence or suspicion will of course depend on 
specific local histories. Markers of dangerousness and the populations that 
they are seen as referring to change over time and space. In the U.K., after the 
London bombs in July 2005, people carrying heavy rucksacks on the under-
ground were often viewed suspiciously. In Israel, on the other hand, wearing 
heavy winter coats in summer arouses suspicion, due to the tendency of sui-
cide bombers to hide their bombs under thick jackets. More generally styles 
of dress or physical characteristic are often associated with particularly dan-
gerous groups. As Ochs (2006) argues, Israeli security officials pay close at-
tentions to clothes and appearance, as well as try in engage people in conver-
sion in order to ‘listen to their accents to determine whether they are Jewish 
Israeli, Palestinian or foreign and ascertain their degree of suspicion’ (see also 
Paine 1992; Liebes/Blum-Kulka 1994; Helman 1997; Ben-Ari 1998). This is 
not to say that Israeli security officials necessarily have clear idea of what 
they were defending, or of who is the enemy. Indeed these notions are proba-
bly very fractured and contradictory. As Virginia Dominguez (1989: 166) has 
argued you cannot assume ‘too neat and clear cut a separation between self 
(Israeli and Jewish) and other (epitomized by, but not restricted to, Arabs)’.
For Dominguez, the references are neither fixed nor determinate, as there are 
‘uncertainties and indeterminacies at the boundaries of the collective self’ 
(Dominguez 1989: 174). This means that for Israeli security officials bodies 
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can not be easily read for culturally based notions of danger. Many Israelis 
and Palestinians are physically, socially and culturally difficult to tell part. 
Nearly 20 percent of the Israeli population are Palestinian Arabs. Further-
more, many Jewish Israelis are descended from the Jewish populations of 
other Middle Eastern countries, and speak Arabic fluently. Many of the Pales-
tinian residents of the West Bank have worked in Israel for years and there-
fore not only speak Hebrew, but also dress and cut their hair in ways that 
make them indistinguishable from many Israeli citizens. In such a context it 
can be difficult to ‘tell’ an Israeli citizen who needs to be protected from a 
Palestinian threat.18 Arguably however, the difficulties in telling Israeli from 
Palestinian only increases the fear and suspicions of security officials, as they 
constantly look between confusing documents and bodies in order to deter-
mine possible dangers. 
Similar racially and culturally based conceptions of threat are also present 
in the U.K. Dangers to the security of the British state and individual citizens 
are increasingly viewed as originating in particular forms of Islamic belief 
and practice, often seen as stemming from outside the U.K., both culturally 
and territorially. However, friend and foe can only be problematically mapped 
onto citizens and non-citizen, due to the large U.K. born Muslim population 
that is increasingly seen as a potentially dangerous presence. The result is that 
suspicion is inherently racialized. This can be seen most obviously in the 
2006 decision to bar two British students of Pakistani origin from a flight 
from Spain to Manchester on the grounds that they were behaving suspi-
ciously. Their suspicious behaviour included speaking a language that 
sounded like Arabic (actually Urdu) and wearing beards. More tragically, 
such a process can also be found in the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, 
the Brazilian who was mistaken for suspicious person of Arab descent by the 
British police. 
In this context, the very demand for identification becomes racialized. 
Under U.K. law there is no stand alone legal requirement to prove your iden-
tity in public spaces. Police officers can ‘stop and search’ as well as demand 
personal details only if they have ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ that a 
person is in the possession of stolen or prohibited items.19 Home Office fig-
                                             
18  I have one South African friend who has worked in Israel for many years as a 
building contractor. He is of Afrikaans origin, nearly two metres tall, with a big 
bushy moustache and a former semi-professional rugby player. In the 1990s he 
worked in Sudan and converted to Islam, changing his name to Mohammed Ab-
dallah. Whenever he would fly through Tel Aviv’s Ben-Gurion airport he would 
always cause confusion for the border guards who were uncertain how to deal 
with him. 
19  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Furthermore, senior officers can give 
authorization for stop and searches in a given locality, without individual suspi-
cion, if they believe that a violent incident may take place, or a person is carry-
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ures reveal that between 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 the number of recorded 
stop and searches rose by 17 percent for white people, but by 36 percent for 
Asian people and 38 percent for black people (LSE 2006). There is consider-
able controversy over the reliability of these statistics and the U.K. NGO State 
Watch has claimed that between 2001/2002 and 2004/2005, stop and searches 
have increased by 66 percent for black people and by 75 percent for Asians 
compared to less than 4 percent for white people. Furthermore, between 
2001/2002 and 2002/2003, police stop and searches under terrorism legisla-
tion rose by 302 percent for Asian people, by 230 percent for black people 
and by 118 percent for white people. Such statistics have caused widespread 
arguments over whether they show widespread institutional racism within the 
U.K. police forces. Defenders of the police have argued that crime and terror-
ism are not equally distributed amongst the British population, and therefore it 
makes sense to target ‘stop and search’. Whether this is true or not, it ignores 
a context where racial and cultural markers can implicitly become grounds for 
suspicion. The point is that rather than create a universal form of identifica-
tion where ‘if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear’, some peo-
ple clearly seem more suspicious than others. 
Conclusion
In the face of security threats that are widely seen as clandestine and hidden, 
identity cards are increasingly used by states as they try to make their citi-
zens/subjects more ‘legible’. The question remains however as to what forms 
of knowledge are produced by identity cards and how this transforms the rela-
tionship between states and the populations they seek to control. The claims 
that identity cards produce transparent and secure forms of knowledge, or that 
they create an all knowing Orwellian state, are equally misplaced. Rather than 
simply create legibility and knowledge, identity cards also produce their own 
forms of illegibility and ignorance. After all, Bourgass was able to remain un-
detected not despite of identity documents but because he was able to manipu-
late them. He was able to do so because documents create a separation be-
tween the physical and the legal aspect of personhood, hiding bodies behind 
                                                                                                                              
ing ‘dangerous instruments’ without ‘good reason’ (s60 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994). Finally, police are also entitled to stop and search 
for articles that could be used for terrorism in specific areas that have been 
authorized by senior officers (s44 of the Terrorism Act 2000). London has been 
continuously designated as such a zone since February 2001. Although they ha-
ve fewer powers than police officers, immigration officials can also question 
people to determine their immigration status where there is a ‘reasonable suspi-
cion’ that a person is an immigration offender. 
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layers of always potentially forged paper. Despite the promise of a bright 
technological future, biometric identity cards do not radically alter the situa-
tion, as they still rely on a form of representation that rather than bind bodies 
to documents, creates spaces for misrepresentation, manipulation and poten-
tial subterfuge. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, in a context 
where legal forms of citizenship and culturally based notions of belonging ex-
ist in an uneasy tension, the more powerful sense of fraud, that someone 
might not be who their documents say they are, remains. 
Rather than create security through knowledge, identity documents create 
their own particular types of suspicion, ignorance or ‘known unknowns’, and 
therefore produce new forms of racialized suspicion and insecurity. Precisely 
because identity cards do not tell the state every thing they want to know, 
state officials are forced to resort to reading bodies for marks of suspicion, 
feeding into racialized notions of danger. Yet bodies too only offer a confus-
ing surface from which to read possible threats. Facial characteristic, skin 
colour and styles of clothes can only tell you so much in a world where bod-
ies, ideas and objects are constantly crossing borders. As people try and sepa-
rate friend from foe there is therefore a constant movement between confus-
ing bodies and unclear documents, neither of which are entirely trusted. The 
result is a racialized form of citizenship, where bodies, documents and legal 
status merge. The rights and obligations of citizenship are therefore not the 
product of a stable mapping of documents and legal status or straightforward 
racial stereotypes, but rather emerge through the gaps and fissures created by 
an unstable technique of governance. As a result, the forms of knowledge cre-
ated by identity cards therefore create their own forms of insecurity. The cru-
cial question of course, is who is made to bear the burden of these new forms 
of uncertainty. 
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The Danger of ‘Undergoverned’ Spaces: the 




This article aims at a reconstruction of how the Sahel region of Africa has 
been integrated into the ‘war on terror’ by security experts and an analysis of 
the various social implications of the discourse and intervention practices. 
Applying the arguments of critical geopolitics and the securitisation frame-
work, this contribution will show how the U.S. government operates with a 
spatial terminology in problematizing the Sahel as an ‘undergoverned’ space, 
where terrorist activities, smuggling and illegal migration constitute a threat 
to international security. It will be asked how these discursive manifestations 
came to be the dominant interpretation of social reality in the Sahel. The arti-
cle outlines perceptions and assessments, in short: the political rationality 
which made the military programme ‘Pan-Sahel Initiative’ and its broader 
successor, the ‘Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership’, possible. It is 
an investigation into the question of how dominant representations of and ac-
tions in the region are embedded within the U.S. global strategy of pre-
emptive action against perceived threats. An analytical lens on space aims at 
highlighting the entire apparatus that has securitized the Sahel over the last 
few years. In a remarkably open public policy, U.S. security professionals 
have made powerful geographical statements about the Sahel region, sup-
ported by the use of illustrative maps, reiterating the dangerousness of this 
area. It will be argued that by generating knowledge about the ‘poorly policed 
Sahel’, the U.S. military experts play a decisive role in transmitting the 
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propositions of the global discourse of the ‘war on terror’ into practices and, 
thus, create the field of their own operations. 
However, the subsequent interventions have unintended consequences as 
they aim at strengthening state authorities in a region where distrust against 
state institutions prevails. It is not the intention of this article to prove which 
part of the intervention ‘caused’ which effect on the ground. However, the 
case will be made that the representation of the region and the subsequent in-
terventions have impacts on how different local actors perceive their role in 
this power relation. They have done so in a variety of ways. The ‘targets’ of 
the interventions, be it governments and their local officials or communities, 
are able to translate, appropriate or challenge the discourse and its policies. As 
a consequence, state-society relations and community relations have changed, 
with ambiguous effects. 
Representat ions of  the ‘Third World’  
Problematisations of geographical or social spaces by hegemonic political 
players are a common instrument for creating urgency and legitimizing inter-
ventions in these spaces. It is part of the geopolitical tradition of Western ac-
tors to categorize spaces in the ‘Third World’ in order to make them manage-
able. Northern actors construct the problem and, at the same time, offer 
strategies for its solution. Thus, the production of geographical knowledge 
can be seen as a political act. 
During the Cold War the two superpowers accumulated knowledge about 
non-European regions in order to help create strong states capable of trans-
forming their ‘backward’ societies. States in which the assumed modernisa-
tion project did not meet the expectations were categorized as ‘weak’.1 After 
the end of the Cold War the discussion of deficiencies of states in the South 
was significantly expanded into security politics. During the 1990s two of the 
                                             
1  For the interplay between knowledge-production and space-production in the 
Anglophone social sciences see Agnew (1998) and Bilgin/Morton (2002). In the 
1950s and 1960s, observation and statistics became the primary means of empi-
ricist knowledge-gathering. The Gross Domestic Product appeared to be the new 
indicator of development. This was complemented by anthropological studies of 
cultural habits in the ‘Third World’. According to Bilgin and Morton the logic 
of abstracting the state from its society, from its historical formation and the in-
ternational context persists to date. Within this logic, large parts of the social 
sciences keep focussing on observable data on the capacities of agencies. Thus, 
‘the architecture of modernisation and development theory, including conse-
quent representations of the post-colonial state, has undergone minor modifica-
tions and shifts of emphasis, adapting to new conditions and circumstances, whi-
le remaining relatively unchanged’ (Bilgin/Morton 2002: 65). 
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most prominent representations of spaces by Western foreign policy actors 
with regard to the Non-Western World were those of the ‘failed’ and the 
‘rogue’ state. However, while the main deficiency of the former is most of all 
seen in the incapability of state authorities to provide basic services or to ef-
fectively control their territory, which was interpreted as having mainly inter-
nal effects, the latter was believed to pose a direct threat to the international 
state system by supporting terrorism, violating human rights or through the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Bilgin/Morton 2004: 170).2 Af-
ter the 9/11 attacks one characteristic originally assigned to rogue states, 
namely the accusation of harbouring terrorists, was now attributed to states 
perceived as weak or failed. The U.S. National Security Strategy, announced 
in 2002, officially marked the shift towards pre-emptive action within U.S. 
foreign policy and drew the attention to weak states: 
‘The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can 
pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not 
make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and 
corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels 
within their borders’ (White House 2002: ii). 
‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones’ (White 
House 2002: 1). 
The perceived threat makes it mandatory for Western states to engage in weak 
states as in times of terror no one can afford to ignore these spaces. In a 
speech at the West Point Military Academy George W. Bush is explicit about 
the new danger and the steps that need to be taken: ‘We must take the battle to 
the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they 
emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of ac-
tion. And this nation will act.’ (Bush 2002) It is remarkable that since 9/11, 
the new threat apparently roots in somewhat diversified geographical spaces 
as the terms ‘weak states’, ‘failed states’ and ‘undergoverned regions’ are 
used interchangeably in key policy documents. It has become common sense 
for Western government authorities to stress the link between such regions, 
which are perceived as insufficiently governed, and the possibility that they 
might become a breeding ground for terrorism (among others EU 2003: 8-9; 
OECD/DAC 2003: 16; USAID/Department of State 2003: 10; White House 
                                             
2  At the same time, however, ‘rogue’ or ‘failed’ states have functional aspects for 
the West: Their existence makes the justification for action – in order to ‘end’ 
the alleged threat – easier. To call states ‘weak’ or ‘failed’, on the other hand, al-
lows one to blame internal factors for their deficiencies rather than to take 
aspects of the global economic structure into account (Jacoby 2005). 
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2003: 23; Department of Defense 2006: 12). In contrast to the 1990s, when 
the individual’s security in the South rather than state security was the pri-
mary addressee of Western policy interventions, it is now the security of the 
population in the homeland that is at stake when promising to deal with ‘trou-
bled’ areas: 
‘German interests are being defended […] at the Hindukush’ (the former German 
minister of defence, Peter Struck, 4 December 2002). 
‘Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world, or healthy in a sick world; nor can 
we expect to remain prosperous in a poor world’ (CIDA 2005: 1). 
‘[T]urning a blind eye to the breakdown of order in any part of the world, however 
distant, invites direct threat to our national security and wellbeing. […] For as well 
as bringing mass murder to the heart of Manhattan, state failure has brought terror 
and misery to larges swathes of the African continent, as it did in the Balkans in the 
early 1990s. And at home it has long brought drugs, violence and crime to Britain’s 
streets’ (Straw 2002: 1). 
Recently the ambitious characterisations of deviant statehood by Western 
players (such as weak, rogue, failing, failed, collapsed, problematic, dissolv-
ing, anaemic, captured, aborted, shadow states and those under stress, etc.) 
have given way to a more amorphous conceptualisation of ‘dangerous places’. 
External and internal security are seen as inherently linked and the challenges 
have to be addressed by the ‘whole-of-government’-phalanx of Western secu-
rity, foreign policy and development actors.3
Consequently, not only foreign policy agendas had to be adjusted. Differ-
ent policy fields have since been expected to act in a ‘coherent’ way towards 
states perceived as ‘fragile’. An illustrative example is the modification of 
Western development policies. In a process which started in the 1990s with an 
integration of conflict prevention, all major development agencies in the 
Western world have since incorporated security-related aspects (Duffield 
2001; Hönke 2005; Beall et al. 2006; Klingebiel 2006). In order to secure 
funding by their governments they now even designed concepts on how de-
velopment assistance can support the fight against terrorism (USAID 2002; 
AusAid 2003; U.S. Department of State/USAID 2003; Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2004; CIDA 2005; DFID 2005). 
By reiterating that the ‘undergoverned’ spaces of the Sahel are exploited 
by terrorists, the U.S. military creates urgency for a regulating intervention. 
Taking problematisations of geographical and social spaces into account 
                                             
3  Inter-agency and inter-department efforts, labelled whole-of-government-
approaches, were especially developed for dealing with ‘fragile states’. This 
concept is advanced by the Australian government, the U.S. government and by 
the OECD/DAC. 
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when analysing the integration of Africa into the ‘war on terror’, allows a 
broader insight into the political rationalities which motivate foreign policies 
towards these spaces. 
The Spat ia l isat ion of  Danger 
In critical social theory there are two interlinked frameworks which help to 
understand the political implications of the notions of space. Building upon a 
broad range of materialist and poststructuralist works (as e.g., Harvey 1989; 
Soja 1989; Lefebvre 1991), critical geopolitics scholars argue that geographi-
cal knowledge constitutes a political category (Agnew/Corbridge 1995; 
Dalby/Ó Tuathail 1998). In this context, the various perspectives of securitisa-
tion have shown how social phenomena – which allow the inclusion of spaces 
– can be declared a serious threat. Both approaches imply that spaces are so-
cially produced. For a long time, however, the notion of space was identified 
with the territorial state. This equation was foundational for the discipline of 
International Relations. And, in turn, states claimed authority to be the main 
narrator of space and territory (Ó Tuathail 1996). The expansion of social or-
der from the sixteenth century onwards was linked to the fabrication of spatial 
order. During the time of evolving statistics, statehood and conquest, the 
‘blank spaces on the globe succumbed to the sovereign authority of govern-
mental institutions and imperial science, the surface of the globe appeared for 
the first time as a system of “closed space”, an almost completely occupied 
and fully charted geographical order’ (Ó Tuathail 1996: 15). The key ques-
tions within classical geopolitics, that is, the spatializing of global politics, 
were: ‘Who does this space belong to’ and ‘In what way is “their” space dif-
ferent from “ours”’ (ibid. 16). In order to understand the focus on territorial-
ity, the aspect of control is crucial. According to Sack, territoriality involves a 
form of classification by area; it furthermore contains a form of communica-
tion (to establish the boundary, e.g., by setting up a sign stating a possession 
or exclusion); and finally, territoriality involves an attempt at enforcing con-
trol over access to the area and to the things within it, i.e., that transgression 
will be punished (Sack 1986: 21 ff.). Territory therefore inherently includes a 
relation of violence in so far as the monopolisation of the use of force within a 
designated territory is part of Max Weber’s famous definition of the state 
(Neocleous 2003: 102). The reluctance in mainstream International Relations 
Theories to go analytically beyond the imagination of a compartmentalized, 
state-centred world provoked Agnew to argue that it finds itself in a ‘territo-
rial trap’. He accused the mainstream approaches of being ahistorical and of 
taking for granted the state-territorial spaces as fixed units of secure sovereign 
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space. Furthermore he refused to accept the territorial state as existing prior to 
and as a container of society (Agnew/Corbridge 1995: 83 f.). 
In the 1990s critical political geographers started to analyse the function-
ing of geographical knowledge ‘as an ensemble of technologies of power 
concerned with the governmental production and management of territorial 
space’, termed ‘geo-power’ by Ó Tuathail (1996: 7). They shifted the focus 
from fixed and given spaces towards representations of space, that is, the sys-
tem of classification and meaning of spaces conceptualized by experts, in-
cluding scientists and urban planners.4 Focusing critically on the production 
of geographical knowledge by experts and institutions is a politicizing act as it 
questions the often familiar and unchallenged assumptions of such manifesta-
tions. Critical political geographers build upon Foucault’s works on the inter-
play of power and knowledge and on his concept of governmentality (Fou-
cault 1980: 119, 2006a, 2006b). Foucault analysed the broad range of the ‘arts 
of government’, which include more than regulating efforts by the state. 
These strategies are more broadly understood as structuring the field of ac-
tions of the subjects (Foucault 2000: 341). Based on political rationalities, 
they are made possible by problematisations and expertise of a certain phe-
nomenon, which are then being ‘translated’ into political programmes 
(Rose/Miller 1992: 177-83). Governmentality constitutes: 
‘a discursive field, within which the exercise of power is being ‘rationalized’. This 
happens through the elaboration of terms and concepts, the specification of objects 
and boundaries, through the supply of arguments and rationales, etc. A political ra-
tionality thus allows to propose a problem and offers particular strategies for the 
treatment and the solution of this problem. […] These programmes not only express 
wishes and intentions, but define an implicit knowledge’ (Lemke 1997: 147).5
Thus, it is the strategies of government which render such political pro-
grammes operable (Rose/Miller 1992: 183). 
Critical political geographers aim at replacing essentialist notions of space 
with a focus on practices and representations. In contrast to the explanatory 
                                             
4  Critical geopolitics scholars refer specifically to the works of the French philo-
sopher Henri Lefebvre (1991[1974]) who was one of the first to argue that space 
is a social product. 
5  My translation. Original quotation in German: ‘[Regierung bezeichnet] ein dis-
kursives Feld, innerhalb dessen die Ausübung der Macht “rationalisiert” wird. 
Dies geschieht durch die Erarbeitung von Begriffen und Konzepten, der Spezifi-
zierung von Gegenständen und Grenzen, durch die Bereitstellung von Argumen-
ten und Begründungen etc. Eine politische Rationalität erlaubt also, ein Problem 
zu stellen und bietet bestimmte Lösungs- und Bearbeitungsstrategien an. […] 
Diese Programme drücken nicht nur Wünsche und Absichten aus, sondern defi-
nieren ein implizites Wissen.’ 
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problem-solving tradition they work genealogically. They challenge the say-
ings of ‘wise statesmen’ and draw attention to broader culturally embedded 
expressions in administration, the academia and popular culture (Dalby/Ó 
Tuathail 1998: 1-14). Drawing from Dodds, Allen illustratively points out that 
‘in this vein, the practice of foreign policy making, for instance, appears as 
primarily a collection of scripts which combine various coded geographical 
assumptions and descriptions about “faraway” places which are then used to 
narrate geopolitical events and legitimize a particular course of action’ (Allen 
2003: 102). 
Foreign policy makers do not simply accumulate ‘objective’ knowledge 
about particular regions. They have used this to declare these spaces danger-
ous in order to create the urgency to take action. This process was termed se-
curitisation. The dealing of U.S. government authorities with the whole Sahe-
lian region during the past years is a striking example. Applying this perspec-
tive, categorizing regions as ‘failed states’ or a ‘breeding ground for terror-
ism’ has proved to be a securitizing practice insofar as it has allowed for the 
establishment of interventions into theses spaces in order to regulate them. 
Based on a constructivist approach, the concept of securitisation assumes that 
the term security does not necessarily need a referent object but is socially 
constructed. Securitisation is therefore a political decision to conceptualize an 
issue in a particular, security-centred, way. Participants of such a discourse 
problematize a certain issue and consequently assign ‘existential threats to a 
referent object, [generating] endorsement of emergency measures beyond 
rules that would otherwise apply’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). This notion has been 
criticized for its focus on existential threats and exceptional measures (Abra-
hamsen 2005).6 In contrast to that, Didier Bigo stressed that the securitizing 
process works continuously in everyday (discursive and non-discursive) prac-
tices in the field of security agencies. Linking external and internal security, 
transnational experts create a ‘continuum of threats and general unease’ as 
they semantically relate different phenomena such as migration, drug traffick-
ing and terrorism (Bigo 2002: 63 ff.). In this vein the process of securitisation 
involves the capacity of security professionals to claim what security is and to 
establish a code of practice for a regulation of the issue. In short, it is a tech-
nology of government (Bigo 2000: 194 ff.). 
Although heavily discussed in the field of securitisation, critical scholars 
in International Relations Theory have shown the interplay between the con-
struction of danger and the politics of identity (Dillon 1996; Campbell 1998).7
                                             
6  For further critical accounts see McSweeney (1996); Huysmans (1998) and, 
from a materialist perspective, Neocleous (2000). 
7  Critics accused Buzan et al. of their half-hearted constructivism, as they would 
treat the results of a social construction (such as identity) as an objectively given 
and thus retain an objectivist and realist view (McSweeney 1998). 
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Through the mobilizing politics of securitisation the object (dangerous people 
or places) is clearly identified, homogenized and certain characteristics, val-
ues and behaviours are assigned to it. This labelling is of central importance 
to the discursive construction of threat. The process of securing provokes the 
question of who is being secured and who remains ‘outside’. Insecurity can 
thus be seen as the necessary condition for security. Calls for security have to 
refer to the danger which threatens this security (Neocleous 2000). Through 
politics of identification, securitisation includes a moral agenda. It aims at le-
gitimizing the actions taken to eliminate the threat. By doing so, it closes the 
ranks in the ‘homeland’ and mobilizes public support for – like in our case – 
the ‘war on terrorism’ (Abrahamsen 2005: 65). At the same time it draws a 
line between our place and their spaces. Since they are presented as posing an 
external threat, the spaces on the ‘dark side of globalisation’8 cannot be ig-
nored. These spaces therefore have to be engaged by different strategies, such 
as inclusion of the willing and containment of the ones considered as the most 
problematic (Rose 1999: 240 ff.; Abrahamsen 2005: 70; Hönke 2005). Af-
rica’s integration into the ‘war on terror’ is a showcase illustration of the en-
gagement of such ‘problematic’ spaces. 
Afr ica’s Integrat ion into the ‘War on Terror ’  
After a brief episode in the early 1990s during which the continent was more 
or less ignored, Northern policies towards Africa began to focus on the reso-
lution and prevention of violent conflicts (Duffield 2001). While at this time 
weak or failed statehood was still mainly described as a problem for the popu-
lation in the affected regions, these spaces were soon integrated into the 
global discourse of the ‘war on terror’. The terrorist attacks in East Africa in 
1998 and 2002 as well as the proximity of the ‘failed’ state Somalia to the 
Arabian Peninsula alerted the U.S. to re-engage on the continent. At the same 
time it became known that the reliance of the U.S. on African oil was increas-
ing. Today 15 percent of the oil imported by the United States comes from 
Africa. Some years from now every fifth imported barrel is expected to origi-
nate in Africa (Goldwyn 2005).9
Therefore, in order to prevent an influx of terrorists into Africa, an inter-
national ‘Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa’ was established in 
                                             
8  Label used for ‘weak states’ in a USAID document (USAID 2005: v). 
9  Klare and Volman compare the attention the continent has recently attracted in 
Washington with the developments in the Caspian region in the 1990s. In the 
Caspian region as well as in (West) Africa they identify a ‘trajectory of ever-
expanding U.S. military involvement’ where oil reserves and an alleged terrorist 
threat form the key determinants for the U.S. engagement (Klare/Volman 2006). 
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Djibouti in 2002. Along with French, Spanish and German troops, 1,700 
American soldiers are monitoring the Red Sea and the Somali borders. How-
ever, the effectiveness of this force was doubted from the very beginning, as 
weapons continue to reach Somalia. In reaction to the second severe terrorist 
attack on the Paradise hotel near the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa in No-
vember 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush set up the ‘Eastern Africa 
Counter-Terrorism Initiative’, funded by the State Department with U.S.$ 100 
million over five years. 
Engaging the Sahel Region 
Around the same time the U.S. European Command of the U.S. Armed Forces 
(Eucom) was trying to persuade the Department of State that a similar 
counter-terrorism initiative is needed in another part of Africa as well. A re-
gion that was actually recovering from instability and that had no known links 
to international terrorism: the Sahel. The political rationality of the ‘Pan Sahel 
Initiative’ and its reproduction by the media constitute an illustrative example 
of how security experts problematized a whole geographical region in order to 
pave the way for an expansion of influence and control. Within several 
months this diverse region was represented as a space where terrorists, arms 
dealers and human traffickers roam freely and where, therefore, ‘this nation 
has to act’, to paraphrase U.S. president Bush’s justification for pre-emptive 
action. It was thus securitized. Jeremy Keenan estimates that around 3,000 
journalistic articles were published in the twelve months after the hostage-
taking of thirty-two European tourists in 2003, reproducing the narrative of 
the Sahel as Africa’s lawless and dangerous ‘Wild West’ (Keenan 2005: 622; 
San Francisco Chronicle, 27 December 2005). 
Based on the few deviant voices, I will trace the rationalities of this dis-
course and its transformation into concrete interventions. These strategies ha-
ve severe ramifications within the region insofar as they have enabled politi-
cal actors in the region to appropriate, to instrumentalize and even to shape 
the discourse and interventionist policies to a certain extent. The militarisation 
of the region, which aimed at strengthening the capabilities of the govern-
ments in regions where state authorities have only limited influence, threatens 
to have unintended effects. 
The official trigger for the engagement of the U.S. in the Sahel region 
may be seen in the hostage-taking of thirty-two European tourists in Southern 
Algeria by the ‘Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat’ (GSPC) in 
2003, an action that Eucom’s then Deputy Commander Charles Wald consid-
ered a ‘blessing in disguise’ (Village Voice, 31 January 2006). As after the 
end of the Cold War most of the conflicts Eucom was dealing with simply fa-
ded away, Eucom had to find new challenges in order to justify the resources 
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it is being allocated. That is why a State Department official once called Eu-
com’s new activities in Africa ‘a hammer looking for a nail’ (ibid.). 
In 2002, the year before the hostage-taking, a conflict between Eucom and 
the State Department over the appropriate U.S. policy towards the Sahel re-
gion was developing. The State Department had reservations against Eucom’s 
aggressive military strategy, and particularly against the proposed aerial 
bombings against militants in northern Mali. The U.S. embassy in Mali 
strongly warned against the radicalizing effects those strikes against what 
were believed Arab nomads rather than terrorists would have (ibid.). The 
plans were dropped, but after the hostage-taking in spring of 2003 a slightly 
altered counter-terrorism programme, the Pan-Sahel Initiative, could take off. 
The main goal of this operation was to enable the militaries of Mauritania, 
Mali, Niger and Chad to effectively control their whole state territory and to 
prevent cross border movements of ‘illicit arms, drugs, goods and people’ 
(Eucom Interview 2005). Eucom acted as an agenda-setter in ‘putting the Sa-
hara on the map as a new front in the war on terror’ (BBC World Service, 8 
and 15 August 2005).10 And despite the fact that the Department of State offi-
cially established the PSI, it was Eucom’s public policy machinery which was 
able to mobilize the media by reproducing the argument of ‘an ungoverned 
Sahara as a breeding ground for terrorists’: 
‘They’re there for a purpose, whether it’s looking for real estate or recruiting or loo-
king for arms, whatever it is, we know there’s a preserve. It may be small but it’s a 
bad indicator. […] It’s an area we think is becoming appealing potentially for terror-
ist organisations or individuals to operate with semi-impunity. […] It has a lot of 
expanses of open area that are conducive to terrorist operations or sanctuary’ (Eu-
com’s former Deputy Commander, General Charles Wald in Associated Press 
2004).
In the West, one can receive attention for Africa – beyond humanitarian is-
sues – particularly by referring to security interests. While security issues al-
ways were part of the Northern engagement with the South, 9/11 changed the 
weighting of phenomena such as migration, arms proliferation, disease, and 
terrorism. They are now represented as interconnected problems on the same 
scale of ‘risks of open borders’, which therefore, so the implication, have to 
be addressed by the same means of intervention. Within the predominant ‘war 
on terror’ the military – as we can see not only in Eucom’s engagement with 
the Sahel – has a special role to play. 
                                             
10  Eucom is responsible for the coordination of the U.S. forces in Europe, large 
parts of the former Soviet Union and Africa, with the exception of East Africa, 
the Horn, Egypt and Sudan. 
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Through an extraordinary public relations policy Eucom disseminated 
their authoritative knowledge about the terrorist threat originating in the Sahel 
and the military way to its solution. The perpetual rhetoric of the uncontrolled 
Sahel and the action needed to counter this supposed threat was escorted by 
an extensive use of maps, aiming at illustrating the dimensions of the prob-
lem. These maps are indicative manifestations of the political rationality 
within U.S. security circles. They categorize and simplify whole regions and 
create urgency to take action. 
Mapping the Threat 
It is commonly expected that maps provide guidance and orientation in repre-
senting geographical areas. They have long been considered as adequately de-
scribing territories, as ‘mirroring’ spaces. However, geographers early on ac-
knowledged that maps are simplifying devices – as indeed they have to be 
since they face the challenge to collapse three-dimensional spaces into a two-
dimensional form. Such simplifications necessarily have political implica-
tions. As Harley puts it: ‘Maps are too important to be left to cartographers 
alone’ (2001b: 149). Maps constitute value-laden images and are deeply in-
volved in the relations of power and knowledge. Harley reminds his readers to 
look ‘[…] not through the map at the world it depicts but inwards or back-
wards to its maker and outwards or forwards to its readers’ (quoted in An-
drews 2001: 6). 
In fact, cartography has played an important role in state-making from the 
seventeenth century onwards. Rulers of the emerging states after the Peace of 
Westphalia needed to negotiate and mark their territories. During the Imperial 
Age maps became powerful tools in establishing borders, claiming ownership 
of various territories across the globe. As Mark Neocleous put it: The map as 
an illustration for identity, sovereignty, and legitimacy within a demarcated 
space ‘became the perfect symbol of the state’ (Neocleous 2003: 119). The 
map in its political functionality creates and constructs a reality rather than 
representing it, using the techniques of selection, omission, simplification, 
classification, creation of hierarchies, and symbolisation (Harley 2001b: 163; 
Neocleous 2003: 120). Maps serve the project of the modern state in collect-
ing information about space and transforming it into an object of political 
knowledge by classifying and generalizing landscapes – similar to the role 
statistics have in gathering data on the state population. Neocleous has 
pointed to the mystifying effects of maps. By omitting authorship and interest 
and by pretending accuracy and actual facts, the map is naturalizing: Borders 
become accepted, violence is obliterated and – through the reiteration of the 




In our context, the mechanisms of silencing constitute the most important 
feature as empty spaces on maps are deliberate positivist statements (Harley, 
summarized by Andrews 2001: 13). Harley identified various ways of silenc-
ing in maps: A space can be described as empty and information can deliber-
ately be withheld. Here he refers to the omission for certain reasons like ‘x 
has […] properties that render it unsuitable for inclusion in this map’ (ibid. 
14). Neocleous reminded us that the Oxford English Dictionary describes ‘off 
the map’, as something ‘obsolete’ and even ‘out of existence’ (Neocleous 
2003: 121). 
Therefore, maps are political and at the same time ‘[de-socialising] the 
territory they present. They foster the notion of a socially empty space’ 
(Harley 2001a: 81). However, in deconstructing the map, Harley identified 
possibilities to challenge the hegemonic representations: ‘By dismantling [a 
text, a map] we build’ (Harley 2001b: 168). In his conclusion he stresses the 
need for alternative actions: ‘If we can accept intertextuality then we can start 
to read our maps for alternative and sometimes competing discourses’ 
(ibid.).11
The securitisation of the Sahel region by U.S. military experts was ac-
companied by the extensive use of visual aids. The selected maps below were 
applied at Eucom-workshops to illustrate the urgency of the Pan Sahel Initia-
tive.12
                                             
11  The need for a ‘cognitive mapping’ in order to stay capable of political action in 
a capitalist system was famously raised by Jameson (1984: 83 ff.) 
12  The shown maps were used at Eucom workshops within the programme of the 
Africa Clearing House, which is a discussion forum on security issues in Africa. 
Map 1 was created by The Economist but was used by Eucom. 
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Map 1: Africa’s key problems 
Source: Eucom 
Map 1 gives a simplified overview of Africa’s presumed key problems. Al-
most the whole continent seems to be under severe stress and is dominated by 
four features: conflict, uncontrolled spaces, extremism and migration into 
Europe. According to Eucom, U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
‘squeezed’ terrorists out of these regions into Africa as the ‘extremist inroads’ 
from the Arab peninsula show. This ‘squeeze-theory’ was used on a regular 
basis by the U.S. military to claim a link between terrorism in the Middle East 
and Africa.13 A ‘semi-permanent’ conflict belt stretches from Somalia in the 
northeast across Central Africa to Angola in the southwest. Interestingly it in-
cludes relatively peaceful regions like Tanzania and Kenya. The whole Sahel 
area consists of ‘uncontrolled spaces’, from which there is a massive flow of 
migration across North Africa into Europe. During the last three years Eucom 
officials have been very active in the public realm to share their characterisa-
tion of the region. They continually depicted the Trans-Sahara region as ‘vast 
empty spaces’, ‘remote expanses’, as ‘ungoverned’, ‘under-governed’ or 
‘poorly policed’ regions. The first two characteristics strengthen our percep-
tion of the Sahara as a blank space on the globe, a mysterious region we have 
insufficient knowledge about. It is a region which is not yet classified. How-
ever, the latter descriptions applied by Eucom have somewhat clearer implica-
tions. These are normative attributions smoothing the way for an active – and 
                                             




military – engagement, regardless of the actual presence of internationally op-
erating terrorists in the region. This pattern of levelling and homogenizing the 
diverse space of the Sahelian Sahara, supported by the illustrating maps be-
low, deliver an easy-to-grasp classification of the proposed area of operation. 
Map 2: The terrorist corridor in the Sahel region 
Source: Eucom 
On map 2 the whole Sahel region is not only uncontrolled, but forms a terror-
ist belt reaching from Mauritania across Mali, southern Algeria and Niger into 
northern Nigeria. In map 3 this belt is expanded even further to the shores of 
the Mediterranean Sea in the northwest. Remarkably – with the exception of 
Senegal, but including Libya – safe havens for extremists can be found in all 
the countries the successor of the PSI, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorist Ini-
tiative, will later operate in. According to this map, terrorists are now believed 
to ‘operate throughout the Sahel’. This strategic manifestation of an increased 
threat is needed to justify the broadening of the counter-terrorism initiatives. 
In map 3 geopolitical arguments are applied to illustrate a situation that illus-
trates urgency: ‘Interiors are too large to enforce laws’ or ‘borders are unable 
to be regulated or patrolled due to enormous size’. Again, geographical size is 
self-explanatorily related to an absence of order and to terrorist activity. With 
the expansion of the PSI, Eucom offers another solution to the ‘problematic’ 
of the Sahel. The illustration tells us that the fight against terrorism demands 
cross-border operations, whereas the goal of the Trans-Saharan Counter-
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Terrorism Initiative is to reinforce national borders and to control movements 
on the ground. The solution for the transnational problem is – at least publicly 
– still seen in the effective nation-state. 
Map 3: The expanded terrorist area 
Source: Eucom 
Broadening the Intervention 
The Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), as the initiative is 
being called after the most recent renaming, is an inter-agency programme, 
formally led by the Department of State. Apart from the State Department, it 
involves the Military, the Treasury Department, the Justice Department and 
the development agency USAID (New York Times, 10 June 2005). A certain 
part of its budget will be managed by USAID. As part of the U.S. State De-
partment USAID has always been an integral pillar of the U.S. foreign policy. 
Since the 9/11 attacks, however, the convergence of development and security 
politics has been intensified. Applying the ‘whole-of-government’-approach 
within the counter-terrorism initiative TSCTP, USAID’s goal is to ‘create a 
“line” past which the spread of Islamic extremism stops from entering into 
sub-Saharan West Africa’ (USAID 2006). USAID focuses on supporting local 
governance and on the establishment of a conflict early warning system. 
Aware of the reservations against an American presence in the Sahel region, 
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USAID has additionally set up a TSCTP-programme to support marginalized 
parts of the population in Mauritania, Chad and Niger. 
Despite its repeated denial to establish permanent bases in Africa, U.S. 
president Bush announced in February 2007 the establishment of a ‘unified 
combatant command for Africa’ (Africom), a step that reflects the growing 
strategic interest and the preventive policy approach of the U.S. in Africa.14
However, U.S. officials were quick to stress that the new command is more 
than a pure military affair. It is rather seen as a showcase for the now fashion-
able inter-agency approach and will deal with ‘humanitarian assistance’, ‘dis-
aster relief’ but will ‘have the responsibility to do whatever military opera-
tions that the secretary of defense and the president direct’ (DoD 2007). The 
aim of Africom, according to Pentagon officials, is to ‘prevent problems from 
becoming crises and crises from becoming catastrophes’ in light of ‘poor 
governance, wars and population pressures’ and ‘natural threats’ (American 
Forces Press Service 2006). At the same time, however, the Pentagon insists 
that the establishment of Africom does not mean an expansion in numbers of 
combat troops permanently based on the continent (DoD 2007). 
‘The long war’ as the ‘war on terror’ has been dubbed, rather requires 
rapid (re-)actions in different parts of the world. To meet the challenges of ‘ir-
regular’ warfare by non-state actors, the U.S. prefers to aim for temporary 
basing rights. Often, ‘bare-bone facilities’ (Klare/Volman 2006: 302) like air-
strips or warehouses are sufficient for use in a prompt time frame. In the 
Trans-Sahara region the U.S. Department of Defence has access to airfields or 
ports in Algeria, Mali, Senegal, Gabon, Morocco and Tunisia (ibid. 303). 
How can this form of intervention be conceptualized while integrating a 
spatial perspective? From a transnational lens, PSI and TSCTP can be de-
scribed as flexible types of ‘transterritorial deployments’ (Latham 2001: 72). 
As Latham has illustratively shown, such transterritorial deployments differ 
from other forms of transboundary formations such as arenas and networks. 
Transterritorial deployments can be defined as purposeful placements of an 
external entity (unit, representative, organisation) into a local context in which 
they keep their external identity by retaining strong links to the context from 
which they are deployed (ibid. 75 ff.). Following Latham, these deployments 
differ in scope and time, that is, they can include a broad or a narrow agenda 
(annexation of a territory vs. an expedition or a humanitarian relief operation), 
and they can be temporary or permanent (military campaign vs. religious mis-
sions). As shown above, with the expansion of the PSI into the TSCTI/TSCTP 
the scope of the deployment was broadened. On the one hand, this reflects a 
                                             
14  Africom will then be responsible for the whole continent with the exception of 
Egypt, which will remain under the responsibility of the U.S. Central Command. 
Africom is supposed to be fully operational by September 2008. 
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more comprehensive notion of security among policy-makers after 9/11, 
which requires action of the full-range of government. On the other hand, an 
intensified engagement influences the social impact in the particular region. 
Short and narrow deployments such as the Pan Sahel Initiative have the great-
est ‘situational power’, as Latham calls it. They focus on a narrow area of 
concern, a situation such as a famine, a refugee crisis or, as in our case, a per-
ceived security threat by terrorists in the Trans-Sahel. By doing so, people, 
discourses and resources are drawn into this concrete situation and power 
emerges from the delimited focus of the operation: ‘It is the power not to have 
to take on responsibility entailed by these powers over and within society. It is 
the power to enter and withdraw relatively flexible from situations’ (ibid. 82). 
This reflects to a certain extent the military strategies within the ‘long war’. 
For many people in the Sahel the biggest concern is the militarisation of 
the region by the U.S., who aims at expanding often autocratic state structures. 
The presence of foreign or national military is encountered with distrust, as 
state actions were considered the source of violence and arbitrariness in the 
past. Publicly branded as a ‘hot spot for terrorism’, people fear that the eco-
nomic marginalisation will aggravate as long as their region is dealt with as a 
security problem. 
It can only be speculated why exactly the PSI expanded into the Trans-
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, which also includes economic and de-
velopment policies. To broaden the agenda of a transterritorial deployment 
usually means less flexibility, more responsibility for the local context and 
more interaction with people on the ground. Following the goal of the U.S. 
government, which is to prevent the spread of extremist thoughts into the re-
gion, gaining trust of the local people seems to be a necessary condition. 
‘Winning the hearts and minds’ may, however, be feared to result in the impe-
rial endeavour of a permanent management of these societies, a direction that 
is being discussed as ‘trusteeship’. It is defined as the governance of territo-
ries by a mixture of transnational actors, including strong states, multilateral 
organisation, non-governmental organisations and domestic authorities 
(Fearon/Laitin 2004: 7 ff.) 
Troublemakers in the Sahel? 
It is beyond the scope of this contribution to assess the actual terrorist threat 
by Islamists in the Sahel. In fact, there are confusing and divergent statements 
coming from the region. Even reports resulting from long field works did not 
come to a decisive conclusion (ICG 2005a; Mc Govern in BBC World Service,
8 and 15 August 2005). Suffice it to say that in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
region was in a state of recovery: The brutal civil war in Algeria and the Tu-
areg rebellions in Mali and Chad came to an end, extremist groups were dis-
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persed and tourists started to rediscover the region. The overall level of secu-
rity in the countries improved. However, according to Keenan’s analysis, this 
period came to an end shortly after with the advent of the Pan-Sahel Initiative 
(Keenan 2006: 270 ff.). 
For the U.S. government the kidnapping of the European tourists in 
Southern Algeria in 2003 was proof of the presence of Islamist terrorists in 
the Sahel, namely the GSPC, a splinter group of the Algerian Groupe Islami-
que Armé (GIA). However, several organisations, journalists and experts ar-
ticulated doubts about the alleged acuteness of this threat. Keenan is con-
vinced that the Algerian military intelligence services lured the Americans 
into the region by infiltrating the GSPC in order to rid the country of the in-
ternational pariah status it had had in the 1990s and to attract foreign invest-
ments and military equipment: ‘Probably 90 percent of the Saharan popula-
tion, as far as I can make it out, just know that the word GSPC now is a name 
for the Algerian intelligent services. And there is a lot of truth in that’ 
(Keenan in BBC World Service, 8 and 15 August 2005).15 The Algerian mili-
tary service Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) has some 
experience in manipulating different groups. Former Algerian militaries made 
allegations that during the civil war the infiltration of armed rebel groups was 
a deliberate strategy of escalation of the DRS in order to undermine popular 
support for the Islamists (AI 2006: 8). 
Since the hostage-taking of the European tourists in 2003 Algerian au-
thorities and Eucom officials have been quick to stress this link between 
armed groups operating in the Sahel and al Qaeda, a claim that remains ques-
tionable until today.16 In 2004 the U.S. State Department added the GSPC to 
its ‘Terrorist Exclusion List’. However, at the same time the then U.S. ambas-
sador to Mali, Vicki Huddleston, said that the Algerian GSPC did not consti-
tute a threat in the region any longer (Faath 2005: 8). Yet, General Wald rated 
the risk of terrorism in the Sahel at ‘100 percent. They have already had ter-
rorism in the Sahel region. It is a matter of how bad it could get’ (Wald in 
BBC World Service, 8 and 15 August 2005). U.S. officials are unclear about 
whether terrorism already ‘breeds’ or ‘could breed’ in the region. Even Eu-
com admits that there is a dispute on whether the Sahel is a breeding ground 
or could become one (Eucom interview 2005). Within the paradigm of ‘pre-
emptive action’ within U.S. foreign policy, the level of threat needs to be sus-
tained in order to justify interventions and tough security measures. The secu-
                                             
15  In the same line see Le Monde diplomatique, February 2005. 
16  For the ongoing dispute even amongst academics see the various articles in the 
special issue of the Journal of Contemporary African Studies 2007, 25 (1). De-
spite GSPC’s self-proclaimed and widely reported merger with al-Qaeda, its 
character and role in Algeria remain ambiguous. See Washington Post, 5 Octo-
ber 2006. 
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ritisation of the Sahel and its persistent representation as a region character-
ized by the lack of governance, illegitimate cross-border trade and rising ex-
tremism gives a striking example. Thus, it does not matter whether terrorists 
are active in the region or whether ‘roaming’ people are affiliated to al Qaeda. 
It is sufficient to refer to the pure probability in the future, that is, to claim 
that the threat ‘may materialize’. As Charles Wald put it: ‘They are not neces-
sarily al Qaeda but they’d like to be with al Qaeda and they have to be ad-
dressed’ (Wald in BBC World Service, 8 and 15 August 2005). 
Mil i tar isat ion,  Marginal isat ion and Discontent  in 
the Sahel  Region 
Despite the relatively narrow scope of the U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives in 
Northern Africa, they deeply affect local settings. Conceptualizing spaces as 
empty or undergoverned are, as critical cartographers have shown, strong 
manifestations of political rationalities. They delimit spaces and assign certain 
characteristics to a territory. On the maps discussed above, the whole area of 
the Sahelian Sahara region is shown as an ‘uncontrolled space’, which is at 
the same time translated into instability and a threat to global security. The la-
belling of people of the Sahara as susceptible to terrorist activities constitutes 
an influential knowledge about this space which allowed for the counter-
terrorism initiatives to be established. Yet, according to critical scholars, it 
was these interventions – aiming at fostering security – which have resulted in 
an increased instability within the affected countries: 
‘[…] far from furthering political stability, security and democracy, Washington’s 
ill-conceived policy has taken North Africa and much of the Sahel – a region which 
is considerably larger than the entire USA – into a dangerous spiral of increased au-
thoritarianism and repression, increased regional instability and insecurity, increased 
popular resentment of both Washington (anti-Americanism) and their own regimes 
and the increased threat of militant extremism’ (Keenan 2006: 271). 
There is no doubt about the fact that certain actors in the region, foremost 
state authorities, welcome the international counter-terrorism engagement as 
they profit in various ways from its presence. In a report, indicatively entitled 
Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel – Fact or Fiction?, the International Crisis 
Group, states: ‘It is […] apparent that actors on the ground in these four coun-
tries [Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad – J.B.] are poised to use American fears 
of an Islamist threat to benefit financially and/or politically in ways that recall 




Mauritania’s government adapted to the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ 
most avowedly. Its performances aimed at confirming the perception of the 
Islamist threat that has dominated U.S. foreign policy since 9/11 (Jourde 2007: 
87 ff.). The government of former President Maaouya Ould Taya construed 
the coup attempts of 2003 and 2004 as evidence for the existence of interna-
tional terrorism within his country, although the plotters came from Maurita-
nia and to a certain extent even from within the Mauritanian military. He 
overstated the internal Islamist threat and played down internal political 
cleavages (ICG 2005b). In April 2005 the government carried out a crack-
down on Muslim leaders and in June it declared to have found evidence re-
lated to the GSPC. The U.S. government agreed with the assessment of the 
government of Taya in underlining that the biggest threat to Mauritania alleg-
edly came from outside forces (Associated Press, 25 June 2005). The gov-
ernment quickly blamed Muslim fundamentalists for an attack on a Maurita-
nian border post near Lemgheyti in June 2005, where twenty-four people lost 
their lives. 
However, opposition media and international experts claimed that several 
important questions remain unanswered.17  Firstly, it is unrealistic that the 
GSPC would launch such a large scale attack just a few days before the be-
ginning of the region’s largest military manoeuvre, the United States-led Op-
eration Flintlock, in which 4,000 troops including 1,000 U.S. soldiers took 
part. Secondly, why were over twenty vehicles, which the rebels allegedly 
used for the attack, not spotted by plane or satellite surveillance? Thirdly, why 
did the first soldiers at the scene, the Algerians, offer no assistance to the 
wounded? And finally, why did the government deny access to the wounded 
in the hospital? Additionally, experts on the ground doubt that the GSPC even 
has the capacity to carry out such a large attack. However, the most important 
question is what should be the reason for GSPC to attack Mauritania, as 
members of the group took refuge and received medical treatment in Maurita-
nia earlier on? It rather seems to be the case that it was convenient for the 
government to blame the GSPC. At that time, human rights violations, wide-
spread corruption, a growing inequality and frustration, particularly among 
people from the south who did not feel sufficiently represented in the state 
apparatus, was soaring in Mauritania. Several scholars are convinced that 
Ould Taya’s tactics of securing support by constantly stressing an external 
terrorist threat to the country, proved to be successful for a considerable time 
(Jourde 2007: 77-78). The International Crisis Group argued that ‘the Ould 
Taya government’s anti-terrorist rhetoric accompanied by repressive actions 
appears to be primarily a convenient device for not tackling acute political 
problems’ (ICG 2005a: 16 and 2005b). 
                                             
17  See for the following BBC World Service, 8 and 15 August 2005. 
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Ould Taya’s reign was ended by a coup d’état on 3 August 2005. Parts of 
the Mauritanian military under the former head of national security, Colonel 
Eli Ould Mohamed Vall, seized power while the president was abroad. Hav-
ing known Ould Taya’s rule, the international community remained largely 
silent in their reactions to the coup – despite their initial support of his politics. 
In a referendum in June 2006 the elaboration of a new constitution and the 
schedule for the transfer of power back to civilian rule were approved by an 
overwhelming majority of the Mauritanians. With the parliamentary and 
presidential elections held in November 2006 and March 2007, respectively, 
the military so far stuck to its promise.18
Temporarily, the coup had a subduing effect on the counter-terrorism ini-
tiatives in Mauritania. The U.S., who had trained Mauritanian soldiers in the 
PSI and in Operation Flintlock under the old government, put the training on 
hold and reassessed the political development. Today, however, the U.S. have 
arranged the reintegration of Mauritania into their ‘International Military 
Education and Training Program’ in 2007. 
The main profiteer of closer ties to the U.S. seems to be Algeria. Due to 
the brutal massacres of the Algerian army in the civil war following the an-
nulment of the 1992 elections, which the Islamist party FIS would have won, 
the country became an international outcast. The Army, the Military Security 
DRS and various militias committed large scale human rights violations in the 
name of ‘fighting terrorists’. It was not until the Bush administration gained 
power that the economic and political relationship between the U.S. and Alge-
ria under Abdelaziz Bouteflika as president were revived. Since 9/11 this rela-
tionship also involves the military and intelligence sectors (Faath 2005: 5). 
The Bouteflika government managed to convince the Bush administration that 
the two countries were fighting against the same extremist enemies and, there-
fore, should foster a symbiotic relationship. Since then, U.S. authorities have 
acknowledged the Algerian ‘experience’ in fighting terrorists. As members of 
the U.S. military stated, the United States can learn a lot from Algeria about 
fighting enemies in sparsely populated desert areas (Eucom interview 2005). 
Reversely, on a visit to Algeria, then U.S. defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
said that ‘they need some things and we have things we can help with’ (New 
York Times, 13 February 2006). In 2002 the Maghrebian countries were in-
cluded in the U.S. Anti-Terror Assistance programme. 
                                             
18  In March 2007 Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, a former minister under 
Taya who lived in exile, was elected new president of Mauritania. At this stage, 
it is too early to predict Mauritania’s future foreign policy. However, the fact 
that Abdallahi was seen as a ‘consensus’ candidate and that he was backed by 




Since then, the U.S. have multiplied their military and non-military aid to 
Algeria. Despite the still opaque role of the Algerian DRS19 within the intra-
Algerian conflict and the ongoing human rights violations, in the two years of 
2005 and 2006 Algeria was permitted to buy military equipment from U.S. 
companies (‘commercial sales’) for more than U.S.$ 500 millions (Volman 
2006; Department of State/USAID 2007: 734). Additionally, the European 
Union made Algeria one of the priority countries in their counter-terrorism 
assistance (Council of the EU 2005). Still, the dependency seems to be mu-
tual. Keenan believes that the Americans rely on Algerian intelligence in the 
region, as they themselves lack capacities on the ground (Keean in BBC
World Service, 8 and 15 August 2005). Some sources even claim that Alge-
rian and U.S. military are jointly carrying out anti-terror operations across the 
Sahel, which is, however, constantly denied by the U.S. military (ibid. Eucom 
interview 2005). The close military relationship between Algeria and the U.S. 
is expected to have strengthened the notorious security establishment in Alge-
ria. Despite the decrease in violent acts, a culture of impunity and torture still 
holds reign in the country. Keenan summarizes that the militarisation of the 
region has reinforced ‘cleavages between ruling elites, protected by their se-
curity establishments, and the “unrepresented many”’ (Keenan 2006: 271). 
Local Tuareg in the southern part of Algeria complained that since the Alge-
rian government won the U.S. as their partner, the local state authorities – in-
cluding the police and the DRS – act even more repressive against members 
of the opposition and civil society. This led to a widespread violent outbreak 
in the southern city of Tamanrasset in July 2005. There are allegations that 
state agents provoked these riots in order to prove ‘extremist activity’ in the 
region (Keenan 2005: 635). 
In Mali an instrumentalisation of the ‘war on terror’ by the government 
was not performed as blantantly as in Mauritania. However, the extended 
counter-terrorism initiative has become a symbol for fostering the North-
South divide in the country. While the government profits from both the in-
ternational funding and the partnership with the West, Northern leaders are 
suspicious of a strengthened central government at a time when decentralisa-
tion is supposed to gain ground. 
According to some scholars, the widely circulated and reiterated represen-
tation of Northern Mali as ‘ungoverned’ and the subsequent materialisation of 
the counter-terrorist rhetoric, undermines a trust-building co-operation be-
tween the government and the population in Northern Mali and is more likely 
to facilitate a destabilisation of the region (Gutelius 2007: 66 ff.). The U.S. 
military states that Mali is one of the most difficult cases within the TSCTP. 
                                             
19  To date, no public information is available about the mandate and the organisa-
tion of the DRS (AI 2006: 7 ff.). 
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Eucom admits that they do not have an answer as yet to question of how to 
improve the security situation without destabilizing the region (Eucom inter-
view 2005). Although the 1990s rebellions of the Tuareg in northern Mali 
were settled in 1996, there is still a high level of frustration amongst the Tu-
areg. The peace accord included the integration of former rebels into the Ma-
lian Army and investment in northern infrastructure (Klute/von Trotha 2000). 
However, the distrust against the national government persists. Local sources 
estimate that up to 90 percent of the Tuareg in towns like Kidal are unem-
ployed and do not feel they can participate in development and investment 
programmes, despite the efforts made by the government to include the north-
ern regions (BBC World Service, 8 and 15 August 2005). In fact, marginalisa-
tion continues to thrive as poverty remains the most challenging problem 
(IRIN, 14 October 2004, ICG 2005a: 20). Local Muslim leaders fear that 
hopeless youths could follow everyone who promises an opportunity, and that 
the dissatisfaction could make people susceptible to join fundamentalist 
groups who are present in northern Mali. 
For many young people the cross-border trade constitutes the only possi-
bility for social advancement. Northern Mali’s livelihood depends on the 
trade across the Sahara. Virtually all products which can be found on the mar-
kets in Kidal come from Algeria. On the border there are hardly any customs 
posts, large parts of the traded goods remain undocumented. Cigarette smug-
gling is a lucrative business. It is particularly this uncontrolled cross-border 
movement of goods which worries the U.S. government the most. They fear 
that smuggling activities contribute to supporting terrorist operations. The 
primary goal of the U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives is to help the Malian 
government to effectively control their national borders and to cut-off cross-
border smuggling. However, strengthening state structures and reinserting the 
presence of the Malian Army in the north is a sensitive issue. 
Economically, the region has for a long time been a self-help system. In 
the 1990s, due to the privatisation policy of the World Bank, neglect of the 
region by the Malian government and corruption of formal markets, Islamic 
NGOs, coming from Saudi Arabia and Libya, introduced new economic pos-
sibilities into the area and made new resources accessible. They established 
development projects and provided services in areas that Western donors and 
the government neglected (Gutelius 2006). As there is no alternative for en-
suring subsistence, a disruption of informal trade would deepen desperation 
and frustration. International experts compare this policy with the destruction 
of the poppy fields in Afghanistan. If one destroys the lifeblood of a region 
without offering an alternative, then the people may turn towards more ex-
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tremist thoughts (Mc Govern in BBC World Service, 8 and 15 August 2005).20
These informal networks offer possibilities for acquiring different kinds of 
capital for many young people. As David Gutelius put it: 
‘What the U.S. and its allies have failed to recognize is the multivariate nature of 
these struggles, which comprise in any case more than cigarette smuggling or other 
goods thought to fund al-Qaeda. Informal marketing activities are social mecha-
nisms by which communities not only cope with serious environmental degradation 
and deep social change, but also the shifting formal sector markets over which they 
have little control and to which they have little access’ (Gutelius 2006: 39). 
Due to these developments, experts fear a new Tuareg rebellion.21 An inci-
dent in May 2006 gave proof of the volatility of the region. On 23 May, sev-
eral Tuaregs under the leadership of the former rebellion leader Hassan Fa-
gaga attacked three military bases in Kidal and Menaka and took arms and 
ammunition. Six people were reported to have died during this action. After-
wards, the attackers demanded increased efforts for the development of the 
north and a more effective integration of Tuareg into the Malian Army. 
Conclusion
The article critically analysed the integration of the Sahel into the ‘war on ter-
ror’ by the various practices of ‘problematizing’ the region. A spatial perspec-
tive on this process shows which kinds of images were assigned to these geo-
graphical spaces in order to create the sense of urgency which has legitimized 
the interventions in the Sahel. After demonstrating the range of techniques 
used by the U.S. government, the article sought to show how the rhetoric and 
the subsequent counter-terrorism initiatives affect the social relations in the 
countries on different levels. The discourse of the ‘war on terror’, which 
works rather like a global template, has opened various ways for governments 
to use its rhetoric to meet their own ends. As critical voices have shown, it is 
not unlikely that the counter-terrorism initiatives have become a cash cow for 
governments who know that using the T-word will certainly raise awareness 
in Washington. Such tactics threaten to render a profound dealing with inter-
nal conflicts, such as the marginalisation and exclusion of the population in 
                                             
20  In November 2006 Mali’s application for funding under the U.S. Millennium 
Challenge Account was approved. The country signed a ‘development Compact’ 
and will receive 461 million U.S. $ for irrigation and infrastructure projects by 
the U.S. government over the next five years. 
21  As the Malian professor Aboubacrim Ag Hindi put it: ‘The biggest danger in 
this region is not al-Qaida. It is famine. If the development of these zones is not 
undertaken, we may see more rebellion there’ (IRIN, 14 October 2004). 
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the remote areas of the Sahel countries, impossible. So far, the expanded se-
curity policies in parts of Algeria, Mali and Mauritania have revealed their re-
pressive effects and have resulted in growing frustration which, in turn, may 
lead to resistance or disengagement among the excluded groups. Finally, a 
Western policy focusing solely on expanding government control into areas 
where distrust against the central state prevails, where internal conflicts may 
flare up again, where the ecological and economic vulnerability is high and, 
not least, oil resources were recently discovered22, is on the verge of promot-
ing unintended consequences. However, such a policy reflects the persistence 
of state-centred views in the North despite the operation of other modes of so-
cial control and governance in many postcolonial settings. 
With regard to epistemology and methodology, pioneering research aim-
ing at a full understanding of the ‘social life of the war on terror’ needs to fo-
cus on different levels: a thorough textual analysis helps to identify the ration-
alities of political actors and security professionals about the problematic of 
‘undergoverned’ spaces and populations; a study of knowledge production 
makes obvious the conditions of its translation and dissemination from the 
global into the local. Additionally, future research must examine the mecha-
nisms of appropriation of the discourse and its conversion into security prac-
tices in the region. Finally, an ethnographic analysis explores the reactions of 
the problematized groups to the exclusionary policies which deeply affect the 
social fabric. There is no doubt that hegemonic discourses and subsequent in-
terventions are to different extents translated, internalized or challenged on 
the ground. An interdisciplinary approach that combines a multi-sited ethno-
graphic with a political-sociological approach, sharing an interest in the 
analysis of the global topography of security (on a macro level), of the condi-
tions of knowledge production (on a medium level) and of the everyday secu-
rity practices and reactions to them (on a micro level) can yield a heuristic 
value in revealing the multifaceted apparatus of the ‘war on terror’. 
                                             
22  There are offshore fields in Mauritania and oil fields in the Tuareg areas in nor-
thern Mali and at the border to Niger. Additionally, neighbouring Nigeria is the 
5th biggest oil provider for the U.S. Africa will come up for 25 percent of the 
U.S. oil consumption within the next years. U.S. energy companies have in-
vested 45 billion $ in exploring oil fields, 50 billion $ are due to be invested 
(ICG 2005a: 26). The former acting assistant secretary of state for African Af-
fairs, Charles Snyder, said: ‘It used to be a kind of cruel joke twenty years ago 
when some of us tried to pretend Africa might rise to the level of a strategic in-
terest, but thanks to the oil deposits we’re finding every day in and near Africa, I 
can say with a straight face 30 percent of our oil will come from there, and I 




Abrahamsen, R. (2005): ‘Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and 
Fear’, Alternatives, 30(1): 55-80. 
Agnew, J. (1998): Geopolitics, London: Routledge. 
Agnew, J./Corbridge, S. (1995): Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and 
International Political Economy, London: Routledge. 
Allen, J. (2003): ‘Power’. In: J. Agnew/K. Mitchell/G. Ó Tuathail (eds), A
Companion to Political Geography, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 95-108. 
Amnesty International (2006): Unrestrained Powers. Torture by Algeria’s 
Military Security, AI index: MDE 28/004/2006. July 2006. 
Andrews, J.H. (2001): ‘Introduction: Meaning, Knowledge, and Power in the 
Map Philosophy of J.B. Harley’. In: J.B. Harley (ed.), The New Nature of 
Maps, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-32. 
Beall, J./Goodfellow, T./Putzel, J. (2006): ‘Introductory Article: on the Dis-
course of Terrorism, Security and Development’, Journal of International 
Development, 18(1): 51-67. 
Bigo, D. (2000): ‘When two Become one. Internal and External Securitisa-
tions in Europe’. In: M. Kelstrup/M. Williams (eds), International Rela-
tions Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security 
and Community, London: Routledge, pp. 171-204. 
–––– 2002. ‘Security and Immigration: towards a Critique of the Governmen-
tality of Unease’, Alternatives, 27 (Special Issue): 63-92. 
Bilgin, P./Morton, A.D. (2002): ‘Historicising Representations of ‘Failed 
States’: beyond the Cold War Annexation of the Social Sciences?’ Third
World Quarterly, 23(1): 55-80. 
–––– (2004): ‘From Rogue to Failed States? The Fallacy of Short-termism’, 
Politics, 24(3): 169-80. 
Buzan, B./de Wilde, J./Wæver, O. (1998): Security: a New Framework for 
Analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Campbell D. (1998): Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the 
Politics of Identity, revised edition, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Dalby, S./Ó Tuathail, G. (1998): ‘Introduction’ In: S. Dalby/G. Ó Tuthail
(eds), Rethinking Geopolitics, London, New York: Routledge, pp. 1-15. 
Dillon, M. (1996): Politics of Security: towards a Political Philosophy of 
Continental Thought, London: Routledge. 
Duffield, M. (2001): Global Governance and the New Wars, London: Zed 
Press.
Faath, S. (2005): ‘US-Engagement im Sahelraum: Terrorismusbekämpfung 
als Vorwand oder Notwendigkeit’, DOI Fokus, 18 January 2005 (Deut-
sches Orient-Institut Hamburg). 
156
THE DANGER OF ‘UNDERGOVERNED’ SPACES
Fearon, J.D./Laitin, D.D. (2004): ‘Neotrustreeship and the Problem of Weak 
States’, International Security, 28(4): 5-43. 
Foucault, M. (1980): Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writ-
ings 1972- 1977, ed. C. Gordon, Brighton: Harvester. 
–––– (2000): ‘The Subject and Power’. In: J.D. Faubion (ed.), Essential
Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Vol. 3: Power, London: Penguin, pp. 326-
48.
–––– (2006a): Sicherheit, Territorium, Bevölkerung. Geschichte der Gouver-
nementalität 1. Vorlesungen am Collège de France 1977-1978, Frank-
furt/Main: Suhrkamp.
–––– (2006b): Die Geburt der Biopolitik. Geschichte der Gouvernementalität 
2. Vorlesungen am Collège de France 1978-1979, Frankfurt/Main: Suhr-
kamp. 
Goldwyn, D. (2005): ‘Africa’s Petroleum Industry’, Paper presented at the 
Symposium Africa: Vital to U.S. Security? National Defense University, 
Washington, D.C., 15 November 2005. 
Gutelius, D. (2006): ‘War on Terror and Social Networks in Mali’, ISIM Re-
view, 17 (Spring 2006): 38-39. 
–––– (2007): ‘Islam in Northern Mali and the War on Terror’, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 25(1): 59-76. 
Harley, J.B. (2001a): ‘Maps, Knowledge, Power’. In: J.B. Harley (ed.), The
New Nature of Maps, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 51-
81.
–––– (2001b): ‘Deconstructing the Map’. In: J.B. Harley, (ed.), The New Na-
ture of Maps, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 149-68. 
Harvey, D. (1989): The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Ori-
gins of Cultural Change, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hönke, J. (2005): ‘Fragile Staatlichkeit und der Wandel der Afrikapolitik 
nach 1990’, University of Leipzig Papers on Africa. Politics and Econom-
ics Series, no 77.
Huysmans, J. (1998): ‘Revisiting Copenhagen or about the Creative Devel-
opment of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe’, European Journal of In-
ternational Relations, 4(4): 488-506. 
International Crisis Group (2005a): Terror in the Sahara – Fact or Fiction?
Africa Report 92, 31 March 2005. 
–––– (2005b): L’Islamisme dans l’Afrique du Nord IV: Contestation Islamiste 
en Mauritanie: Menace ou Bouc Emissaire? Rapport Moyenne-
Orient/Afrique du Nord Nr. 41, 11 May 2005. 
Jacoby, T. (2005): ‘Cultural Determinism, Western Hegemony and the Effi-




Jameson, F. (1984): ‘Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capital-
ism’, New Left Review, I(146), (July/August 1984): 53-92. 
Jourde, C. (2007): ‘Constructing Representations of the ‘Global War on Ter-
ror’ in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania’, Journal of Contemporary Af-
rican Studies, 25(1): 77-100. 
Keenan, J. (2004a): ‘Terror in the Sahara: the Implications of U.S. Imperial-
ism for North & West Africa’, Review of African Political Economy,
101(31): 475-96. 
–––– (2004b): ‘Political Destabilisation and Blowback in the Sahel’, Review 
of African Political Economy, 31(102): 691-98. 
–––– (2005): ‘Waging War on Terror: Implications of America’s ‘New Impe-
rialism’ for Saharan Peoples’, Journal of North African Studies, 10(3-4): 
619-47. 
–––– (2006): ‘Security and Insecurity in North Africa’, Review of African Po-
litical Economy, 33(108): 269-96. 
Klare, M./Volman, D. (2006): ‘America, China and the Scramble for Africa’s 
Oil’, Review of African Political Economy, 33(108): 297-309. 
Klingebiel, S. ed. (2006): New Interfaces between Security and Development,
Bonn: Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung. 
Klute, G./von Trotha, T. (2000): ‘Wege zum Frieden. Vom Kleinkrieg zum 
parastaatlichen Frieden im Norden von Mali’, Sociologus, 50(1): 1-36. 
Lefebvre, H. ([1974] 1991): The Production of Space, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Latham, R. (2001): ‘Identifying the Contours of Transboundary Political 
Life’. In: T. Callaghy/R. Kasimir/R. Latham (eds), Intervention and 
Transnationalism in Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
69-92. 
Lemke, T. (1997): Kritik der politischen Vernunft: Foucaults Analysen der 
modernen Gouvernementalität, Hamburg, Berlin: Argument. 
McSweeney, B. (1996): ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen 
School’, Review of International Studies, 22(1): 81-93. 
–––– (1998): ‘Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: a Response to Buzan 
and Wæver’, Review of International Studies, 24(1): 137-40. 
Neocleous, M. (2000): ‘Against Security’, Radical Philosophy, 100 
(March/April 2000): 7-15. 
–––– (2003): Imagining the State, Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Ó Tuathail, G. (1996): Critical Geopolitics, London: Routledge. 
–––– (1998): ‘Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination 
and beyond’. In: S. Dalby/G. Ó Tuathail (eds), Rethinking Geopolitics,
London, New York: Routledge, 16-38. 
Rose, N. (1999): Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rose, N./Miller, P. (1992): ‘Political Power beyond the State: Problema- 
158
THE DANGER OF ‘UNDERGOVERNED’ SPACES
tics of Government’, British Journal of Sociology, 43(2): 173-205. 
Sack, R.D. (1986): Human Territoriality: its Theory and History, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Soja, E. (1989): Postmodern Geographies. The Reassertation of Space in 
Critical Social Theory, London: Verso. 
Volman, D. (2006): U.S. Military Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa 2005-
2007, Washington, D.C. (Association of Concerned Africa Scholars) 
http://www.prairienet.org/acas/military/military06.html
(accessed November 2006). 
Off ic ia l  Documents,  Reports and Speeches 
American Forces Press Service (2006): Officials Weigh Need for Africa 
Command, 6 December 2006. Washington, D.C. http://www de-
fenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=2327 (accessed 7 February 
2007).
AusAID (Australian Agency for International Development) (2003): Counter-
terrorism and Australian Aid, Canberra. 
CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (2005): Canada’s In-
ternational Policy Statement: Development, Gatineau. 
Bush, George W. (2002): Speech Given at the U.S. Military Academy West 
Point. 1 June 2002. http://www.whitehouse/gov/news/releases//2002/06/
20020601-3.html (accessed July 2006). 
Council of the EU (2005): Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan to 
Combat Terrorism. Document 15704/05. December 2005. http://
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/strategies/fsj_terrorism_stra
tegies_counter_en.htm (accessed October 2006). 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004): Principles Governing Danish De-
velopment Assistance for the Fight against the New Terrorism.
http://www.um.dk/en/menu/DevelopmentPolicy/DanishDevelopmentPolic
y/FightagainsttheNewTerrorism/ (accessed January 2007). 
Department of Defense (2006): Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Wash-
ington, D.C. 
–––– (2007): News Briefing with Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecre-
tary of Defense for Policy and Army Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director, 
Joint Staff. Washington, D.C. 7 February 2007. http://www. 
defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3882 (accessed
7 February 2007). 
DFID (Department for International Development) (2005): Why We Need to 
Work More Effectively in Fragile States, London. 
159
JAN BACHMANN
Department of State and USAID (2003): Security, Democracy, Prospe-rity: 
Strategic Plan 2004-2009, Washington, D.C. 
–––– (2007): Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations 2008,
Washington, D.C. 
European Union (2003): A Secure Europe in a Better World. The European 
Security Strategy, Brussels. 
OECD/Development Assistance Committee (2003): A Development Co-
operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention. Key Entry Points for Action,
Paris.
Straw, J. (2002): ‘Failing and Failed States’, Speech Given at the University 
of Birmingham, 6 September 2002. 
USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) (2002): Foreign Aid in 
the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity,
Washington, D.C. 
–––– (2005): Fragile States Strategy, Washington, D.C. 
–––– (2006): Congressional Budget Justification 2007. West Africa Regional 
Program. http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj200/afr/
warp.html (accessed October 2006). 
White House (2002): The U.S. National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C. 
–––– (2003): The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, 
D.C.
Interviews 
Interview at the European Command Headquarters, Stuttgart, 25 August 
2005.
Media
Associated Press. Mauritania Debates Anti-Terror Campaign, 25 June 2005. 
––––. U.S. General: al-Qaida Eyeing Africa, 5 April 2004. 
BBC. Secret in the Sands, Broadcasted by BBC World Service on 8 August 
2005 (part one) and on 15 August 2005 (part two). 
IRIN. Mauritania: Junter Leader Vows to Fight Terrorism, Confirms Ties 
with Israel, 11 October 2005. 
–––– West Africa: Famine not Fanaticism Poses Greatest Terrorist Threat in 
Sahel, 14 October 2004. 
Le Monde diplomatiqe. El Para, the Maghreb’s bin Laden, February 2005. 
New York Times. Rumsfeld’s Algeria: Arms Sales and Closer Ties, 13 Febru-
ary 2006. 
160
THE DANGER OF ‘UNDERGOVERNED’ SPACES
New York Times. As Africans Join Iraqi Insurgency, U.S. Counters with Mili-
tary Training in their Lands, 10 June 2005. 
San Francisco Chronicle. U.S. Takes Terror Fight to ‘Africa’s Wild West’, 27 
December 2005. 
Stars and Stripes. Eucom Slated to Step up Role in Africa, European Edition, 
11 January 2004. 
Village Voice. Pursuing Terrorists in the Great Desert. The U.S. Military’s 
$500 Million Gamble to Prevent the Next Afghanistan, 31 January 2006.
Washington File (U.S. Department of State). US-African Partnership Helps 
Counter Terrorists in Sahel Region, 23 March 2004. 
Washington Post. Al-Qaeda’s Far-Reaching New Partner, 5 October 2006.
161





The aim of this paper is to analyse different aspects of the socio-legal trans-
formation which the integration of the Moroccan state into the international 
war on terror unleashed in the country after a period of intense exposure to 
transnational Islamic activism. It will be argued that this transformation 
opened up new vistas for actors with divergent interests, leading to a read-
justment of their agencies under the conditions of changed interdependencies 
that permeate through scales and frames. The interactions between global, na-
tional and local scales are approached here as scalar arrangements. These are 
socially constructed through political-legal interaction and are dependent on 
the socio-political and juridical agendas of those actors who are empowered 
by those arrangements.1 The focus on scalar arrangements draws attention to 
the dynamics in power relations between actors at different scales. 
Focusing on these scalar interdependencies, the state’s response to terror-
ism and Islamic activism in Morocco is analysed in conjunction with the reac-
tion of the rural population in southwestern Morocco both to activities of the 
prominent Islamic movement in this rural area, the Salafiyya, and to the ef-
fects of anti-terror legislation. The period of time to be examined in this re-
spect is that between the emergence of Islamic activism in one rural area in 
the southwest of Morocco in 1999 and the end of the year 2006. Turning 
                                             
1  Cf. Purcel/Brown (2005) for environmental issues and Tsing (2005) for an in-
tegration of the concept of scale in the anthropology of globalisation; cf. He-
rod/Wright (2002) for a wider theoretical frame. 
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points or key dates structuring this time frame are the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 in New York and of 16 May 2003 in Casablanca. The reac-
tions to these events on state level as well as in a remote rural area will be 
analysed as an interconnected and globally embedded process. While focusing 
on the consequences the adoption of an anti-terror legislation had at a local 
scale, these will not be considered as independent of particular social condi-
tions the preceding Salafi impact had created. 
The context of law and terror has found increasing resonance in recent 
times – with reference to a quite limited and upscale empirical basis, how-
ever.2 If one looks at the empirical lowlands where legal practice is generated, 
it becomes obvious, so my argument, that the intertwining of Islamic activism 
and anti-terror legislation triggers a series of interactions between locales, the 
state and a global environment. For this context, the analysis necessitates ref-
erence to rather different types of data. Sets of empirical data and information 
collected and extracted from oral transmissions in the form of hearsay, gossip, 
rumours and narratives, are included into the analysis just as are official 
statements and the reaction to Islamic activism in the public debate and the 
media in Morocco. Therefore, my argumentation is based on a balance be-
tween empirical facts and the analysis of oral transmissions. Using these dif-
ferent sources it becomes apparent that the concerns involved are divergent, 
but clearly interdependent. While at a national public level, security concerns 
and the defence of civil liberties against the range of options the new legisla-
tion provides state agents with are controversially debated, the local discourse 
is about social coherence and solidarity, targeting the problem of how to come 
to an arrangement with Islamic activists and whether to integrate them into or 
ostracize them from the local community. This reveals, firstly, that local co-
hesion is challenged by both the Salafiyya activities and the state intervention 
in local affairs. I will argue that in the resulting struggle, local people seem to 
be successful in restricting the external control over local affairs which both 
Islamic activism and anti-terror legislation have tried to exercise. This proc-
ess, the argument continues, led to an expanded local agency with regard to 
state officials without a weakening of the state. 
I will argue further that this process did not prevent an adaptation of the 
new legal tool in local repertoires of legal practice, a process which, in turn, 
cannot be seen independently of its being embedded in a wider context. So, 
the fact that local people make use of Moroccan anti-terror legislation for 
their own purposes implicitly keeps it operative and this way establishes new 
dimensions of interdependency throughout scales. The argument is subdi-
vided into four successive lines. Firstly, resolute state intervention in local af-
fairs with respect to the new anti-terror law reinforced the local people’s pol-
                                             
2  Cf. e.g. Dickinson (2005); Mazrui (2006). 
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icy of keeping away state agents from their local affairs. At the same time, the 
external threat enhanced the local process of reconstructing social cohesion 
and of reintegrating religiously deviant members of the community. Secondly, 
the continuing process of political liberalisation under the umbrella of the 
anti-terror law, combined with the new emphasis state authorities put on local 
tradition and values as remedies against Islamic activism, created a state of 
conflicting priorities. This incertitude paved the way for a strategic proceed-
ing of local actors and contributed to the successful local management of the 
process of local reconciliation. Thirdly, and parallel to that process, an alter-
native instrumentalisation of anti-terror legislation beyond the narrower local 
framework of the village by the same local actors who successfully thwarted 
the states’ application of the law in their villages took place. This was partly 
motivated by the possibility to take advantage of the new law by denouncing 
opponents to state agents in local conflicts. Reference to anti-terror laws was 
also employed against propagators of Salafi ideology without a local back-
ground because local people felt betrayed by the movement and unwillingly 
connected to the realm of terror after the bombing attack of Casablanca in 
2003. Beside this, new fields for local instrumentalisation opened up by a lo-
cal reading of state references to the law in different circumstances. Finally, 
the fourth line of the argument of scalar interdependencies in the dealings 
with anti-terror legislation refers to the government’s re-interpretation of local 
references to the law as evidence supporting the instrumentalisation of the law 
which state agents pursued at a transnational scale. 
In order to understand the way in which anti-terror legislation was wel-
comed in this rural area, I will start with a short overview over the previous 
development. In a next step, the issue of Islamic activism and anti-terror legis-
lation will be discussed in the context of the political processes in Morocco 
after the enthronement of King Mohammed VI in 1999. An analysis of state-
local interplay for the period after the implementation of the new legislation 
will follow. Two examples of a creative access to the new legal resource in 
multi-scale conflict constellations beyond the ‘terror and security’ scope will 
be the core of the analysis. 
In a conclusion, anti-terror legislation will be interpreted as a major incen-
tive for the reconfiguration of mutual scalar interdependencies. It contributed 
to an expanded local agency and the reconstruction of local identity, while at 
the same time offering actors on a local, national as well as on a transnational 
level a new instrument, the application of which for particular purposes, how-
ever, depends on the fine-tuning between actors at all scales. 
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Salaf i  Act iv ism in the Moroccan Souss 
The regional focus of this paper is the Souss plain with its adjacent mountain-
ous surroundings of the Atlas and Anti-Atlas in southwest Morocco. Data 
from different villages are included in this analysis.3 They stem from an envi-
ronment where Islam in all its local variations plays an essential role for local 
identity and belonging, the legal arena and the organisation of daily life. 
Islamic activists appeared in the rural Souss for the first time in 1999. In-
tervention in the Moroccan countryside started with the arrival of foreign non-
Moroccan missionaries from Middle Eastern countries, who founded a ma-
drasa (Islamic school) in a medium-sized town in the region.4 The first three 
missionaries to appear in one of the villages where research was done were 
Moroccans who had been educated in this same school. They stood out from 
the local population as they had beards and wore traditional clothes (gandura)
and traditional caps. Their beards in particular were seen to be distinctive, and 
for this reason they have been referred to as Shablhi (as-shab al-lihi), beard 
wearers. For the rural Souassa, the Salafi were an unknown movement which 
seemed not to be rooted in Moroccan Sufi Islam. 
Instead, the Salafiyya (from salaf, ancestor; companion of the Prophet 
Muhammad) maintains close ties with the Sa’udi ideology of Wahhabism. 
Nevertheless, the movement is part of the scene of Moroccan Islamism and 
maintains historical relations with the elites of Moroccan political and ortho-
dox Islam, ‘ulama’ and Islamic leaders inside and outside the inner circle of 
political power. The Salafiyya movement propagates ‘Islam as the solution’ 
(al-Islam huwa al-hall), the most widespread motto of Islamic activism, indi-
cating that the adjustment of all life spheres towards the Islamic agenda offers 
the only escape from current misery. Its supporters promote a return to the 
roots of legal Islam and demand the reorganisation of social life according to 
Islamic core principles. They declare that they are the ones to hold ultimate 
authority in the judiciary and demand official acknowledgement of the Han-
bali legal code by the state. Hanbali law is closely connected to Wahhabism, 
while Islamic law in Morocco follows the legal school of Malik. This claim 
implicitly challenges the Moroccan state, which also refers to official Islam as 
                                             
3  For reasons of deontology, no concrete localisation is included and the data used 
remain anonymous. Fieldwork on the Salafiyya was carried out for several 
weeks annually between 1999 and 2005. Since 2001, the fieldwork has been part 
of a project within the Legal Pluralism Project Group at the Max Planck Institute 
for Social Anthropology in Halle on ‘Sustainable Development and Exploitation 
of Natural Resources, Legal Pluralism and Trans-National Law in the “Argane-
raie” Biosphere Reserve’. 
4  Proper names and toponyms are reproduced in the commonly used spelling. 
Arabic terms are used in simplified spelling without diacritical marks. 
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a source of legitimation.5 The Salafi criticize practices of popular Islam. Ven-
eration of local saints (in the Salafi’s interpretation ‘polytheism’, shirk), pil-
grimages to the tombs of saints and moussems (mawasim), with its many pro-
fane concomitants, Sufi practices such as trance dancing, were particular tar-
gets of their polemics. They promote the conviction that social justice can be 
provided exclusively by the qur’an and the shari’a.6 At the same time, the 
Salafi condemn Western influence and warn against the destructive forces of 
transnational legal treaties and development cooperation.7 Law and order is 
the paramount topic of their conversation: not only hegemony within the so-
cial sphere, but absolute control over it, was the declared goal of their strat-
egy.8 In order to achieve this goal they did not shy away from activating local 
potential for violent action or to have recourse to violence if they felt it oppor-
tune. At the same time, an essential element of the Salafi’s self-image is their 
role as a religious movement which provides charity and social welfare. 
Mobil isat ion of  Adherents and the Setup of  a  Local  
Rural  Branch 
Beginning in August 1999, a new local branch of the organisation was built 
up in the region of research within a few months. The institutional infrastruc-
ture built up in the local communities was rather rudimental. Local groups 
were centred around a leading figure, called amir, and the internal structure 
was organized in accordance with a binding code of Salafi ideals (manhaj). In 
the course of time, however, the Salafi succeeded in attracting more and more 
local residents. A grass-roots network developed, connecting more than 20 
villages and providing basic goods and services for its members. In May 
2002, the Salafi had mobilized the majority in approximately half of the vil-
lages of the three rural districts in the focus area. Each local cell was also 
connected to a loose regional network and was under external control, as 
some adherents after their ‘re-conversion’. (‘External’ in this context means 
in contact with Moroccan and non-Moroccan urban-orthodox milieus.) Dur-
ing the first phase of the Salafi project, the foreign initiators of the new wave 
of Islamic activities seldom reached these remote areas. But later on, after the 
formation of local groups, itinerant preachers came and visited the new 
Islamist parishes regularly, in spite of their distant location. These preachers 
                                             
5  See Eickelman/Piscatory (1996). 
6  For a comparison with ‘classic’ Salafiyya objectives in Morocco, see the litera-
ture in Turner (2006a); Turner (forthcoming); Wiktorowicz (2006). 
7  See for literature Wiktorowicz (2004: 7 f.); Turner 2006b. 




interfered in the internal structure of the new cells and arranged duties. Some 
of them gave secret instructions and criticized Moroccan politics, complaining 
about state persecution and secular orientation. In each village of the rural dis-
trict in focus, at least one praying house (dar al-qur’an) was established. 
To discuss the manifold factors which thwarted or supported the mobilisa-
tion efforts of the Salafi would go beyond the scope of this text. In some vil-
lages, the missionaries were driven away because they so deliberately acted 
against local rules and behaviour patterns, in others they were not. In some 
cases missionaries failed to pass honesty tests villagers are used to carrying 
out with strangers. In other cases villagers had access to resources such as 
those made available by development agencies, and were therefore less sus-
ceptible to the mobilisation campaign. Furthermore, the Salafi’s incessant 
missionary work and claim to a radical change in public and private lifestyle 
went on to annoy many of those who were not attracted by Salafi ideology. 
Suspicious to all non-adherents remained the fact that the Salafi refused to 
disclose the provenance of the financial means they invested in their social 
welfare projects. In the following, only the aspects of the Salafi mobilisation 
success will be addressed which are of importance for the present line of ar-
gument. 
Some of the Souassa, people I have known for more than ten years, told 
me about their personal motivations for joining the movement. Their reasons 
were manifold, and not always free of contradiction. Descent ties and clan af-
filiation played a role. But this is not to say that Islamic activists have been 
particularly successful in recruiting new adherents along the lines of descent, 
although it is indeed quite often described in the relevant literature as one 
possible way of mobilizing people.9 In the Moroccan case, another important 
social strategy used by local actors becomes apparent. In economic affairs, 
descent groups do not act as coherent units. According to local ideals of risk 
minimisation through diversification, many families delegated one or several 
of their members to join this new and powerful Islamic group for tactical rea-
sons, in order to siphon off any newly available resources. Thus, a majority of 
particular descent groups in the movements’ local cells could exist only to the 
extent that this also reflected local kin structure. In sum, conscious mobilisa-
tion patterns, tactics and strategies of recruitment combined with particular 
local conditions and considerations, such as those of job- and risk-sharing in 
descent groups. In addition, the weekly remuneration of € 10 paid to most of 
the adherents might help in explaining the phenomenon of success – a consid-
erable amount of money for a pauperized rural population. Invitations to reli-
gious instruction in the evenings, coupled with copious dinners, also proved 
                                             
9  See for literature Singerman (1995 and 2004). 
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very successful. This suggested the prospect of long-lasting access to suffi-
cient food resources and raised new hopes for social security. 
Remarkably indifferent during this first phase of Salafi activism in the lo-
cal arena between May 1999 and May 2003 were the very different represen-
tatives of the state and the local power holders. Minor civil servants with a lo-
cal background constantly tried to attract the attention of higher authorities to 
the complaints of many local people about the inconveniences the Salafi in-
tervention brought about – without success. The provincial administration de-
clared they did not intervene in religious affairs. Members of the local rural 
elite who held positions as elected political representatives – even if sympa-
thizing with Salafi ideals – avoided to get in touch with the movements’ 
prominent figures and ostensibly ignored the ongoing development. A lot of 
rumours circulated among the villagers about the reasons of the political lead-
ers for their restraint. Common view was that they were waiting to see 
whether the Salafi would qualify as possible allies in the political arena, 
which was not clear at that time. For on the one hand it was clear that such a 
vivid Islamic activism in the rural world could not have escaped the attention 
of central authorities. State agents from national institutions, however, did not 
intervene. How was that to be accounted for? On the other hand, the Salafi 
heavily criticized state malpractice and corruption. Therefore it was not the 
right moment for local political opportunists to take up a position. The issue 
received a new impetus only after the implementation of anti-terror legisla-
tion, as we shall see. 
When discussing the reasons why the Salafi’s missionary work was so 
successful, one has to admit that fluctuation was quite considerable and that 
the ‘retention period’ for adherents was comparatively short. Membership did 
have a few drawbacks. The pious lifestyle, which was the prerequisite for the 
development of the new resource, has been described as ‘hard work’ for 
somebody who is actually not a fervent religious enthusiast. In this respect, 
the Salafiyya differs from those movements of political Islam today in which 
political activism outweighs the basic idea of a primordial piety to a certain 
extent or allows for compromises between lived religiousness and civic re-
sponsibility. Despite all displays of piety, however, the Salafi never managed 




The Nat ional  Pol i t ical  Atmosphere and Framework 
of  Is lamic Act iv ism 
The following paragraph deals with the political process which framed the 
development of the state’s attitude towards Islamic activities during the de-
picted course of events in the Souss. For a long time state agents, and also ex-
ternal experts, did not regard contemporary Islamic international terrorism as 
a real threat for the country. Morocco was considered to be comparatively 
stable, and the position of the King as the central political authority and the 
commander of the faithful (amir al-mu’minim) was seen as an assurance 
against a radicalisation of Islam in Morocco.10 The political process during 
which the attitude of the state administration towards Islamic activism notably 
changed can be divided into three distinguishable phases. Since much has 
been written on these developments during the past few years,11 only the most 
important characteristics will be summarized here with respect to their feed-
back in the rural area. These phases correspond with time-marking events 
which required state reaction. 
The first phase lasted from the death of King Hassan II and the enthrone-
ment of Mohammed VI in July 1999 to the date of the Islamist attacks against 
the USA on 11 September 2001. The second phase then covers the time from 
11 September 2001 to 16 May 2003, the date of the bombing attacks of Casa-
blanca. Around that time, anti-terror legislation was planned but not adopted. 
Finally, the last phase starting at that point in time might be called ‘the reign 
of the anti-terror law’. 
With Mohammed VI, the process of political liberalisation, which his late 
father had initiated, continued, even though not in the accelerated manner 
many had been expecting. The human rights movement, which had started to 
become increasingly effective in Morocco ever since the early 1990s, played 
an important role in this. The release of political prisoners, the return of po-
litical actors from exile, a coming to terms with state malpractice in the past 
were all put on the new agenda. The project of legal reform concerning gen-
der relations was pushed forward. Expectations of powerful, external transna-
tional actors may have contributed to these processes. 
Local Islamic movements also benefited from the political spirit of re-
newal that characterized the beginning of King Mohammed VI’s reign. It is 
noteworthy that at the same time the new wave of Salafi missionary activity 
started, or became obvious for the first time, in the rural Souss. Whether po-
litical adversaries hostile to the new King’s trajectory paved the way for them 
                                             
10  See e.g. Leveau (1976); Eickelman/Piscatori (1996); Ghazi (1997); Tozy (1999); 
Vermeren (2001). 
11  Ben Rochd (2002); El Wardi (2003); Yassine (2003); Chaarani (2004); Kalpaki-
an (2005); Zeghal (2005) with further literature. 
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is pure speculation, however based on the irrefutable presumption that with-
out state connivance their activities would have been impossible.12 Without 
further going into detail, the point is here that an increase of Islamic activism 
in various facets took place in Morocco at the beginning of the new millen-
nium. 
The first real shock wave in the country was triggered by the realisation 
that Moroccans were involved in the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in 
the USA – not only as marginal helpers but as important leading figures. As a 
reaction to that the implementation of new legislation against terror was 
launched.13 In fact, Morocco had already ratified the Arab Convention against 
terrorism in 1998, and in the following several international agreements as 
well.14 However, after the attacks of 9/11 the American government appealed 
to different states to join the U.S.-American fight against terrorism. So the 
Moroccan government signalized that it would be willing to adopt the U.S.-
American legislative blueprint in order to strengthen its juridical arsenal, but 
did not go any further. At that time, the public discourse in Morocco about the 
consequences the adoption of U.S. strategies might have for the political pro-
gress in the country was dominated by reservations among representatives of 
the institutions of civil society. A polemic arose, for instance, on a national 
level about the commemoration of the victims in New York and elsewhere. 
The Makhzen, the state apparatus, organized an official memorial service in 
the Cathedral of St. Pierre in the country’s capital of Rabat. Representatives 
of political Islam attended that ceremony, as well as representatives of all re-
ligious communities and political groups of Morocco, including the PJD 
(Party of Justice and Development; hizb al-‘adala wa-t’tanmia), the only po-
litical party with an Islamic background accepted by the government. The 
King, however, was not present. The message was clear: The Moroccan state 
does condemn all forms of terrorism, solidarity with the USA and religious 
tolerance were emphasized.15 However, the symbolic and meaningful act of 
commemoration in a church instead of a mosque provoked indignation in 
parts of the Muslim community. A fatwa of 16 ‘ulama’ was launched, de-
nouncing not the intention but the site of the event. The fact that the fatwa be-
came internationally known embarrassed the political scene in Morocco par-
ticularly because the official council of the ‘ulama’ in Morocco had been put 
under state control in the 1980s and the subscribers of the document escaped 
its authority. Part of the content of that document was the rejection of a ‘po-
litical interpretation’ of the terror events in the U.S. and of the extensive defi-
nition of irhab (terror) used by the USA. The fatwa contributed to the public 
                                             
12  Many voices were raised to that effect in the Moroccan press. 
13  Bendourou (2004) 
14  Benyahya 2003 (= REMALD 89, 2003); FIDH (2004). 
15  Zeghal (2002: 54 and 2005: 255 f.) 
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discourse on anti-terror legislation, and in this way also implicitly to the diffi-
dent proceeding of the state actors. Large parts of the Moroccan public inter-
preted the fact that many representatives of Islamic movements condemned 
the terrorist attack against the USA as a sort of compensation for cautious re-
actions of state officials. 
On 16 May 2003, five simultaneous attacks of suicide bombers on inter-
national and Jewish targets (the Jewish Community Center; the Farah Hotel; 
Casa Espana; Bouziatno Restaurant and the Jewish Cemetery) caused the 
death of 45 people, mostly Moroccans, including 12 of the terrorists. All of 
the latter were Moroccans. Three surviving kamikazes were arrested on the 
spot before they could contribute their share to the terrorist acts. The police 
immediately started investigations in the shantytown of Sidi Moumen in 
Casablanca, from where most of the perpetrators came. Also the surroundings 
of the transnationally active movement of Salafiyya Jihadiyya were targeted 
on suspicion of maintaining relations with al-qa’ida. Several religious experts 
whose sermons were evaluated as influential to the kamikaze as well as mem-
bers of the group as-sirat al-mustaqim (the straight path, a Salafiyya branch) 
were arrested, too, or if already arrested for other reasons, were treated as 
members of a supporting milieu or even network.16 The investigations were 
very soon extended to other Moroccan cities. Several networks of organized 
Islamist extremists were detected. The power of state reaction and the disclo-
sures in the media based on official declarations gave the impression of a 
huge terrorist conspiracy against the monarchy as the authority representing 
both the state and Moroccan Islam. The fact that bomb factories and paramili-
tary training camps were discovered seemed to confirm this suspicion and left 
no room for alternative interpretation. In short, after the bombing attacks of 
16 May 2003 in Casablanca, the spirit of renewal in Morocco made way for 
an uncertainty about the future, for fear and irritation. The attacks may be 
identified as the most memorable time marker in the collective memory of all 
Moroccans, apart from the achievement of independence in 1956. 
The Invent ion of  Ant i - terror  Law and the 
Continuat ion of  Pol i t ical  Reform in i ts  Shadow 
Under the depicted circumstances, anti-terror legislation, which had already 
been formulated after 11 September 2001, came into operation very quickly 
by way of neglecting or, better, surmounting all political obstacles or reserva-
tions. Between January and May 2003, a highly controversial debate had 
                                             
16  Lariège (2004) 
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blocked the political process of implementation.17 After the bombing attacks 
in Casablanca, however, the government immediately put the project back on 
the legislative agenda of the parliament, with slight modifications. On 28 
May, 2003, the new law became operative. It was not only implemented but 
consequently applied after this date. This was definitely not the right moment 
to oppose measures in favour of state security. A wave of solidarity against 
terrorism swept through the country, Moroccan artists even presented an op-
eretta against terrorism (la lil irhab) in Casablanca.18 Nevertheless it soon be-
came clear that the civil society beyond the Islamic milieu was developing 
reservations both against Islamic terror and the consequences of an absolute 
state.19 The reasons will become clear in a brief outline of the most important 
contents of the anti-terror legislation.20
First of all, the definition of terror (irhab), already criticized in the men-
tioned fatwa in 2001, is extensive enough to include all forms of disturbance 
of the public order, resulting in a perceptible restriction of the exercise of pub-
lic liberties.21 While most of the law’s substance conforms to the U.S. Ameri-
can template, a central point for the present line of argument needs to be men-
tioned: The notion of complicity and assistance, which may be any form of 
social interaction with an individual identified as a terrorist at a certain mo-
ment, paved the way for collective suspicions and served the supposition of 
supporting milieus. So, the simple analysis of individual behaviour may result 
in a deprivation of fundamental rights of the suspected. This open concept of 
terrorist acts is flanked by a concession of remarkably extensive room for ma-
noeuvre to state officials, like in other national versions of anti-terrorism leg-
islation all over the world, too.22
As a result, the Makhzen sent controversial signals. On the one hand, 
there was the implementation and strict application of anti-terror legislation 
which led to a restriction of public liberties. On the other hand, and parallel to 
that, the process of political reform continued under the umbrella of that law. 
The reform of the family law (mudawwana), for instance, which had long 
                                             
17  Bendourou (2004: 194) 
18  Saâïdi captions in Le Matin; 5 May 2004: ‘Composée par Said Limam et jouée 
le 12 mai au Rialto de Casablanca; une opérette pour dire “non au terrorisme” 
(http://www.lematin.ma/journal/printarticle.asp?id=33728) See also ‘L’opérette 
“non au terrorisme” en représentation mercredi à Casablanca: Quand sons de 
cloche et rythmes soufis traduisent la coexistence des religions’ (Le Matin, 8 
Mai 2004: http://www.lematin.ma/journal /printarticle.asp?id=33853). 
19  Rollinde (2004: 66) 
20  Benyahya (2003) (=REMALD 89, 2003); Bendourou (2004); FIDH (2004) 
21  On public liberties see REMALD 76, 2004. A whole catalogue of illegal eco-
nomic and financial activities has been included in the frame of terrorist acts as 
well. See Bendourou (2004: 191-96 f.). 
22  FIDH (2004) 
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been a controversial topic, passed the parliament in 2004 against resistance of 
important Islamic groups.23 In the political climate at that time of the immedi-
ate adoption of anti-terror law, Islamic movements experienced quite a re-
duced scope for action and agitation against the reformed family law. They 
choked back their polemics against gender equality and similar issues laid 
down in the new mudawwana in order to prevent state repression. 
A parallel development to the containment of Islamic activism is, above 
all, the reconciliation policy after the ‘Years of Lead’. A commission was 
formed which had to negotiate and regulate cases of past state injustice com-
mitted during the so-called Years of Lead between 1960 and 1999.24 King 
Mohammed VI had already charged the human rights association Conseil 
Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme (CCDH) with the organisation of a recon-
ciliation committee on the occasion of his investiture on 21 August 1999. But 
the King did not actually install the commission, called Instance pour l’équité 
et la reconciliation, until 7 November 2003.25 This was seen as a complainant 
gesture, advancing the integration of civil society into the war on terror. How-
ever, the simultaneity of the human rights discourse and the reconciliation 
policy with the proceedings against Islamic activists under the new anti-terror 
law became an acid test for the new liberalisation, and somewhat strange coa-
litions came to the fore. The left-wing oriented, critical press, which itself was 
put under pressure by anti-terror legislation,26 was anxious about the human 
rights standards for their worst enemies, Islamic radicals who were brought to 
trial. Human rights activists expressed their worries about the civic rights of 
imprisoned and accused suspects of terrorism in the press critical of the state, 
and advocated basic rights for them since human rights are indivisible. 
Furthermore, there was a public discussion about all kamikazes being vic-
tims of terrorist propaganda because they were uneducated people who grew 
up in the poorest social conditions. Measures of state intervention in the slums 
around the big cities were adopted, aiming at providing better living condi-
tions for the poorest and restricting urban migration at the same time.27 An-
                                             
23  Rollinde (2004: 61f.). For the development until 2002 see Buskens (2003). 
24  Instance pour l’Equité et la Réconciliation (IER). Rollinde (2004: 63-65). See: 
http://www.ier.ma
25  The matter cannot be discussed in detail at this point, particularly not the questi-
on of impunity of state perpetrators. My focus here is on the impact the human 
rights agencies had on the discourse of the anti-terror legislation with their deci-
sion to watch over the legitimate rights of accused Islamists. 
26  See e.g. Morocco Country Report on Human Rights Practices (2005): http:// 
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61695.htm
27  A press campaign under the motto ‘lutte contre le habitat insalubre’ was laun-
ched against the emergence of slums and a political milieu favouring the expan-
sion of slums. Cf. http://www.seh.gov.ma/Habitat%20Insalubre/charte%20nationale/
charte_nationale.htm 
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other anti-corruption campaign was initiated and welfare organisations were 
implemented in order to cope with the Islamic activists’ major points of criti-
cism: state corruption and the lack of public welfare. Concerning the legal 
sphere, in numerous articles as well as in a speech of the King in June 2003, 
the dominance of the Maliki madhad (school) was pointed out and a clear 
warning against all criticism of Malikiyya delivered. For local actors, most 
important for the strategies of containing the effects of anti-terror legislation 
in the rural zone was the fact that the King highlighted Moroccan culture and 
tradition as the best remedy against the virus of religious aberrance and terror-
ism.28 All these measures were to contribute to the drying out of the same al-
legedly supporting milieus the anti-terror legislation was targeting. 
Operat ive Ant i - terror  Law and the War on Terror ism 
at  the Nat ional  Scale and beyond 
Following the terror attack, Moroccan courts passed a series of prison sen-
tences. More than 1,500 individuals were suspected of having been involved 
in the attacks of May 16th or of other illegal activities with an Islamist or ter-
rorist background. In September 2003, a total of 906 suspected Islamic ex-
tremists had been adjudged in the wake of the bombings, but the Minister of 
Justice, Mohammed Bouzoubaa, warned that ‘the peril is still present’. Al-
most 50 life sentences and other heavy penalties ranging up to 30 years were 
handed down. As Amnesty International stated for several cases of detained 
Islamists, torture resurfaced under the umbrella of anti-terror legislation in 
Moroccan prisons. The association Human Rights Watch reported an increase 
of arrests for 2004.29 To this day, local cells of Islamic activists are constantly 
discovered all over the country which obviously pursued a violent agenda. In 
the course of police operations under the anti-terror law, an involvement of 
military and other state officials in Islamic activism has been revealed and 
shocked the population.30 The profound reshuffle in the security apparatus of 
the state in 2006 and the political deprivation of some of its leading figures, 
who had successfully accroached to themselves power as operators of anti-
                                             
28  An official political campaign by the government in support of local identity and 
culture was launched after the royal speech in July 2003: http://www.
mincom.gov.ma/french/generalites/samajeste/mohammedVI/discours/2003/
Discours%20du%20Trone%202003.htm
29  Human Rights Watch (2004). The report provoked vivid reactions in Morocco. 
See Brousky (2004) in Le Journal Hebdo N° 179 (23-29 October): ‘Le rapport 
explosive’.
30  The group ansar al-mahdi, dismantled end of July 2006, included members of 
the armed forces. See e.g. Chebatoris (2007). 
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terror law in Morocco, were interpreted in some media as the consequence of 
the superiors’ inability to stop the threat of terror.31
International cooperation in the war on terrorism also shapes the way of 
how different actors make use of the new legal instrument in Morocco. One 
year after the suicide bombings of Casablanca the devastating train bombings 
in Madrid in March 2004 made it clear that a Moroccan network, operating 
worldwide, was involved, and disagreement between Moroccan state officials 
and transnational investigators over its nature and origin became obvious.32
According to newspaper interviews, Moroccan state representatives such as 
General Hamidou La’anigri, then Chief of Security, complained about a rather 
unenthusiastic support by their European colleagues after the Casablanca at-
tacks and particularly expressed their frustration about European laws against 
terror being too lenient and not severe enough. The Moroccan investigators 
who arrested and accused [!] 2,112 suspects in the country on the basis of the 
new anti-terror law issued 44 international arrest warrants for suspected ter-
rorists. They also accused European countries of being slow or unwilling to 
extradite captured suspects. 
The need for international cooperation seems prevent the Moroccans’ 
European partners from commenting too explicitly on the respective different 
standards of civil rights resulting from anti-terror legislation. Hamidou 
La’anigri expressed his opinion with reference to his European counterparts: 
‘We are victims of laws and guarantees that protect the rights of individuals at 
the expense of cracking down against organized crimes.’33 In this context the 
Moroccan state adopted the position of its closest ally, the USA. Furthermore, 
La’anigri projected a version of anti-terror law which correlated to the states’ 
own operational imperatives. By making the transnational template applicable 
to Morocco, he also fed this version back into the transnational pool as bind-
ing and this way upscaled Morocco’s own version in an international context. 
In the unofficial public discourse, the dominant conviction was that the Mo-
roccan submission to transnational anti-terror laws was particularly inspired 
by foreign policy strategies aimed at integrating Moroccan attempts to fight 
terrorist violence into a wider frame. Concerning the importance of anti-terror 
law for the internal repertoire of means at the disposal of state functionaries, 
there was a certain congruence of opinions on the national and the local scale. 
                                             
31  Chadi and Jamai entitle an article in 2006 in Le Journal-Hebdo N° 238 (07-20 
January 2006): ‘Laânigri dans la ligne de mire?’; and Chadi et al. state in 2006 
in Le Journal-Hebdo N° 269 (16-22 September): ‘La purge?’. To comment on 
hints and rumours about career strategies, competitions over competences etc. 
within the state apparatus in connection with anti-terror legislation would lead to 
far in this context. 
32  There is scarcely any concrete information about these developments apart from 
newspaper reports, interviews, etc. See Sciolino (2004). 
33  Sciolino (2004) 
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It has been said that the Moroccan state does not actually depend on a new 
legislation in order to increase pressure on the terror scene; but that it rather 
uses the law to demonstrate its perfect conformity with transnational stan-
dards and its international acceptance. Moreover, international demands re-
quired a definite reaction, since Moroccan citizens were perceived as major 
actors in terrorist planning in various circumstances. Inversely, however, in 
the Moroccan context itself, no transnational reinsurance was felt to be neces-
sary in order to justify state action. 
Downscal ing Ant i - terror  Legislat ion:  Salaf i  and the 
State in the Rural  Souss and the Need to 
Reconstruct  Local  Cohesion 
Let us come back to the local fields of the Souss region, where the Salafiyya, 
the movement which is held co-responsible for the terrorist attacks of Casa-
blanca, became active in 1999. After 9/11, the ordinary local adherents clearly 
expressed their condemnation of these acts, whereas the point of view of the 
leading persons never became publicly known. Whatever their ideas at that 
time might have been, there was no official interest in them. The movement 
reached its peak between the two time-marking terror attacks, and no connec-
tion was established between Salafi activism and international terrorism. 
But before the legal impact of the anti-terror law on the rural periphery is 
exemplified in more detail, I will briefly outline the course of events after 
May 2003 with respect to state-local conjunctions. What bothered the Souassa 
was the question whether the rural area must be seen as a reservoir for the re-
cruitment of new terrorists. After the bombing attack, some previously unbe-
lievable rumours about the motives of the Salafiyya missionary activities in 
rural area proved to have a serious background. For instance, big amounts of 
old wine bottles had been bought up at very good prizes. Later, the police 
found several stocks of these bottles, transformed into bombs; the reason be-
ing that the glass of these old bottles is very suitable for bomb fabrication. 
The people who sold those bottles to Islamic activists without having any idea 
of the purpose were ready to take revenge for involuntarily getting involved in 
criminal acts. For the fact was fully recognized that this form of involvement 
could be interpreted as an active support of terrorism. The local activists 
claimed never to have had any information about these occurrences and asked 
for forgiveness. Suspicions started circulating. Furthermore, at least one of the 
Casablanca terrorists, Hasan Taoussi, 24 years old, had kin relations with 
Souassa, since his family, who live in the slums of Casablanca, is of Soussi 
origin. 20 years ago they came from the Atlas Mountains down to the plain. 
This news reached the rural zone in no time. It was, however, not interpreted 
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as an undeniable connection of the Souss with the international web of terror. 
Instead, many Souassa argued that ‘Casablanca’ made him a terrorist, under 
the influence of transnational Salafi. Nevertheless, the mere fact of this re-
mote connection increased the apprehension of being considered a ‘milieu’ by 
state agents and strengthened the feeling of betrayal by the Salafi. 
Anti - terror  Legislat ion,  State Intervent ion and the 
Need to Reconstruct  Local  Coherence 
The Salafi adherents in the Souss villages to whom I am referring in this pa-
per did not openly voice a legal or religious justification of the terrorist at-
tacks in 2003. And they never admitted it to be the declared aim of the Salafi 
project to integrate Morocco into a much broader context of Islamic activism. 
But internal tensions within the Salafi cells soon became obvious, and the 
deep ideological rift that opened between the recruited local members of the 
Salafiyya in the rural zones and the terrorist branch active in Casablanca 
could not be bridged afterwards. In the first months after Casablanca, even 
apart from, or more precisely prior to the impact of the resolute state reactions 
against Islamists in the region, most of the newly recruited adherents dis-
tanced themselves from the movement. Fear of state revenge may have played 
a role, but the feeling of having been deceived by the Salafiyya was predomi-
nant. An atmosphere of deprecation with regard to Salafi and all symbols of 
otherness was felt throughout the rural area. Against this background the new 
law against terrorism took effect. 
The police closed down all Salafi mosques and praying houses and ex-
erted strict control over their observable activities. Ubiquitous presence of se-
curity agents, police interventions and interrogations disturbed village life. 
One cause for consternation was, for instance, that the police started to control 
veiled women in order to check whether in fact it was a terrorist hidden be-
hind the veil. State security agents were said to be active everywhere, in the 
mosques, on the markets, etc., and to arrest people expressing opinions which 
were chargeable according to the new law. 
There were imprisonments, and families broke apart. Intra-familial con-
flicts resulted from a split of family members into Salafiyya adherents and 
followers of local Islam. Drunkards, hashish consumers, persons with a good 
local reputation and pious persons of all kinds of piety might live under the 
same roof. There were fathers who try to convert their sons and vice versa. As 
the incongruities pervaded nuclear families, there was also a – hypothetical – 
reference to the new legal tool in domestic affairs. A father might have said: 
‘I better inform the muqaddim (village mayor) about your clouded thoughts’, 
or, ‘you go on like this and the shurta (police) will come and arrest you.’ 
178
ISLAMIC ACTIVISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
The expansion of investigations to the assumed supporting scene, as pre-
traced in the anti-terror legislation, made the latter known to the overwhelm-
ing majority of the Souassa in a tangible form. Everybody who might possibly 
have been in touch with a terrorist was suspected of adhering to a vague sup-
porting milieu. Therefore, as all Salafi were regarded as possible terrorists by 
the police, the rest of the villagers also felt encumbered by the new law. Eve-
rybody was in danger of being suspected of collaboration simply because 
their neighbours or, for instance, the grocer around the corner were known as 
Salafi adherents. Such was the apprehension of the villagers, and state repre-
sentatives affirmed it very quickly through overzealous action. Youths, who 
full of mischief and just for fun claimed to be in touch with terrorists, were 
severely beaten by the police. The villagers interpreted state reaction to this 
kind of bad joke as over-exaggerated and inappropriate. 
After the majority of the former adherents of Salafi Islamic activism in the 
rural Souss had defected, it was decided in the informal village councils to 
cede the discreet elimination of still remaining non-Moroccan prayers in the 
region to the investigators who were sent out by the central political authori-
ties. Nevertheless, small groups of local Salafi adherents in the rural Souss 
still resisted, claiming both Souassa roots and free choice of orientation within 
the realm of Islam. They no longer received subsidies from outside and 
claimed to have no material interests. In the course of the following year they 
came to be perceived as part of local diversity, passing for one type of reli-
gious orientation within the local scope of the Islamic way of life. A process 
of careful differentiation between the ‘good’ Salafi and the ‘others’ started, 
and new criteria developed. Such criteria first and foremost include a local 
background; furthermore the suspension of all missionary activity and par-
ticularly the abandonment of any criticism of local religious and juridical 
practice. Salafi have to accept the local law, ‘urf. This includes, for instance, 
the acceptance of the role of the Aissaoua, the locally active Islamic Sufi con-
gregation, in conflict settlement. A ban of criticism of state institutions is not 
included in this catalogue of criteria. However, a certain tolerance level was 
conceded, which is comparable to that regarding drunkards or other trouble-
makers with a local rooting. This process may also be read as an indication of 
an internal framing dispute about to what extent demonstrations of otherness 
or a signalling of local rooting can be accepted. Informal village councils and 
state representatives with a local identity exerted extreme social control over 
the village Islamists. At least during the first month of ongoing social restruc-
turing, every single step of an Islamic activist would attract the attention of 
their neighbours. Incorrigible Salafi, who continued to annoy people in pub-
lic, were threatened with denouncing them to the police. Everybody in a vil-
lage was aware of the individual attitudes of each person and was averse to 
generalisations. The remaining Salafi activists seemed to experience a di-
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lemma situation and expressed their feelings in various and contradicting 
ways. On the one hand, they recognized the protection against state interven-
tion granted by their co-villagers and therefore accepted control. On the other 
hand, quarrels did, and still do, occur which must be taken seriously. The 
Salafi are incessantly testing the limits of the tolerance threshold, as these 
numerous quarrels and disputes show. 
In the course of this process of re-integration, the new, or increased, state 
interest in local affairs resulting from an extended power of intervention 
called anti-terror law, proved to be extremely uncomfortable. Pressure on vil-
lage life reached an extent that threatened the local reconciliation project. The 
villagers responded with protective measures. Since regular police controls of 
the village Salafi branch disturbed village life, the village council decided to 
suggest the Salafi should meet at night, outside of village boundaries and 
without attracting attention. Also, locally rooted minor civil servants contrib-
uted to the averting of danger and no longer reported local conflicts caused by 
the Salafiyya to higher authorities, despite still remaining tensions. Instead, 
the villagers now reported their problems with their incorrigible ‘village 
Islamists’, as phrased in talks with me, to the qa’id (chief administrative offi-
cer of a rural district). Other state agents, they felt, would only cause more 
problems than they were able to resolve. 
Furthermore, other simultaneous political signals seemed to mitigate the 
restrictive effects of applied anti-terror legislation. When the King character-
ized local Moroccan tradition and religiosity as the best protection against ter-
rorism and state officials had to go along with these directives, the local popu-
lation hastily attempted to profit from this political hint. The Souassa referred 
to traditional values, for instance, in order to defend their informal self-
autonomy in the maintenance of local order in the villages whenever the po-
lice or non-local state agents tried to intervene in local affairs without the vil-
lagers’ consent. Integrated into local strategy, the ‘culture argument’ offered 
by the King efficiently helped to keep at bay over-officious investigators in 
some of these cases. 
Another matter discussed intensively was the behaviour of the local po-
litical elites. After the sudden turn in policy and legislation with the introduc-
tion of the anti-terror law in 2003, the Souassa frequently asked why the pow-
erful local policy makers in the course of more than four years never did in-
tervene in order to defend the local way of life against religious fanatics. 
Their inactivity, however, did not provoke negative consequences or, in retro-
spect, the disapproval of the central authorities. On the contrary, their inactiv-
ity seemed to pay off. After their re-conversion, formerly fervent adherents of 
the movement as soon as in summer of 2003 started a political career with re-
gional or local cut under the umbrella of the political party of PJD. These 
‘former’ Salafi assisted in forming coalitions with local patrons, who stood 
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for elections representing different established political parties. This triggered 
sophisticated conspiracy theories which reflect the opinion local Souassa have 
in general on corrupt political elites. Speculations concerned national politics 
and beyond, suggesting a financial influence of certain central authorities and 
foreign power holders in favour of the Wahhabi model of Islam. While on the 
one hand, the anti-terror law threatened village communities for the alleged 
forming of supporting milieus and had to be domesticated in the struggle for a 
reconstruction of local identity, the rural political elite and the political estab-
lishment, on the other hand, remained unaffected by these developments. 
So at village level, the local people experienced the pressure of the state 
application of anti-terror legislation against activists and their ‘milieus’; at the 
same time, however, they referred to that same law in order to rid themselves 
of non-local Salafi and used it as a hypothetical means of disciplining the re-
maining activists. Only in this respect is it acceptable to speak of a local in-
strumentalisation of the new laws at that time. This means, to successfully re-
fer to anti-terror legislation in village affairs necessarily required keeping the 
gendarmes away from one’s home. The project of reconstructing social cohe-
sion had top priority, and reference to the new tool for denunciation was as-
sessed as to whether this contributed to the achievement of this goal or not. It 
is true that bearded men were attacked on local markets and the police were 
forced to intervene to protect them against public violence. It is also true that 
bearded men became victims of denunciations. However, informants did not 
ascribe these developments to a kind of local instrumentalisation of the law 
against terror. In fact, these events give evidence of people taking reservations 
against Islamic activists seriously. The mentioned denunciations were no at-
tempts to profit from them. 
While the effects of anti-terror legislation were ambivalent from a village 
perspective, as a means against external Islamic activists the new legislation 
was welcomed. In this context it became an instrument used by rural Souassa 
whenever their sensitive and ambivalent relationship with migrants of Soussi 
origin was affected by transnational Islamic activism. Some migrants had 
adopted a Salafi perspective in their respective host countries. Local Souassa 
voiced their concerns that while Salafi missionary activities in the region have 
been undermined by state intervention under the umbrella of anti-terror legis-
lation, MRE (Moroccans living in foreign countries, in France, Belgium and 
the Netherlands, but of Soussi origin) could contribute to a reinforcement of 
the Salafiyya movement in the region. This would be – at least in the Souss – 
a new phenomenon, since Souassa migrants who had embraced Islamic activ-
ism had not acted as supporters of the local scene during their peak time be-
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tween 2000 and 2003. But this might be a local particularity.34 In other re-
gions, MRE Salafi played an important role in the propagation of Islamic 
ideas in their respective places of origin.35 Therefore, temporarily returning 
migrants with a Salafi background became a particular target of local rejec-
tion in the Souss. But also in cases with different background, when underly-
ing tensions between MRE and local Souassa openly broke out, the latter 
sometimes availed themselves of anti-terror legislation. These tensions rever-
berate that on the one hand, the local villagers feel uneasy because they de-
pend on the investments of their MRE, but complain about the arrogant man-
ner of some of them on the other hand. In summer 2004, for instance, MRE 
with beards were attacked when shopping at the market in Taroudant. The 
makhzenni (auxiliary police) were forced to intervene and brought the liti-
gants before the qa’id. The latter felt uncomfortable with the situation, being 
confronted with a Shablhi of Moroccan origin with his French spouse claim-
ing protection against insults of local attackers who in turn wanted to see their 
victims imprisoned with reference to the ‘new law which allows to eliminate 
all of them’. This was the local reading of the law. In this case, however, an 
ordinary market dispute over quality and prices of goods seemed to be the 
true reason for the accusation. The state representative realized quite clearly 
that frequently, accusations of Islamic activism served the manipulation of lo-
cal conflicts. Indeed, not only MRE, whether with or without a Salafi back-
ground, were accused on the basis of that law. Also local problems which 
must be reported to the qa’id, such as offending somebody’s sense of honour 
by winking at a married woman in public, seemed to be manipulated. Some-
times, offended male relatives of such women tried to turn these events into 
cases of an Islamist background. 
The particular given constellation described in this paragraph was also put 
in a wider context. One apprehension often voiced in the villages was that the 
rural population had to pay the bill for the pressure powerful global actors and 
the elite of the Makhzen exerted on state agents to produce quick results in the 
war on terrorism. Many Souassa, however, supported the view that the state 
reaction would have been similar without any legal reform. People insisted on 
                                             
34  Cf. Singerman (2004: 157 f.). There was the persistent rumor that the Moroccan 
state did not allow the Salafiyya to interfere with the ties between Morocco and 
its migrant communities. Particularly the Salafi cash flow was to run exclusively 
from Saudi-Arabia to the Moroccan countryside. The investments of the MRE in 
rural Morocco, in turn, on which many communities depend, was not to be af-
fected by Salafi interventions in Europe diverting the money into the transnatio-
nal Salafi pool or to be detracted from the usual fields of investment. Recent re-
ports in the media hawk the opinion that political tendencies towards an exclusi-
on of MRE from the national elections in 2007 have to do with an assumed high 
proportion of voters for the Islamic PJD among them. 
35  Cf. Roy (2004). 
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the fact that it was the locals themselves who succeeded in restricting Salafi-
yya influence, instead of the state, which in their eyes failed to contribute its 
share to this enterprise. Thus, the rural zone was not seen as being dependant 
on state support in managing local problems. On the contrary, the very lack of 
state intervention in the early stage of the Islamist appearance on the rural 
scene was interpreted as a deliberate strategy in order not to irritate Saudi 
Arabian investors, who have a bad reputation in the rural Souss. When later 
the police suddenly took previously dismissed complaints against Islamic ac-
tivists seriously, this was said to be enforced by command of high state au-
thorities ‘in order to please the Americans’. 
Anti - terror  Law in Many Fields 
A transnationalized U.S. American legal template not only becomes localized 
through the bottleneck of state implementation and interpretation and local 
adaptation. Its application at national and local scale by state agents is not in-
dependent of its transnational dimension. The rural Souassa, in turn, inter-
preted references to anti-terror legislation by Moroccan state agents for a 
transnational context as master models for a possible use of the legal tool for 
their own local circumstances. Local actors picked up hints and referred to 
anti-terror legislation in contexts that seem to show analogies or even connec-
tions to the transnational contexts in which state actors had mentioned anti-
terror measures. The state, then, at transnational scale, interprets this local in-
strumentalisation of anti-terror legislation as a justified field of application, 
like the empirical cases evidence. 
So after the experiences with anti-terror legislation at village level, the 
scope was broadened for further alternative fields of application. Like terror-
ism, these fields of conflict do not only have a transnational dimension, but 
also national and local ones. Two examples will briefly be outlined, showing 
how the anti-terror law could be useful in a wider context for both the state 
and ordinary local people and could serve the production of realities and cer-
tainties. One example is the linkage of the Western Sahara problem with the 
competition between Souassa and Sahraoui over access to scarce resources, 
the other the association of everyday disputes in the village with the transna-
tional fight against internationally organized drug crime. 
The first mentioned national-local field of tensions that has been affected 
by anti-terror legislation is caused by the exceptional position Sahraoui people 
originating from the Western Sahara enjoy in the whole country. This in-
cludes a relative freedom of action as well as a certain immunity, and at the 
same time material support and further privileges granted by state institutions. 
This is no official state policy, but a widespread and not officially formulated 
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opinion in Morocco. Sahraoui rarely appear in court, even when involved in 
criminal cases, and if they have to, they may expect being released very soon 
because of this political protection. This supported a certain specialisation in 
activities such as smuggling or human trafficking, which can perfectly be pur-
sued under the cover of state privileges for Sahraoui nomadic economy.36 The 
reasons behind these politics are the state’s attempts to integrate the popula-
tion of the Western Sahara into Moroccan society and to distance them from 
the independence movement of the Polisario. The Sahraoui contrive to main-
tain their privileges and proximity to the sphere of the state, while simultane-
ously threatening with separation and their capacity to organize uprisings 
through maintaining a state of latent tensions in their homelands. So, despite 
all privileges, the Sahraoui are being kept under extreme state control. 
Now, some Sahraoui are attracted by the Salafiyya.37 State officials some-
how seem helpless, and they did not dare arrest the leaders of the Sahraoui 
branch of Salafi adherents. As a consequence, a strategy was forged within 
the Makhzen apparatus to accuse the Polisario, the political and military arch-
enemy in the competition over the southern provinces, of fostering Islamist 
tendencies in an attempt to destabilize Morocco. It is not impossible that 
communication between violent Islamists and the Polisario indeed took place. 
But apart from an Islamic background, even Sahraoui representatives of civil 
society associations, such as human rights activists suspected of secretly ad-
vocating endeavours of independence of the Western Sahara, were arrested 
under anti-terror law. They were accused of disturbing public order in Mo-
rocco and of touching on the territorial integrity of the country.38
                                             
36  See San Martin (2005). Human trafficking by the Sahraoui became a delicate is-
sue in the context of the accelerated migration of Sub-Saharians through Moroc-
co to Europe via the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Mellia recently. Moroccan sta-
te officials hastened to accuse the Polisario of trafficking Sub-saharians via Al-
geria to Morocco and to combine this accusation with allusions to the separa-
tists’ closeness to the terror scene. This strategy fits perfectly with the U.S.-
American perception of the Sahel zone as an area of concentration and withdra-
wal for transnational terrorism. Simultaneously, the human traffic the ‘Moroc-
can Sahraoui’ had organized, or better to say, their part of the business, has been 
reduced. Since then the migration flow increasingly shifted to the route from the 
West African coast to the Canary Islands. Latest voice in the press: Cherkaoui 
(2006).
37  Nevertheless, one has to point out that the specific versions of religiosity and 
spirituality which the Sahraoui are proud of are not actually compatible with Sa-
lafiyya ideals. Sahraoui nomads are used to drinking blood and to eating impure 
food such as lizards or turtles and habitually infringe upon nearly all of the rules 
the Islamic activists held essential. However, this does not inhibit tactical allian-
ces.
38  Amnesty International Annual Report (2003) 
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The anti-terror legislation could also be instrumentalized against internal 
enemies. This news attracted considerable attention at the local level and was 
immediately downscaled. The reason is that throughout the Souss, there are 
lines of conflict between Sahraoui nomads and local farmers competing for 
access to scarce natural resources.39 Superficially the potential for conflict can 
be reduced to this dichotomy. Behind it, however, there are economic inter-
ests of powerful political circles within the Makhzen. The local discourse now 
is on the question of whether one might accuse the Sahraoui nomads of being 
terrorists in order to drive them away. It is uncertain, however, how severely 
the state will restrict the Sahraoui scope of activity by applying anti-terror 
law. But how can the anti-terror legislation be activated against the Sahraoui 
without provoking an uprising? Locally this was considered a problem of 
dosage. Exaggerations and actions against Sahraoui as a collective were to be 
avoided. So, first anonymous denunciations of Sahraoui nomads did not refer 
to their illegal pasture activities. Instead, the first good opportunity was to be 
seized to force the police to take action against them. When the locals realized 
that some sub-Saharian refugees were hidden in lorries designated for camel 
transports, they immediately called the police, claiming that Sahraoui were 
helping terrorists to infiltrate the countryside. The police made an inquiry and 
found the refugees. On account of the anti-terror legislation the policemen re-
fused the usual bribe and started an official investigation; the nomads were 
forced to withdraw from the spot and remain in custody of the state. The re-
sult in the long run was that there were no grounds for terror suspicion, and 
everything was swept under the rug as usual. The nomads, however, started to 
avoid the region where they had been denounced, and the locals celebrated 
their success. As a means in particular locally restricted conflicts, anti-terror 
legislation was found to be very helpful, and in this respect was welcomed by 
the Souassa on the local scene as an effective way to defeat an extremely 
powerful antagonist in the competition for access to scarce natural resources. 
Furthermore it is an option for state agents, who on the basis of local suspi-
cions about a Sahraoui entanglement in the terror scene might instrumentalize 
internal power struggles between the backers of camel trading and their ad-
versaries within the Makhzen for their own purposes.40
On an international level, anti-terror legislation and the Moroccan en-
gagement in the war on terrorism provided Moroccan state officials with 
strong arguments against the Polisario. With allusion to local denunciations of 
Sahraoui, subtly encouraged by the state itself, state functionaries accused the 
Polisario of being part of an Islamist network reaching from Algeria to the 
Sahel zone and being involved in human trafficking of sub-Saharan migrants. 
                                             
39  See Turner (2007). 
40  See Turner (2007). 
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These arguments might be of use if the United Nations should at some point 
refuse to make more concessions in the conflict, if U.S. support on the inter-
national scene seems necessary, or if a counterweight against an Algerian-
U.S.-American construction of alliance in fight of the ‘hotbed of terrorism’ in 
the Sahel zone is needed.41
The other example of how anti-terror legislation can be instrumentalized 
individually also reveals a subtle local adaptability and a keen sense of inter-
pretation of political signals. After the uncovering of two huge drug dealing 
organisations in northern Morocco, the police and the state security realized 
that these groups had massively infiltrated state authorities. Now, the in-
volvement of state agents in the hashish trade is quite common in Morocco, to 
say nothing of the political elite. But these syndicates were bristling with 
high-tech weapons and disposed of huge sums of money. State officials dis-
persed the information that the syndicates had connections with the interna-
tional terror scene. Obviously the claim was not completely unfounded. The 
police in fact does not very eagerly prosecute big drug delinquency because of 
its close connection to political circles. On the other hand, there is an ex-
tremely high international pressure on the Moroccan state to restrain drug 
traffic. Both rumours and official statements in the media agreed on the point 
that the state referred to anti-terror legislation because of the fear that terror-
ists might get hold of weapons like armed speedboats.42 Others said this was 
just a gesture of appeasement towards the impatient international drug inves-
tigators.
Nevertheless, the connection was established and ready to use for local 
application. This happened for instance in a quaint drama in a remote village. 
A local drug baron, who had been covered by the police, was involved in a 
simple car crash. He and his partner collided with the car of a small farmer. 
They completely lost their temper and tried to kill the poor man, who man-
aged to escape. In a fit of rage, the two drug dealers burned down both cars 
and took up pursuit of the farmer. The latter, however, made it to the provin-
cial city and informed the provincial police that a drug dealer of his village, 
who was the main financer of the local branch of Islamist activists, was pursu-
ing him because of a car accident. It was obvious that the local gendarmes 
would never have intervened. But the state police alerted the state security, 
and an incredible raid took place – with explicit reference to anti-terror law. 
The dealer was arrested and was ‘treated like a terrorist’ as locals said. This is 
                                             
41  Cf. Keenan (2005). For details on the Western Sahara conflict see e.g. Shelley 
(2004); San Martin (2005). 
42  Bertelsmann Transformation Index Morocco (2006: 4); the latest debate was on 
involvement of the Islamist cell ansar al mahdi in drug business; see Jaabouk 
(2006).
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to say that the arrested was beaten up severely by the police to force a confes-
sion from him, and then transferred to one of the high-security prisons far 
away from the scene of the crime. 
To the international public, the police intervention could be presented as 
evidence that the Moroccan state took indications of a connection between 
drug crime and terrorism seriously, due to its widely known commitment to 
the war on terrorism. Furthermore, it could be emphasized how severe the 
state reacts to drug crimes in general. This would also invalidate reproaches 
of international drug investigators of the Moroccan state being too negligent 
of its persecution of drug crimes. 
Conclusion
This paper shows how a legal template claiming transnational compliance 
permeated a rural environment and interlinked all scales it passed through. 
With the Salafiyya intervention, the local arena had become directly con-
nected with a transnational Islamic network and indirectly with terrorism, the 
latter at first without the knowledge of local actors. The successful mobilisa-
tion campaign of Islamic activists and the invention of anti-terror legislation 
upscaled local affairs to the global war on terror. Anti-terror legislation, im-
plemented in order to cope with terrorism and to contain Islamic activism, de-
veloped a social life of its own and was transformed and customized when 
again downscaled according to divergent interests and circumstances. In the 
fields of local application it was destined for, it was rather perceived as an ob-
stacle than an appropriate tool. State application of the law hindered the local 
process of reconstruction of local cohesion and had nothing to do with the 
causes of terrorism. Drawing on the parallel discourse on tradition and local 
values, the rural Souassa were successful, however, in preventing the new leg-
islation from perpetuating intensified state control in the villages. At the same 
time the law offered the villagers a reference for disciplining local Salafi and 
keeping external ones away. In this respect the state increased its inability or 
disinterest to cope with local differentiation. 
Local actors interpret state reference to the law at the national scale both 
as an attempt to reach results on a transnational scale which the state would 
otherwise hardly be successful in, and as a signal for overlapping fields of in-
terest in which the new law can be of use both for members of the state appa-
ratus and local groups of actors. The local feedback implicitly confirms the 
Moroccan version of anti-terror legislation and produces facts that may be 
used as arguments for state policy. In fact, local people did realize that their 
instrumentalisation of anti-terror legislation in many fields was not independ-
ent of implicit political fine-tuning with state agencies, and that their action 
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would also have repercussions on government strategies. In both cases pre-
sented in the paper at hand, state agents took up local references to anti-terror 
legislation as evidence for existing connections between terrorism and other 
fields of social, political and legal problems. However, it was the state itself 
which had brought into play and spread these alleged connections in the first 
place. This evidence was useful for the argumentation of Moroccan state rep-
resentatives at the transnational level of international drug crime or the West-
ern Sahara problem. 
Further to that, the following results may be summarized: National im-
plementation of a transnational legal template empowered the local arena 
without weakening the state. But within both the Makhzen and the local 
arena, there were winners and losers of the development. As far as the 
Makhzen is concerned at a national scale, particularly members of the security 
apparatus successfully distinguished themselves through strict application of 
the law and this way accumulated power. At a local scale, civil servants suc-
ceeded by a selective application. Among local actors, particularly local non-
Salafi widened their scope of action, while Islamic activists, but also members 
of the rural elite, unmasked as opportunists, had to face reduced agency. New 
fields of application beyond the designated frame of the global war on terror 
opened up by overlapping and dovetailed an interdependent course of action 
for both state representatives and local people. Local reference to the anti-
terror law supported the state in the construction of an external terrorist threat 
to the country. Irrespective of the transnational consequences of this devel-
opment, these scalar arrangements weaken and even absorb strategies for an 
intensification of state control under the analysed circumstances but in so do-
ing at the same time acknowledge the state. 
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